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Foreword 
This is one of the studies on the economic and social modern­
ization of Korea undertaken jointly by the Harvard Institute 
for International Development and the Korea Development 
Institute. The undertaking has twin objectives; to examine the 
elements underlying the remarkable growth of the Korean 
economy and the distribution of the fiuits of that growth, 
together with the associated changes in society and government; 
and to evaluate the importance of foreign economic assistance, 
particularly American assistance, in promoting these changes. 
The rapid rate of growth of the Korean economy, matched in 
the less developed world (apart from the oil exporters) only by 
similar rates of growth in the neighboring East Asian economies 
of Taiwan, Hongkong, and Singapore, has not escaped the 
notice of economists and other observers. Indeed there has been 
fairly extensive analysis of the Korean case. This analysis, has 
V 
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been mainly limited to macroeconomic phenomena; to the be­
havior of monetary, fiscal, and foreign-exchange magnitudes 
and to the underlying policies affecting these magnitudes. But 
there are elements other than thcsc that need to be taken into 
account to crDlain what has happened. The development of 
Korean entrepreneuiship has been remarkable; Korea has an 
industrious and disciplined labor force; the contribution of 
agricultural development both to overall growth and to the dis­
tribution of income requires assessment: the level of literacy 
and the expansion of secondary ,nd higher education have 
made their mark; and the combination and interdependence of 
government and private initiative av'd administration have been 
remarkably productive. These aspects together with die growth 
of urban areas, changes in the mortality and fertility of the 
population and in public health, are the primary objects of 
study. It is hoped thi'c they will provide the building blocks 
from which an overa'l assessment of modernization in Korea 
can be constructed. 
Economic assistance from tile United States and, to a lesser 
exient, from other countries, has made a sizable but as yet un­
evaluated contribution to Korean developmnent. A desire to have 
an assessment undertaken of this contribution, with whatever 
successes or failure.s have accompanied the U.S. involvemelnt, 
was one of the miotivcs for these studies, which have been fi­
nanced in part by the U.S. Agency for Intrnational Develop­
mnent and, in part, by the Korea Development Institute. From 
1945 to date, U.S. AID has contributed more than $6 billion to 
the Korean economy. There has also been a substantial fallout 
from the $7 billion of U.S. military assistance. Most of tile 
economic assistance was contributed during tIle period before 
1965, and most of it was in the form of grants. In later years 
the amount of economic assistance has declined rapidly and 
most of it, though concessional, has been in the form of loans. 
Currently, except for a mnor trickle, U.S. economic assistaice 
has ceased. The period of rapid economic growth in Korea has 
been since 1963, and ini Korea, as well is in other countries 
receiving foreign assistance, it is a commonplace that it is the 
receiving country that is overwhelmingly responsible for what 
vi 
Foreword 
growth, or absence of growth, takes place. Nevertheless, eco­
nomic assistance to Korea was exceptionally large, and what­
ever contribution was in fact made by outsiders needs to be 
assessed. One of the studies, The Developmental Role of the 
Foreign Sector and Aid, deals with foreign assistance in macro­
economic terms. The contribution of economic assistance to 
particular sectors is considered in the other studies. 
All the studies in this series have involved American and 
Korean collaboration. For some studies the collaboration has 
been close; for others less so. All the American participants have 
spent sonic time in Korea in the course of their research, and a 
number of Korean participants have visited tile United States. 
Only a few of the American participants have been able to read 
and speak Korean and, in consequence, tile collaboration of their 
colleagues in making Korean materials available has been invalu­
able. This has truly been a joint enterprise. 
The printed volumes in this series will include studies on the 
growth and structural transformation of the Korean economy, 
the foreign sector aid aid, urbanization, rural development, the 
role of entrepreneurship, population policy and demographic 
transition, and education. Studies focusing on se eral other 
topics-the financial system, the fiscal system, labor economics 
and industrial relations, health and social development-will 
eventually be available either in priiited or mimeographed 
form. The project will culminate in a final sum:,ary volume on 
the economic and social dcvelopment of Korea. 
Edward S. Mason 
Harvard Institute 
for International Development 
M444r/C4 
Mahn Je Kim 
President, 
Korea Development Institute 
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A Note on Romanization 
In romanizing Korean, we have used the McCune-Reischauer 
system and have generally followed the stylistic guidelines set 
forth by the Library of Congress. In romanizing the names of 
Koreans in the McCune-Reischauer systems, we have put a hy­
phen between the two personal names, the second of which 
has not been capitalized. For the names of historical or political 
figures, well-known place names, and the trade names of com­
panies, we have tried to follow the most widely used romaniza­
tion. For works written in Korean, the author's name appears 
in McCune-Reischauer romanization, sometimes followed by 
the author's preferred romanization if he or she has published in 
English. For works by Korean authors in English, the author's 
name is written as it appears in the original publication, some­
times followed by the author's name in McCune-Reischauer 
romanization, especially if the author has published in Korean 
also. In ordering the elements of persons' names, we have 
adopted a Western sequence-family name first in all alphabet­
ized lists, but last elsewhere. This is a sequence used by some, 
but by no means all, Koreans who write in English. To avoid 
confusion, however, we have imposed an arbitrary consistency 
upon varying practices. Two notable exceptions occur in refer­
ences to President Park Chung Hee, and Chang Myon, for whom 
the use of the family name first seems to be established by cus­
tom and preference. Commonly recurring Korean words such as 
si (city) have not been italicized. Korean words in the plural are 
not followed by the letter "s." Finally, complete information 
on authors' names or companies' trade names was not always 
available; in these cases we have simply tried to be as accurate 
as possible. 
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Preface 
This study is part of the Harvard-Korea Development Institute 
proj-ct, on the 30-Year Modernization of Korea. When David 
Cole and Edward Mason approached me to undertake the 
"Trade and Aid" study, my curiosity about the role of trade 
and aid in Korea overcame my reluctance to cover ground much 
of which had already been explored. For anyone interested in 
the general topics of international trade and economic develop­
ment, the South Korean experience is of enormous interest. In 
a world where developing country after developing country had 
adopted import substitution and exchange control, with the 
"foreign trade bottleneck" perceived as the main determinant 
of the growth rate, South Korea's experience has been excep­
tional. To be sure, Singapore and Hong Kong have relied upon 
exporting, but it can be argued-not necessarily with justifica­
tion-that their lack of rural sector makes their experience 
xxi 
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"different." Taiwan's experience is more similar, but political 
problems, her considerably smaller size, and the fact that 
growth has been somewhat less spectacular all make the Korean 
experience se'.m the more fascinating. Moreover, Korea's re­
source base is deplorably poor, and I can recall, from graduate 
school days, the apparent hopelessness of Korea's development 
prospects. To try to learn more firsthand about the role of 
trade and aid in that transformation was too attractive a pros­
pect to pass up. 
Reluctance stemmed from the availability of a number of 
good studies about Korea's trade. Two in particular cover 
Korea's trade experience well. The first is by Charles R. Frank, 
Jr., Kwang Suk Kim, and Larry E. Westphal," who were my 
colleagues in the National Bureau of Economic Research project. 
The second is by Kim and Westphal.' For many aspects of 
Korea's trade and development, those works are definitive, and 
I have relied heavily upon them. Their influence should be evi­
dent throughout this study. 
I finally decided to undertake the project when I learned that 
I would be able to collaborate with Wontack Hong and Suk 
Tai Suh in carrying out the research for the proj,.'ct. They have 
been invaluable collaborators, not only in undertaking com­
panion research papers,3 but also in pointing out best data 
sources, answering numerous questions, and discussing many 
aspects of Korea's dev lopment. They also read the manuscript 
and made numerous comments v.hich have improved both 
accuracy and content. 
I am also indebted to Edward S. Mason and Kwang Suk 
Kim, who commented upon the entiie manuscript. Kwang 
Suk Kim was an invaluable source of information at all stages 
of the research. Larry E. Westphal read the penultimate draft of 
the manuscript and made many valuable comments and sug­
gesticns. 
Perhaps the greatest debt, however, is to Mahn Je Kim. He 
extended KDi facilities, including the time of Drs. Hong and 
Suh for the research, and also was instrumental in enabling me 
xxii 
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to interview a ntmber of prominent Korean businessmen and 
government officials. Their patience and courtesy in discussing 
Korea's modernization are greatly . ppreciated. 
The project was financed by HIID as part of tile Korean 
modernization study. Edward S. Mason provided intellectual 
leadership. I am indebted to him and to David Cole for both 
financial support and valuable insights into the Korean econ­
omy. 
Pat Kaluza, Carol. Such, Linda Lee, and Judy Boher typed 
the manuscript in original and revised forms. My thanks to them 
for their cheerfulness, even when confronted with marked-up, 
undecipherable pages. 
Anne 0. Krueger 
June 1978 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 
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Introduction 
Among the many transformations that have accompanied 
Korea's modernization, perhaps none has been more startling 
than the shift in the role of trade and aid. As late as the end of 
the 1950s, Korea was a developing country with many of the 
"typical" problems. The development effort was geared at 
import substitution: a chronically overvalued exchange rate was 
maintained through quantitative restrictions upon imports, 
multiple exchange rates, and related measures. Imports were 
financed chiefly by aid, as exports-which were predominantly 
primary commodities-had failed to grow significandy and were 
under S30 million. By the mid-1 970s, the role of trade and aid 
in Korea was entirely transformed: exports constituted one of 
the chief "engines of growth" of the economy; export earnings 
had increased at an aierage annual rate in excess of 40 percent 
for more than a decade. Aid had been replaced to a large extent 
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Introduction 
by export earnings and by private commercial capital flows. 
Exports, which in 1960 had constituted a mere 2 percent of 
GNP, were over 28 percent of GNP by 1975. 
Understanding the role of trade and aid is crucial for interpret­
ing Korea's recent economic history. It is also of considerable 
importance in terms of the lessons that may be gleaned for 
other countries' development policies and prospects. Not only 
was the Korean economy transformed over the period of 
modernization, but Korea's export performance has been 
unmatched by any other developing country. The fact that both 
the growth rate of e:'port earnings ad the growth rate of real 
GNP accelerated in much the same time interval raises important 
questions about the relationship between the two changes, and 
also about those aspects of the experience that were unique to 
Korea. 
No detailed itemization of the "lessons" emerging from 
Korea's trade and aid will ever be definitive. Too many changes 
took place simultaneously, and too many complex interrela­
tionships are involved for any precise quantitative estimate of 
the importance of the trade-and-aid sectors in Korea's perfor­
mance. It is, nonetheless, the purpose of this study to provide 
the evidence available ol the role of trade and aid in Korea's 
development, and to analyze, to the extent techniques of 
economic analysis permit, the contribution o~f trade and aid to 
Korea's modernization. 
The study is organized chronologically, primarily because the 
distinct periods of Korea's economic nnd political history 
dictate that approach: the various aspects of trade and aid 
within each period are best understood in relationship to each 
other. After analysis of those F-riods, an assessment of the 
microeconomic and macroeconomic efficiency of trade and aid 
is attempted in the last two chapters, 
Chapter 1 covers the period from 1945 to 1953, beginning 
with the departure of the Japanese and lasting until the end of 
the Korean War. American military occupation started in 1945 
and continued through 1948. The disruption of economic 
2
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activity that accompanied the shift from Japanese rule to U.S. 
Military Government resulted in pressing needs for relief 
supplies. During the years of military government, aid was 
devoted to "relief," or maintenance objectives. Exports were 
negligible and unimportant as a component of domestic eco­
nomic activity and also as a source of foreign exchange. Imports, 
by contrast, were sizable but mostly aid-financed. Despite the 
short-term nature of the objectives during most of the period of 
military government, c rtain reforms were accomplished that 
were important in laying the foundation for future development. 
These iacluded land redistribution, the disposition of Japanese 
properties, and the start of a Korean school system to replace 
the prior Japanese one. 
With the end of the military government in 1948, military 
relief was replaced by aid administered by the Economic 
Cooperation Administration (ECA). Little more than continuing 
relief had been achieved by the ECA when the invasion from the 
north took place. ECA operations were suspended indefinitely, 
and the military assuned responsibility for relief operations for 
the duration of the hostilities. By 1950, there had been 
substantial recovery from tie disruptions associated with the 
departure of the Japanese and with the partition of tie country. 
It is probable that recovery would have continued, and aid-as 
contrasted with relief supplies-,'ould have assumed sizable 
proportions in 1950 had not the war broken out. As it was, the 
next few years were dominated by the war and its effects. Relief 
imports, again directed at prevention of "disease, starvation and 
unrest" of the civilian population, were under military control. 
The United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency, wl-ich had 
been voted into existence in the fall of 1950, was not ?,er­
mitted to begin reconstruction activities Until 1952. 
In terms of Korean modernization, therefore, the ea'ly period 
up to 1953 represents a time when the role of aid was primaly 
that of relief and "buying time." "Trade" consisted primarily of 
aid- and military-related imports, so that it is the aid story that 
dominates the period. 
3
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Chapter 2 covers the period of recovery. aid dependence, and 
emphasis upon import substitution which lasted until 1960. 
Export earnings were a relatively minor source of foreign 
exchange during that period, since aid financed tile bulk of 
Korea's exports. Korea n trade-and-payients policies were geared 
primarily to receiving as much aid as possible, preventing the 
excess demand for foreign exchange from being realized, main­
taining an overvalued exchange rate, and stimulating domestic 
economic activity in import-substitution industries. These 
policies came into sharp conflict with the perceptions of the 
American government about desirable trade and balance-of­
payments policies. Consequently, rrade-and-paymcnts policy 
became a central point of contention in the aid relationship. 
The years 1961 to 1965 marked a time of transition, during 
which policy changes and the start of rapid exp~ort g3wcth 
vlrtu;!lv transformed the econol y. TH1ose changes and develop­
ments during the transition years are analyzed in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the period from 1966 to 1975, which was 
dominated by a growth strategy aimed at promoting Korean 
exports, not only in order to enable the financing of needed 
imports, but also to provide tile major "enginc" of growth. Dur­
ing this last period, aid diminished and finally became negligible 
as a source of foreign excha3nge, although it was replaced in sonic 
measure by inflows of private capital, attracted by deliberate 
policy and the apparent safety assured by the rapid growth of 
export earnings. 
The final two chapters are concerned with analyzing the role 
of trade, aid, and capital flows in Korea's growth. Chapter 5 is 
concerned with the inicroeconomic aspects of the trade-and­
payments regime. The focus is on the efficiency of the import 
substitution drive, aid, the export-promotion policies of the 
1960s and early 1970s, and of capital inflows and their afloci­
tion. A final chapter then attempts to place trade, aid, and 
Lapital flows in perspective in terms of their contribution to 
the modernization of Korea in the thirty years after 1945. 
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ONE 
The 1945-1953 Period 
The years from 1945 to 1953 were marked by severe economic 
dislocation, associated first with the departure of the Japanese, 
then with partition, and finally with the Korean War. Understand­
ing the pattern of trade and aid in those years is important for sev­
eral reasons. First, the disruptions of the period generated the 
initial conditions for later reconstruction; understanding of the 
trade-and-aid policies of later years is not possible without knowl­
edge of prior events and of the extreme economic difficulties that 
prevailed. Second. many of the issues of later periods had their 
origins in the 1945-1953 period. For example, controversy over 
exchange-rate policy, a feature of the aid relationship in the 
1950s, started during the Korean War years. Third, despite the 
fact that many of the achievements of the reconstruction period 
were lost during the Korean War, some accomplishments endured 
and contributed importantly to later development. 
5
 
The 1945-1953 Peijod 
For thirty-f7ive years prior to 1945, Korea had been a Japanese 
colony, and trade ties had naturally been determined largely by 
the Japanese Colonial Government and Japanese entrepreneurs 
who commanded the vast majority of resources in Korea. 
Examination of the South Korean production pattern prior to 
World War 11yields insights into both the potential comparative 
advantage of the partitioned country and the immediate post­
war structural imbalances which early imports, financed almost 
exclusively by the military, were designed to remedy. With 
respect to the immediate post-w years and up to 1953, as 
would be expected in the context of triple dislocatioi, data are 
scattered and those that exist are of questionable reliability. 
Nonetheless, they serve to give some idea of the quantitative 
magnitude of the imbalances of the period. During 1946-1948, 
the U.S. Military Government undertook some fundamental 
reforms and also provided relief supplies. In 1949, responsibility 
for administering aid w'is shifted to the Economic Cooperation 
Administration (ECA), which continued many of the programs 
started earlier. Further changes, of course, ensued in the Korean 
War and post-war years. 
PRODUCTION AND TRADE PATTERNS
 
PRIOR TO 1945
 
Data on production and trade prior to 1945 are scattered, and 
those available pertain primarily to the Korean peninsula as a 
whole. Available information, howeve-r, seems sufficient to 
permit confidence that exports constituted a sizable fraction of 
production for a number of key commodities. 
To turn first to production, agriculture was dominant, with 
more than 80 percent of the labor force and about half of 
national incortie originating in that sector. It is noteworthy 
that manufacturing apparently constituted a somewhat higher 
fraction of output than one would have expected for a 
country at Korea's stage of development: about 31 percent 
6
 
Production, Trade Prior to 1945 
of gross commodity output originated in manufacturing in 
1936.' 
Data on trade flows reflect these same general patterns. Rice 
was the largest single export, constituting somewhere between 
40 and 53 percent of each year's exports between 1930 and 
1935. Consonant with the relatively high share of manufacturing 
output, however, Korea was already exporting manufactures: 
trade data suggest that textile exports (mostly silk) exceeded 
10 percent of total exports after 1923, while pulp and paper, 
pig iron, sugar, wheat flour, leather, cement, and ammonium 
sulphate constituted another 3 to 6 percent of the value of 
exports. 2 
Although Korea appears to have been a net importer of most 
manufactured products, data indicate that almost the entire out­
put of raw silk was exported, and that as much as about 40 
percent of ammonium sulphate, cement, and sugar output, and 
about 20 percent of cotton fabrics and paper products output 
was exported in the mid-1930s. 3 
During the colonial period, Korea's trade balance was negative 
in every year, with imports constituting as much as 35 percent 
more than exports in some years, and averaging about 28 percent 
in excess of exports for the 1936-1939 years.4 This capital 
inflow represented, in large part, Japanese investment in Korea. 
Japan was Korea's major trading partner throughout the 
colonial period, with over 85 percent of imports originating in 
Japan proFer' in each year from 1931-1939 and ark even higher 
fraction of exports going to Japan proper until 1937, after which 
the figure still remained in excess of 70 percent.6 
There is no reliable ,,ay of estimating the real volume of trade 
in the pre-war period. Exports in 1939 were recorded to be 
1,006.8 million yen, while imports were 1,388.5 million yen.7 
If one takes the wholesale price index and deflates the trade 
statistics on a 1970 base, and then converts the resulting esti­
mates to dollars at the official exchange rate, the computations 
would indicate that Korean exports, valued in 1970 prices, were 
on the order of magnitude of S936 million in 1939, while 
7
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imports were $1,291 million in that year. As nearly half of rice 
output, about one-third of fishery output, and more than half 
of mineral output were exported, those estimates of trade flows 
are roughly consistent with exports constituting approximately 
30 percent of ,ational income and a per capita income of 
$130-4150 (1970 prices).' 
Evidence with regard to production and trade patterns for the 
north and south sepa, ately is extremely sparse. It is well known 
that agricultural output was predominant in the south, and that 
the north produced most of the minerals and electric power. The 
pattern of production differed for manufacturing as well. 
Reflecting the north's more favorable endowment of mineral 
resources, 95 percent of basic chemical production, 72 percent 
of other chemicaL, 99 percent of basic chemical fertilizer, and 
97 percent of iron and steel production originated in the north, 
which also accounted for over half of paper products, coal 
products, non-metallic minerals, and steel and metal products 
production. By contrast, the south accounted for 83 percent of 
tobacco production, 88 peicent of fiber spinning, 85 percent of 
textile fabrics, 75 percent of transport equipment, and 100 
percent of elctrical machinery production, dtlthough this last 
sector was of negligible size. Overall, 45 percent of all manufac­
turing gross output originated in the south and 55 percent 
3riginated in the north, but those figures conceal the extent to 
which individual industries were concentrated in different 
regions. 9 
TRADE FLOWS, 1945-1949 
Korea must have been adversely affected by World War 1I. What­
ever effects there were were dwarfed, however, by contrast with 
post-war events; as the Japanese left, the U.S. Military Govern­
ment took command over "occupied territory," and the country 
was partitioned. 
There are no reliable data to indicate the extent of the chaos 
8
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of the immediate post-war period. The departure of the Japanese 
resulted in the shutdown of many businesses as entrepreneurs 
and technicians left; the partitior of the country resulted in a 
severing of trade and financial ties, a process not completed until 
1948 when tile power supply from the north was finally com­
pletely shut off; and an influx of refugees from the north 
further aggravated the situation. As if those factors were 
not enough, world trade patterns were themselves in disarray, 
so that disruption in Korea was only one part of the broader 
problem of post-war rehabilitation. 
Against this background, it is hardl) surprising that infla­
tion was rampant: the wholesale price index is estimated 
.o have increased 40-fold between June and August of 1945 
a id to have quadrupled again from then to the end of 1946.10 
There were three types of international transactions: regular 
trade, smuggling, and relief supplies provided by the United 
States.
 
Of these three, regular trade was undoubtedly the least 
important in the early post-war years, and it remained miniscule 
by contrast with the volume of r2lief and aid imports right 
through the Korean War. Table I provides an estimate of the 
approximate volume of official trade for 1939 and for 1946 
through 1953. Any comparison between 1939 and 1946 is 
necessarily very crude. However, when it is recalled that the 1946 
price level was about forty times higher than that of 1939, it is 
evident that 1946 trade was a tiny fraction of the pre-war volume. 
Data for 1945 are, of course, unavwilable but would undoubtedly 
show a comparable pattern, at least for the latter half of the year. 
If the data in Table I are approximately accurate, they would 
indicate that commercial and government-financed trade came 
to a complete halt until 1948. Even if one allows for the fact 
that tile 1939 data include the trade of both the north and the 
south, and even if the estimates of trade volumes for 1946 and 
1947 are off by several hundred percent, it is improbable that 
the real volume of trade through official channels was as much 
as 1 percent of its 1939 level in 1947. 
9
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TABLE 1 Estimated Trade Flows, Pre- and Post-War 
Exports __ Imports Exports Imports 
1,000s of won 
1,O00s of currencyunitsb constant 1947 prices 
1939 1,006 1,388 n.a. n.a. 
1946 50 160 90 290 
1947 1,110 2,890 1,110 2,090 
1948 7,200 8,860 4,420 5,440 
1949 11,270 14,740 5,060 6,620 
5,210 a 9,360 1,500i 9 50c 3 2 ,5 7 0 a 
1951 45,910 121,830 2,090 5,550 
1952 194,960 704,420 4,270 15,410 
1953 398,720 2,237,010 6,700 37,590 
Sources: 1939 data from Wontack Hong, "Trade Distortions and Employment," 
Table B t. Data in current and constant priCes for 1946 to 1953 are from 
Charles Frank, Kwang Suk Kim, and Larry E. Westphal, Foreign Trade 
Regimes and t:conoynic Development, (National Bureau of Economic 
Research, New York, 1975), p. 10. 
Notes: aRecorded private and government trade only. Aid-financed goods are not 
included. 
byeml in 1939, w 'n from 1946 to 1951, and hwan in 1952 and 1953. 
'Does not include trade tirough Seoul and lnchl'n ports, as the data were lost in the 
war. 
For 1948 and 1949, the apparently rapid increase in the vol­
ume of trade reflects primarily the incredibly small base from 
which it started. From the viewpoint of understanding trade and 
aid in Korean modernization, the essential pcint is that regular 
commercial international trade ii the period between r'e en. of 
World War 11 and the Korean War was negligible. The "recovery" 
of exports, which consisted almost entirely of agricultural 
products and minerals, still left exports trivial by pre-w'Ar 
standards when the Korean War broke out.1 ' 
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 again resulted in 
the complete disappearance of commercial and government­
financed trade, as indicaLed in Table 1. Indeed, all that needs to 
be recognized about trade flows during the 1946-1953 period 
10
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is that commercially financed trade was, for all practical pur­
poses, nonexistent. 
RELIEF AND AID PRIOR TO THE KOREAN WAR 
Several agencies were involved in providing assi:tance of one sort 
or another in the 1945-1953 period. For the convenience of the 
reader, Table 2 lists the main agencies, their periods of operation, 
and the total relief supplied. 
AMERICAN DOMINANCE AND OBJECTIVES 
The U.S. Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was the 
first agency, and began officially on September 9, 1945. It con­
tinued holding authority tintil August 1948. The Republic of 
Korea was then established and recognized by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations. The United States transferred 
its supporting assistance, both economic and military, to the 
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) at that time, 12 
and ECA aid to the Republic of Korea lasted until April 1951. 
Then, the ECA mission was closed down due to the war, and 
its functions were transferred to the United Nations Kcrea 
Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA). Thereafter, a bewildering 
variety of agencies became involved in administering various 
forms of assistance. During the period prior to the Korean War, 
GARIOA (Government Appropriations for Relief in Occupied 
Areas) assistance amounted to about S500 million, spread over 
the five years 1945 through 1949. The only other assistance 
received prior to 1949 was from UNRRA (United Nations Relief 
and Rehabilitation Administration), and it amounted to less than 
S1 million, due primarily to opposition from the Soviet Union 
to United Natiotis assistance for the Republic of Korea. Assis­
tance administered by USAMGIK therefore dwarfed all other 
sources of imports by a multiple of several hundred. 
During the entire 1945-1950 period, American objectives were 
never clearly defined, and the indecision resultin, therefrom was 
11
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reflected in aid policy, especially as the occupation period 
progressed. Originally, American occupation was designed to 
accomplish three purposes: 1) to establish a free and indepen­
dent Korea (as had been promised at Cairo and Potsdam); 2) to 
make Korea strong enough to be a stabilizing factor in Asia; and 
TABLE 	2 Agencies Involved in Relief and Rehabilitation 
Total 
Periodof Assistance 
Agency Acronym Operation ($ millions) 
United States Military 
Government in Korea (USAMCIK) GARIOA f 1945-1949 502.1 
Economic Cooperation 
Administrationa ECA 1949-1951 110.9 
United Nations Korea 
Reconstruction Agency UNKRA e 1950-1955 111.6 
United Nations Command, Civil 
Relief in Koreab CRIKd 1950-1956 457.2 
International Cooperation 
Administration c ICA 1953- 5.5 
Soturce: 	 Aid magnitudes are fron: Bank of Korea as reported in Economics Statistics 
Yearbook, various issue:i. 
Notes: aECA goods were received until 1953, although the amount after 1951 was 
very small-about $4 million. 
bCPJK comn-,olcies were received until 1956; of total assistance, S59.1 million 
came after 1953. 
CICA assibtace started in 1953; ICA became the Mvlutuai Security Agency, which in 
turn became the U.S. Agency fo, International Development. ICA and its successor 
agencies were important after 1953;aid for 1953 only is included in the table. 
dTechnically, the U.N. Security Council Resolution of July 31, 1950 created the 
United Nations Civil Assistance Command (UNCACK), which later became the 
Korean Civil Assistance Command (KCAC). The latter, in turn, was administered 
almost exclusively by the American military through CRIK, which nonetheless 
administered about $35 million of non-U.S. funds. See Harold Koh, "The Early 
History of U.S. Economic Assistance to the Republic of Korea, 1955-63," typed, 
1975, and also Gene M. Lyons, Ailitary Policy amid Economic .Aid: ie Korcan Gase, 
1950-1953 (Columbus, 1961).
 
eAt the same time as UNKRA was created, the U.N. also created UNCURK, the
 
United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. It was
 
intended to administer economic dev-lopnent assistance for a united Korea after the
 
war. It was not a factor in aid to South Korea.
 
fGARIOA = Government Appropriations for Relief in Occupied Areas, which
 
funded relief supplies for all occupation areas, as the name implies.
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3) to make the country a "showcase of democracy" in Asia. It 
was not entirely clear, however, whether these objectives per­
tained to a reunified Korea, or whether, instead, these goals
could relate to the south standing alone. 13 The problem came 
to the forefront oiLLy when the urgent relief needs had been 
met, military occupation ended, and ECA assumed respon­
sibility for Korean aid. 
THE MILITARY OCCUPATION 
In the first years of GARIOA, the feasibility of the three goalsdid not raise serious questions, since the immediate and pressing
need was for supplies that could provide the population with 
sustenance and enable the restoration of basic economic func­
tions. The former objective was sought with the provision of
aid, while the latter centered upon establishing a functioning
Korean government, disposing of Japanese-owned properties,
and restoring a functioning educational system.
The commodity import program centered threeon basic
objectives: I ) prevention of starvation and disease; 2) increasing
agricultural output; and 3) the provision of basic consumer 
goods. It is estimated that more than 90 percent of early aid
consisted of imports of commodities in finished form which
 
could be immediately distributed without further processing. 14

Disposing of Japanese properties was necessary both i'i order
 
to make resources productive 
 and because the American 
authorities did not wish to be accused of seizing Japanese

properties for their own benefit. A major portion of the

administrative capabilities of the early occupation period was

therefore devoted to 
 issues associated with the disposition of
these properties, and especially of land. This ultimately resulted 
in a land reform of wide-reaching scope.
Since education had been Japanese during the colonial period,
trained teachers, as well as buildings and supplies, were lacking.
The military authorities therefore were obliged to attempt the
restructuring and reform of the educational system, including
emphasis on Koreanization and teacher training. 
13
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of the relativeprovide any assessmentIt is not possible 	 to 
of these thrusts of activity of the militaryimportance of each 
done is to provide 	an account of government. All that can be 
undoubtedly essen­
each, noting that commodity imports were for stim­and disease andstarvationtial in preventing massive 
and educational reforms 
ulating agricultural production. Land 
toward longer-run goals that could not 
have been 
were oriented 
able to survive the earlyhad not the south 	beenaccomplished 
that would inevitably,unrestpost-war years witiout the social 
the partition­
of relief goods, have accompaniedin the absence 

ing of the country.
 
Commodity Imports 
startedand reconstructioninflow of imports for reliefThe 
began functioning, and military governmentshortly after the 
to the Korean War. Underthe period tipcontinued throughout for consumerapparentlymost expenditures wereUSAMGIK 
and textiles. Emphasisgoods-especially food, coal, oil, 	
upon 
to the financing of 
increasing agricultural production also led 
1948, even under 	 USAMGIK, large imports of fertilizers. By 
toward the provision ofshift somewhatemphasis had begun to 
would enable increased production capacity 
in 
goods that 
with the short­of officials in KoreafrustrationKorea."1 The E. A. G.was summarized by term nature of American policy 
Johnson: 
which we could attemptof economic developmentThe program 
would have liked. Con­
was, to be sure, not as far-reaching as we United States armyof reference restricted the 	
to 
gressional terms 
to Korea, designed primarily to prevent under­short-range assistance 
we constantly accused of and unrest, and werenutrition, disease, 
was also the function 	of going far beyond these guidelines. Yet it from a Japaneseorderly transitionto facilitate anUSAMGIK To this end,Korean government.to an independentadministration 
to deviate somewhat from a strict construction we found it necessary we 
and relief in Occupied Territories". We realized of "government if thedeal of economic rehabilitation hal to engage in a 	 great 
able provide a tolerablyto be to 
new Korean government was 
14 
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satisfactory administration of its inherited capital plant and other 
16
resources. 
In the first half of 1949, ECA essentially continued GARIOA­
type programs, concentrating on the importation of fertilizer, 
petroleum, agricultural supplies, and other goods. During that 
year, it also drew up a proposal for a three-year reconstruction 
program which was duly submitted to Congress. Tile program 
was explicitly development oriented. The stated goals were: 
1) To maintain a sufficient quantity of consumer goods and raw 
matcrials to prevent excessive hardship, disease, and social unrest, 
atid 
2) To lay durable foundations for a Korean economy which, with a 
rapidly diminishing level of subsidy from the United States, could 
become a solvent trading partner in the world economy.17 
The proposed aid program focused on three main areas, and was 
based on the assumption that a viable South Korea would be an 
exporter of agricultural commodities. Tile first priority was to 
be the development of coal resources, itself necessary to achieve 
the second objective, the expansion of thermal power generat­
ing facilities, which was deemed crucial, given the termination 
of power supplies from the north. Finally, fertilizer production 
capability was to be developed in line with the view that 
agricultural exports were to be increased through growth of 
output of that sector. The ECA request was for S350 million 
over a three-year period in the expectation that, at the end of 
that time, private sources of capital ";nd exports would finance 
imports. 
Among American policy-makers there were substantial doubts 
as to whether South Korea could ever become self-sufficient in 
the sense of providing an "acceptable" standard of living to her 
people without substantial aid inflows.' The reconstruction 
program was delayed in Congress in line with these concerns, 
and appropriations were stop-gap, covering three-month periods 
15
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while the bill (H.R. 5330) was being debated. On January 19, 
1950, the bill failed by one vote. It was then redrafted and 
reduced in scope. The redrafted version passed and authorized 
$100 million for fiscal year 1951. 
Korean data indicat_2 that, of tile total of SI10 million 
administered by the ECA, $23.8 million were received in 1949, 
$49.3 million in 1950, and $31.9 million in 1951, with the small 
residual delivered in 1952 and 1953. It is thus evident that the 
delay in passing tile ECA bill effectively prevented the inaugura­
tion of any sustained development program before the outbreak 
of the Korean War. 19 
It is d.fficult to judge the contribution of GARIQA- and ECA­
financed supplies to Korean recol'stiuction during the 1945­
1950 period. Because there are no national income accounts 
statistics, there is no meaningful ;,ggregate against which to 
measure aid-financed imports. Moreover, Korean records of 
commodity imports do not include items imported under aid 
programs. Even those data that arc aailable are not necessarily 
reliable, due largely to the nature of th. economic situation that 
then prevailed. 
Some idea of orders of magnitude caii nonetheless be gleaned 
from piecemeal evidence. Table 3 gives data on fertilizer imports 
and grain production and imports in the 1946-1949 period. 
Food-grain imports constituted as much as 11 percent of the 
total grain supply in 1947. Wheat imports were considerably 
larger than rice imports, however, so that aid-financed imports 
were more important in terms of total grains than they were in 
terms of rice production. 
In addition to the direct augmentation of the food supply, 
imports of raw materials and agricultural supplies undoubtedly 
contributed to the growth of domestic agricultural output. As 
is apparent from Table 3, fertilizer imports grey. rapidly over the 
1945-1949 period. Some idea of their contribution to the 
growth of agricultural production can be derived from studies of 
the determinants of productivity growth within agriculture. Tile 
key work is that of Sung Hwan Ban. According to his estimates, 
16
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TABLE 3 Contribution of Imports to Domestic 
Grain 	Supplies, 1946-1950 
Imports/Total 
Production Imports Supply 
Total Total Total Fertilizer 
Rice Grain Rice Grain Rice Grain Imports 
(1,oOoare) (1,000 AlT) (%) (1,000 MT) 
1946 n.a. i,.a. - 164.4 n.a. n.a. 171.4 
1947 2,155 2,806 39.4 353.9 1.7 11.2 419.1 
1948 2,403 3,116 69.9 267.3 2.8 7.9 529.3 
1949 2,279 3,209 - 57.0 1.7 766.1 
1950 2,263 3,162 13.3 44.1 0.5 1.3 76.1 
Source: 	 BO K, lcomlic Statistics Yearbook, 1958. Agricultural production data, 
given in sok, were converted to metric tons with a convtrsion factor of 
6.45 s k = I MT. 
labor used in agriculture was approximately unchanged over 
the 1946-1953 period at about the same level as in the pre-war 
period. By contrast, the total area devoted to crops and total 
fixed capital stock had declined slightly. Current inputs, and 
especially fertilizer, by contrast, increased. He estimates fertilizer 
inputs in 1949 at 11,250 million (1934) yen, compared to a pre­
war high of 10,633 million (1934) yen in 1936 and a 1945 low 
of 3,513 million (1934) yen.2 According to his data, total 
agricultural output grew at an annual compound rate of 2.09 
percent from 1945 to 1953, with an annual rate of increase of 
inputs of 1.50 percent. Input increases, therefore, accounted for 
about 72 percent of output increases. It seems evident, there­
fore, that imports and fertilizer and other supplies-the com­
ponent of inputs which was growing--must be credited with a 
substantial portion of the increase in agricultural output that 
took place. 
The second piece of evidence with regard to the contribution 
of aid comes from examination of the commodities financed by 
aid. Tabie 4 gives the commodity composition of GARIOA 
imports over the 1945-1949 period. It indicates that foodstuffs 
17
 
TABLE 4 	 Commodity Composition of GARIOA Imports, 1945-1949 
(S and %) 
1945 1946 1947 1948 1949
b 
Commodity $000 % % % % %T000 	 $000 $000 $000 
Foodstuffs 3,604 73.0 21,551 43.5 77,574 44.2 67,698 37.7 4,887 5.2 
Agricultural Supplies - 0.0 6,983 14.1 31,394 17.9 38,609 21.5 43,481 46.9 
Unprocessed Materials - 0.0 113 0.2 3,809 2.2 8,093 4.5 11,844 12.8 
Petroleum and Fuel 1,330 27.0 12,224 24.7 14,221 8.1 25,510 14.2 9,711 10.5 
Medical Supplies - 0.0 134 0.3 2,096 1.2 3,321 1.8 2,369 2.6 
Clothing and Textiles - 0.0 1,863 3.7 26,680 1S.2 5,627 3.1 - -
Reconstruction' - 0.0 4,994 10.1 17,696 10.1 26,856 15.0 20,172 21.7 
Miscellaneous - 0.0 1,683 3.4 1,911 1.1 3,878 2.2 239 0.3 
TOTAL 4,934 49,945 175,371 179,592 92,703 
Sources: BOK, Economic Review, (1955), p. 314 for 1945-1948; and AlonthIv StatisticalRevicuw, February 1952 for 194'. The categories
listed for 1949 do not correspond precisely to those for 1948. Their allocation to the 1945-1948 classification is indicated in 
Note b. 
Notes: a"Reconstruction'* includes the following categories: automotive, building materials, chemicals and dyestuffs, communications, 
educational support, fishing industry supplies, highway construction equipment, marine, mining industry, office supplies, power and light,

and railroad.
 
b1949 categories of aid goods. when differently classified, were allocated as follows: fertilizer is the only item in Agricultural Supplies- in
 
Unproccssed Materials are r.tw cotton, spinning raw materials, crossties, bamboo, lumber and "raw niateriais and scrii-finished products";
and Reconstruction includes: chemicals, hides and skins, pulp and paper, cement. salt. ron and steel, machines and equipment, motor 
vehicle equipment, transport equipment, and rubber products. 
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and petroleum were the only commodities to reach Korea under 
the program in 1945. In 1946 and 1947, foodstuffs still 
accounted for almost half of total imports, while supplies 
.directly for the agricultural sector wer another 14-18 percent 
of total imports. During those early years, "reconstruction" 
imports were a very small fraction of the total. By 1948 and 
1949, however, foodstuffs were decreasing in both relative and 
absolute importance, while agricultural supplies and reconstruc­
tion materials were increasing. To GARIOA imports in 1949 
must be added those financed by the ECA in that year although, 
of course, the latter were relatively small in magnitude. 
Comparison of the total imports under GARIOA for each 
year from 1945 to 1949 with the data for commercial imports 
given in Table I provides further support for the proposition 
that commercial imports were relatively unimportant in the 
1945-1950 period. While it would be desirable to have data 
indicating the relative importance of aid in GNP and as a frac­
tion of total supply, figures are simply unavailable. Given the 
destruction and dislocation that had been experienced by the 
economy, it seems reasonable to conclude that the aid inflow 
was extremely important in preventing further deterioration in 
the situation in 1945-1947 and in permitting reconstruction in 
1948-1949. 
Land Reform 
As already briefly mentioned, the departure of the Japanese 
left a considerable amount of land (and other property) 
unowned. For lack of alternative, the occupation governinelt 
vested these lands, and other alien properties, in itself. It was 
immediately decreed that the maximum rental paid by tenants 
should be no more than on,-third the annual crop. This created 
some difficulties, in that no records of earlier production levels 
(and therefore average yields) were available, and the regulation 
was apparently not enforced for tenants on land owned by 
Koreans. 21 
The military government was anxious, for political reasons, to 
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divest itself of the vested lands at the earliest possible date2 2 and 
made a number of efforts in that direction which were tech­
nicall," infeasible. However, the New Korea Company, Ltd., 
which had been established by USAMGIK to administer the 
vested lands, gradually acquired the records, experience, and 
staff with which land distribution could be undertaken. Finally, 
by a military ordinance dated March 1948, the New Korea 
Company was abolished, and a National Land Administration 
was established as the Korean government agency responsible for 
selling the land. No tenant was to be permitted to purchase land 
if his holdings would increase to more than two chnligbo (about 
five acres), and the price paid to the National Land Administra­
tion was to be three times annual production, spread over a 15­
year period. This was, therefore, approximately equal to about 
20 percent of the crop each year. Within a very short time, 
700,000 plots had been sold. By September, some 487,621 
acres were sold to 502,072 tenants. This represented over 96 
percent of all land which had previously been Japanese-owned. 23 
Apparently corruption was held to a minimum. According to 
Mitchell, who had headed the New Korea Company: 
The office staffs were worked at top speed for a period of a few 
weeks; morale was kept high; prizes and bonuses were used to keep 
up production and maintain a competitive spirit in the organization. 
Most important, however, is the fact that the very momentum of 
the operation kept it well out in front of sabotage, opposition, and 
corruption. For example, some Koreans in the National Land 
Administration admitted privately, and rather sadly, to this observer 
that they could have become millionaires if they had had time to 
organize their relatives and send them around to all prospective 
land purchasers. 24 
The land distribution carried out under American military 
occupation was followed by a clause in the Korean constitution 
which called for land reform on Korean-owned lands. Despite 
some delays, measures were taken in 1949 so that, prior 
to the Korean War, most land (including that which had been 
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Korean-owned) had either been redistributed or had been sold 
privately by landlords anticipating redistribution." 
There is ccnsiderable debate about the short-run effects of the 
land distribution and reform on agricultural production. It is 
estimated that yields in 1948 were about 30-40 percent below 
their average levels of 1936-1937.26 Official statistics indicate 
that 1949 output of grain was not above its 1948 levels, despite 
the fact that the weather was apparently favorable in that year. 27 
It would thus appear that short-run effects on production could 
not have been positive and were probably somewhat detrimental. 
Reasons given include the fact that plots were of small size, 
but also, and perhaps more important, that land!ords had 
previously supplied intermediate inputs to the tenants, who, 
once redistribution had been accomplished, had no source of 
supply for those inputs. 
Regardless of the short-term impact, however, the consensus 
is that the long-run effects were strongly positive, especially in 
political terms. Gregory Henderson regards the land reform 
undertaken by USAMGIK as the "best" of its accomplish­
ments, and evaluated its effects as follows: 
Tenancy was reduced to about 33 percent from about 75 percent in 
1945. The terms were equitable. Disposal of these lands did much to 
reduce rural instability, undermine Communist influence, actual or 
potential, among the peasants, increase their cooperation in the 
election process, and arouse expectation, later fulfilled, that Korean 
landlord-held lands would be disposed of similarly. 
28 
Cole and Lyman reached a similar conclusion: 
In terms of production, the reform was considered to have been 
somewhat detrimental, at least in the short run. But psychologically 
and politically it had very positive effects. Subsequent improvements 
in farm income, though probably resulting as much or more from 
other factors of production, were in the farmer's mind often con­
nected with the land reform. Moreover, the reform eliminated the 
fundamental divisive issue in the countryside. Thereafter, the locus 
of serious political conflict shifted largely if not entirely to the 
urban centers. The reform similarly eliminated the last key issue 
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on which the left wing could have hoped to develop substantial rural 
support in Korea. Finally, it changed the nature of government 
requirements in the countryside. The basic socio-political obstacle 
to rural development had been eliminated, but the problems of low 
productivity and low income remained. It was clear that further 
improvement in the rural sector would depend upon substantial and 
relatively sophisticated technical inputs and economic policy manage­
ment. 29 
Whereas the program to dispose of vested land appears on the 
whole to have been successful, efforts of the military govern­
ment to divest itself of Japanese-owned enterprises were less so. 
By 1948, little progress had been made, and the properties were 
transferred to the Republic of Korea. Despite an effort in 1949 
to persuade landlords dispossessed in the land reform to purchase 
the enterprises, almost all enterprises remained in government 
hands until after the end of the Korean War. 
Education 
The Japanese had operated the Korean school system as a 
vehicle for "JIapanizing" the Koreans: use of the Korean 
language in the schools was forbidden, and Korean culture and 
history were not taught. When the U.S. Military ,Government 
replaced the Japanese, many former teachers were among those 
repatriated to Japan. Korean education had to be reorganized 
both for nationalistic reasons and because the Japanese departure 
had left a severe shortage of teachers. The military government 
set out to attempt to "c'iemocratize" the Korean educational 
system. What this meant in practice is not entirely clear, 
although it did imply increasing educational opportunities for 
women and a much higher ,nrollment rate than had been the 
case under the Japanese. 
The American occupation government of necessity placed 
primary emphasis on elementary education and on increasing 
both the supply of teachers and their competence. A few 
numbers serve to indicate the magnitude of the program and its 
achievements: from 1945 to 1948, the number of elementary 
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school pupils rose 82 percent and the number of secondary 
school pupils increased 183 percent; simultaneously the number 
of available teachers increased 55 percent, 569 percent, and 268 
percent at the elementary, middle, and secondary levels, 
respectively." ° Koh also cites a figure showing that the rate of 
literacy of adults in Han'gtl, the Korean alphabet, increased 
from 20 percent at the time of Liberation to 71 percent two and 
a half years later. While these figures arc only illustrative of the 
order of magnitude of the program, it seems clear that education 
programs undertaken in the I940s contributed importantly to 
development potential in later years. Of course, the Korean War 
resulted in the destruction of a high fraction of available class­
rooms and educational materials, and aid in the 1950s had once 
again to be directed toward the education sector.3" 
AID DURING 1950-1953 
By the spring of 1950, it could reasonably be said that some 
momentum in recovery had been achieved: substantial land 
reform had been accomplished, and agricultural output was 
considerably above its 1945 level, though it is doubtful whether 
the per capita consumption levels of the 1930s had been 
reattained.32 Some progress had also been made with respect to 
relieving the disruptions occasioned by the cutoff of electricity. 
On the industrial side, individual industries had achieved sizable 
proportionate increases in output, but power bottlenecks, the 
fact that many enterprises were still in government hands and 
managed by bureaucrats with little or no industrial experience, 
and the poor condition of much capital stock still served as con­
straints on industrial output. The niagnitudc of the constraints 
was lessening ovcr time, however, and the planned FCA program 
gave promise of more rapid improvement in the next several 
years. 
Once the Korean War started, however, the economy quickly 
reverted to much the same condition as in 1945-1946: with 
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production declines due to war-associatcd dislocation and de­
struction, efforts to rebuild productive capacity ceased, and aid 
focused on consumer goods and relief supplies to m'.intain the 
transport and communications network. Two aspects of the aid 
relationship ale impo-tant for purposes of understanding later 
developments: on the one hand, there is the identification of 
the aid donors and their role: on the other, important issues 
arose in attempting to define the Korean arid American con­
tributions to the war. Negotiations over this problem set a 
precedent for much of the aid relationship that wits to continue 
later into the 1950s. 
DONORS AND THEIR ROLE 
As already mentioned, with the outbreak of the Korean War, it 
was decided to terminate ECA operations and to turn them 
over to the United Nations. This was not, in fact, achieved until 
1951, although ECA-financed imports in 1951 were only one­
fifth of their 1950 level, and contracts for imports of such 
commodities as cotton and fertilizer were canceled with the 
outbreak of the war. 
As the Korean War was to be waged under U.N. auspices. it 
was decided that relief and rehabilitatiu1r efforts should be 
administered by the United Nations. Accordingly, the United 
Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) 33 was est-lb­
lished late in 1950. By that date, U.N. forces had moved north. 
It was believed that hostilities had ceased and that reconstruc­
tion could begin immediately. 
Although both UNKRA and the United Nations Military 
Command were United Nations endeavors, there was an impor­
tant difference: the Military Command reported to the United 
Nations in New York via Tokyo and Washington and the 
American military headquarters there. In effect, the American 
army was representing the United Nations in running the war. 
As such, it had the normai powers that an army has to control 
entry into the war zone, to take mea.ares to prutect information 
that might aid the enemy, to control logistics, and so on. 
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For a variety of reasons, the United Nations Command exer­
cised this authority to block UNKRA, which reported directly 
to the United Nations in New York, from beginning its opera­
tions for several years. Because of concern with the logistics of 
military supplies, security, and related issues (such as the con­
fusion that might result if UNKRA shipments were not 
coordinated with military shipments into the already congested 
ports), UNKRA was relatively ineffective unti, 1953. Through 
CRIK (see Table 2), the army operated its own relief program, 
designed to prevent "starvation, disease and unrest" in occupied 
areas. In effect, the U.N. Command took the view that that part 
of its necessary military function was the maintenance of orderly 
conditions in areas where the army was functioning--that is, in 
the part of Korea tnder the control of the U.N. Command. 
The ambiguous role of UNKRA continued through the period 
of hostilities and uIp to the signing of the Armistice. The relation­
ship between the American military authorities and representa­
tives of UNKRA was somewhat strained but, without effective 
backing in Washington, there was little that UNKRA officials 
could do. 4 John Lewis, in discussing the role of UNKRA, cites 
one knowledgeable observer who commented, "UNKRA was 
kept out!-for a long time-then allowed to peek-then allowed 
to plan-then finally allowed to start a puny program in 1952­
53."."3 
Th relative importance of UNKRA, contrasted with CRIK, 
can be seen in Table 5. The phasing out of ECA, which had 
provided over 80 percent of the $58 million received in 1950, is 
evident. By 1951, CRIK provided more than half of all assis­
tance; in 1952 and 1953, CRIK was dominant as a source of aid, 
with UNKRA beginning to play a role. The commodity composi­
tion of aid during this period is reported below. 
DEFINING AID DURING WARTIME 
There is a major issue as to what constitutes aid from an ally or 
allies to a country upon whose territory a war is being fought. 
To the extent that the ally physically removed from the 
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TABLE 5 Aid Received, by Source, 1950-1953 
(i ,000s) 
ECA CRIK UNKRA Total 
1950 49,330 9,376 - 58,706 
1951 31,972 74,448 122 106,542 
1952 3,824 155,235 1,969 161,028 
1953 - 158,787 29,580 188,367 
TOTAL 85,126 397,846 31,671 514,643 
Source: BOK, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1961 and 1964, as given by Wonta-k 
Hong, "Trade Distortions and Employment," text Table 4.2. 
fighting contributes commodities toward the maintenance of 
the population in the war-afflicted country, it is not entirely 
clear whether that is a part of the ally's contribution to the war 
or constitutes aid. HowNever, it is measured as aid and will be so 
treated here. CRIK aid was of precisely this nature.36 
A more difficult issue arises when troops of tile allies are 
maintained on the soil of the country. In that case, the foreign 
troops must be enabled to purchase some goods and services 
from the local market even if most goods are provided by the 
allied military itself. Such was the case with troops under the 
U.N. Command during the Korean War. When American and 
other military forces landed, they required a means of payment. 
To facilitate this, the Korean government turned over to the 
U.N. Command an "advance" of a large amount of w6n with 
the understanding that terms of repayment in foreign exchange 
would be negotiated. The Korean government continued to 
make advances at intervals as currency was required for the 
foreign troops. 
A question of major importance thereupon arose: At what 
exchange rate should the w6n advances be reimbursed? On the 
one hand, the w6n was undoubtedly overvalued at the time of 
each advance, and Korean insistence upon full paymnent at 
the then official exchange rate was, in an economic sense, 
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unreasonable.37 On the other hand, the injection of w~n into 
the stream of purchasing power at a time when the supply of 
good, and services was shrinking was unquestionably inflation­
ary, and there can be little doubt that, had the Korean govern­
ment received foreign exchange against the w6n advances 
immediately, the increased flow of importables which would 
thereby have resulted would have damped inflationary pressures 
at least to some extent. In fact, the American government 
adopted a bargaining posture under which it: 1) demanded to 
repay the "w~n advances" at a "reasonable" exchange rate at 
the time of repayment; 2) chastised the Korean government for 
permitting a high rate of inflation; and 3) as a means of apply­
ing pressure, refused to pay anything for tile w6n advances while 
negotiations were under way as to the appropriate exchange rate 
ior repayment. 
The Korean government simultaneously adopted a policy of: 
1) maintaining the parity of the currency in order to increase 
bargaining power and thus increase the real proceeds from the 
w6n advances; 2) demanding payment against the win advances 
at the (overvalued) exchange rates that prevailed when tile win 
were issued; and 3) attempting to limit inflationary pressures 
only insofar as cajoled into doing so as part of a negotiated 
settlement of each tranche of the outstanding w6n advances.38 
American concern with Korean inflation had its origins in the 
ECA period. The Korean government had signed, as a precondi­
tion for ECA assistance, a joint protocol identical to that 
employed in Europe, under which the Korean government 
agreed to maintain monetary and fiscal stability as part of its 
contribution toward reconstruction. In April 1950, American 
concern with Korean inflation had mounted to a point where 
the then Secretary of S.te, Dear Acheson, sent a formal 
memorandum to the Government of the Republic of Korea, in 
which it was strongly hinted that the entire ECA program 
would be reassessed unless measures were taken to control 
inflation. 9 
Obviously, the outbreak of the war intensified inflationary 
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pressures enormously, and those pressures persisted throughout 
the 1950s in varying degrees. it is not the purpose here to 
investigate the causes of inflation, but it is pertinent tc note 
that issues of trade and exchange-rate policy in Korea were 
decided against a background of inflation, which implied that 
the K can currency was becoming increasingly overvalued in 
the .bsence of action to devalue it. In addition to the usual 
reluctance to devalue, the w6n advances provided a strong 
lncenn'e for the government to refuse to alter the exchange 
rate, as this would weaken its bargaining position with respect 
to the dollar amoUnts to be received for w~n advances.4" At a 
time when dollars received against w~n advances were the major 
source of foreign exchange, it is hardly surprising that this issue 
created difficulty. Much of the aid relationship in the late 1950s 
centered around this issue. 
TRADE FLOWS DURING THE KOREAN WAR 
The Korean Var was a period during which the economy lost 
ground; much of what had been reconstructed during the 1946­
1949 period was destroyed as most of South Korea changed 
hands in the fighting. Trade flows were therefore important 
primarily in providing commodities to civilians who otherwise 
would have suffered even more severely through inadequate 
food, insufficient clothing, inadequate housing, and disease. 
As is apparent from Table 1, commerical imports were below 
their 1949 level in 1951, and probably also in 1950, although 
records were lost in the war so that the data are incomplete. 
Imports began growing rapidly in 1952 and 1953, as payment 
for the first w6n advances was received and was used to finance 
a flow of commercial imports in excess of foreign exchange 
earnings through exports. To be sure, some of the commodities 
imported must have been sold to troops stationed in Korea, 
although military imports were separately recorded. 
Exports remained low throughout the war. There are rio 
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Korean estimates of the dolbr value of commercial flows for 
the period prior to 1953, which makes it very difficult to esti­
mate the relative importance of commercial imports contrasted 
with aid-financed imports. One approach is to convert the trade 
data from Table 1 at the official exchange rate, and then to 
compare them with either the IMF estimates of the dollar value 
of total imports (f.o.b.) or with the recorded dollar flow of aid­
financed imports. The results of these computations are 
reported in Table 6. The results are indicative only of probable 
orders of magnitude, but nonetheless are sufficient to show that 
aid was far more important than commercial imports which 
were, in any event, financed largely by repayment for w6n 
advances rather than by export earnings. 
TABLE 6 	 Indicators of Relative Importance of Aid 
and Commercial Imports, 1950-1953 
Aid as 
Commercial Total Aid % of 
Imports Imports Total Imports 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
($ millions) 
1950 2.89 n.a. 58.7 n.a. 
1951 406 171.8 106.5 62 
1952 11.74 194.7 161.0 83 
1953 37.28 314.0 188.4 60 
Sources: Column (1). Data from Table 1 converted at the official exchange rate (1.8 
for 1950, 3 for 1951,6 for 1952 and 1953).
 
Column (2). IMF, InterationalFinancialStatistics, (May 1976), line 71 rd.
 
Imports are f.o.b. 
Column (3). Table 5. 
To all intents and purposes, therefore, the Korean economy of 
the years during the war was h.ghly dependent upon imports 
and financed those imports by aid or by w6n advances: com­
mercial foreign exchange earnings were an almost insignificant 
factor. 
Reliable national income accounts estimates are not available 
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for the period prior to 1953. For 1953, imports are estimated 
to have been 12.9 percent of GNP, while exports were about 2 
percent of GNP. 4' It is probable that that share was slightly 
greater than in the preceding years, but, even so, it is apparent 
that imports constituted a major source of supply of commodi­
ties, and a significant damper to the inflationary pressures that 
existed. Indeed, it is difficult to try to imagine what the rate of 
inflation might have been in the absence of the import surplus. 
As mentioned above, CRIK provided the major source of aid­
financed imports in the 1950-1953 period. Table 7 gives the 
commodity composition of CRIK aid, showing that food and 
clothing comprised the major portion of CRIK supplies in both 
1951 and 1952: items such as agricultural equipment, transport 
equipment, and construction materials, which would have been 
TABLE 7 CRIK Supplies Received, by Principal Commodity 
(S1 ,OOOs) 
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Foodstuffs 37,746 45,756 73,974 23,397 8,721 
(Rice) (20,121) (18,537) (30,236) (853) (2,310) 
(Barley) (6,831) (12,474) (17,502) (5,343) -
Medical and Sanita­
tion Supplies 6,220 5,592 1,742 1,362 1,035 
Fuel 555 8,991 12,985 2,810 -
Construction Materials 4,496 5,560 13,260 1,674 2,893 
Transportation Equip­
ment 1,947 1,454 347 485 393 
Agricultural Equip­
ment - 23,495 19,874 13,904 14 
Rubber and Products 1,039 3,875 709 - -
Textiles and Clothing 25,444 47,004 33,286 5,037 583 
Miscellaneous - 13,805 2,610 1,472 395 
TOTAL 77,447 155,532 158,787 50,141 14,034 
Source: BOK, Economic Review, various issues. 
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destined to increase productive capacity, were almost negligible 
until 1953. Even in that year, food and textiles accounted for 
more than two-thirds of total supplies provided through CRIK. 
Thus, if ever aid could be classified as destined for "main­
tenance," it was the aid provided to Korea during the period of 
active fighting. Such aid was obviously essential if a higher 
incidence of malnutrition, exposure, and disease was to be 
prevented. It did not, however, contribute directly to tile 
modernization of Korea, except in the sense of buying time 
until rcconstruction could begin once again. 
THE TRADE-AND-PAYMENTS REGIMES, 
1945-1953 
Inflation was rampant during the entire 1945-1953 period, 
although the rate varied from a low of around 60 percent from 
1948-1949 and 1952-1953 to a high of 700 percent during 
1945. This -eflected, of course, severe demand pressures result­
ingboth from the disruption of supply and from the attempts of 
the government to command resources. 
In such circumstances, pressure upon the balance of payments 
was inevitable under any sort of trade-and-payments regime. 
The fact that export capacity had been virtually destroyed 
implied that, without other sources of foreign exchange, imports 
would be constrained to very small amounts. In fact, there was a 
strong tendency to attempt further to restrict imports by 
quantitative techniques while resisting pressures to devalue the 
currency. The overvaluation of the currency, in turn, implied 
that withholding foreign exchange earnings, such is they were, 
from official channels could be extremely profitable if such 
currency were sold in the black market or used to finance the 
purchase of goods that could then be imported extra-legally and 
sold at an extremely high premium. Currency overvaluation also 
undoubtedly discouraged exports, thereby further intensifying 
pressures on the balance of payments. 
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The 1945-19,53 period, therefore, was one during which 
changes in the exchange rate, although frequent, came too little 
and too late. Simultaneously, exchange-control regulations were 
continuously altered in an effort to try to channel foreign­
exchange transactions through legal mechanisms. 
EXCHANGE RATES 
Table 8 provides data on the nominal and real exchange rates 
that prevailed for some major categories of transactions over the 
period. In the period right after the American occupation began, 
exchange rates were meaningless, as virtually all private trade was 
conducted under barter arrangements. Likewise, special export 
incentives, tariffs on imports, and special exchainge rates 
applicable to them meant that the effective rates for each cat­
egory of transaction differed, and most were generally above 
those shown in Table 8. 
Nonetheless, the rates given in the two left-hand colmns o 
Table 8 are significant because they reflect the cfficial rate 
which served as a basis both for government purchases of 
foreign goods and services, and for remuneration of the :v',, 
advances. Comparison of those two rates with the U.S. green­
back rate (black market rate for d.llars) provides one partial 
indication of the extent to which both the official -ate and the 
greenback rate were overvalued. 
Inspection of the exchange r'Ltes in Table 8 indicates why the 
exchange rate could not itself be significant for most private 
transactions: despite frequent devaluations, the real exchange 
rate generally failed to keep pace with inflation. In that circum­
stance, the exchange rate could not serve as a major deterrent to 
imports or as an incentive for exports. This can be seen in two 
ways: examination of the behavior of the black market rate. and 
analysis of changes in the real exchange rate. 
Black market rates are not always a reliable indicator of the 
extent of excess demand for foreign exchange at the prevailing 
exchange rate. This is especially so when the black market rate 
is a currency rate, applicable only to cash. For, in that instance, 
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it usually proves possible to use currency onl for relatively 
small transactions, often consumer gcoo. 'rhere is less reason 
than usual to doubt the validity of the U.S. greenback rate, 
however, since the rates on U.S. greenbacks and MPC (military 
payments certificates) applied to (illegal) purchases of goods 
from the American PX. Even so, the black market rate relative 
to the official rate must be viewed with considerable caution is 
an indicator of the extent to which excess demand prevailed. 
It is unfortunate tiat there are no black market quotations 
prior to 1948. The first one available, for October 1948, indi­
cates a black market rate about 1.7 times the official rate. By 
June 1949, the gap had widened consicerably, with the black 
market rate equal to about 4.8 times the offici:il rate. The gap 
between the two rates then narrowed, as the official rate was 
doubled in May 1950. At the outbreak of the Korean War, the 
differential between the two rates had fallen to its lowest point, 
at about 130 percent of the official rate. It stayed within a small 
range of that differential until December, but thereafter the gap 
opened markedly. It was during this period that controversy sur­
rounding the exchange rate at which w6n advances should be 
repaid was at its height. The differential between the official 
rate and the black market rate remained huge up to and includ­
ing the time of the Armistice in August 1953. As can be seen, 
the black market rate was then about 4.4 times the official rate. 
While it is difficult to attach very much significance to the 
precise magnitude of the differential or dates of turning points, 
premiums as large as 200 and 300 percent are symptomatic of 
very severe currency overvaluation. While the effective exchange 
rates 42 for most transactions were usually somewhat above the 
official rate, they were by no means sufficient to absorb the 
differential indicated by the data in Table 8. 
That overvaluation was severe can also be seen in the right­
hand half of Table 8. There, the nominal exchange rates 
indicated on the left were divided by the wholesale price index 
(on a 1965 base) to provide an index of the "real" exchange 
rate. A higher number implies a less overvalued exchange 
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Nominal Exchange Rates PriceLevel DeflatedExchange Rates 
(current w~n per dollar) (1965 w~n per dollar) 
Official CounterpartDeposit U.S. Official CounterpartDeposit U.S. 
Effective Date Ratea Rateb Greenbacksc Ratea Rateb Greenbacksc 
Oct. 1, 1945 0.015 - - 93.8 
July 15, 1947 0.05 - 29.2 - -
Oct. 1, 1948 0.44 - 0.74 148.1 - 249.2 
Dec. 15, 1948 0.45 0.45 n.a. 137.6 137.6 n.a. 
June 14, 1949 0.9 0.45 2.17 252.1 126.1 607.8 
Nov. 1, 1949 0.9 0.5 2.55 189.4 105.3 536.8 
Dec. 1, 1949 0.9 0.6 2.83 176.1 117.4 553.8 
Jan. 1, 1950 
Apr. 1, 1950 
0.9 
0.9 
0.8 
0.9 
3.48 
2.98 
159.3 
150.8 
141.6 
150.8 
615.9 
499.2 
Q 
. 
May 1, 1950 1.8 1.1 2.28 304.1 185.8 385.1 
May 15, 1950 1.6 1.1 2.28 270.3 185.8 385.1 
June 10, 1950 1.6 1.4 2.42 260.2 227.6 393.5 
June 25, 1950 i.8 1.8 2.42 292.7 292.7 393.5 
Oct. 1, 1950 1.8 2.5 2.58 162.2 225.5 232.4 
Nov. 1, 1950 2.5 2.5 3.42 196.9 196.9 269.3 
Dec. 1, 1950 2.5 4.0 6.12 170.1 272.1 416.3 
TABLE 8 (continued) 
NominalExchange Rates Price Level DeflatedExchange Rates 
(current w n perdollar) (1965 w n perdollar) 
Counterpart Counterpart 
Official Deposit U.S. Official Deposit U.S. 
Effective Date Ratea Rateb Greenbacksc Ratea Rateb Greenbacksc 
May 1, 1951 2.5 6.0 9.83 91.2 219.0 358.8 
Nov. 10, 1951 6.0 6.0 18.21 132.7 132.7 402.9 
Average 1952 6.0 6.0 n.a. 71.3 71.3 n.a. 
Aug. 28, 1953 6.0 18.0 26.4 55.6 166.7 244.4 
Dec. 15, 1953 18.0 18.0 38.7 152.5 152.5 328.0 3 
Source: Frank, Kim, aad Westphal, ForeignTrade Regimes, pp. 30-32. 
Notes: a~ther rates altered b~twcen the dates shown, but the official and counterpart deposit rates did not.bTes onterartDepsatesalt redmben ntedatesfhwnt the ficilan d cuntepA-RtK dgreepttes did.cn a 
"The Counterpart Deposit Rates came into effect with the signing of the ECA-ROK Agreement. U.N. currency advances were subject to I
slightly different rates for part of the period.
cThe U.S. greenback rate is the estimated black market rate for U.S. currency. 
The 1945-1953 Period 
rate, that is, a higher price of foreign commodities relative to 
domestic commodities. 
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The data in Table 8 indicate that the real nominal exchange 
rate fell sharply after 1945. ' Even a devaluation of massive 
proportions in July 1947 failed to restore the real exchange rate 
to more than one-third its October 1945 level. Successive 
devaluations in 1948 and 1949 increased the real price of 
foreign exchange somewhat, and it appears to have reached its 
highest level in May of 1950. 
The impact of the Korean War and the accompanying inflation 
on the real exchange rate can easily be seen by examining 
the data for 1950-1953. By August 1953, the real exchange rate 
was less than 20 percent of its pre-war peak. The extent to 
which that represented severe currency overvaluation is evident 
when it is recalled that even the real exchange rate of May 1950 
was probably overvalued, although by a smaller proportio.1 than 
at any other time during the 1945-1953 period. Even the huge 
devaluation-by 300 percent-of December 1953 failed to 
restore more than half the erosion in the real rate that had 
preceded it. This is a factor of considerable importance in 
interpreting the behavior of exports over the years immediately 
after the Korean War. 
The remaining point to be noted from Table 8 is the relation­
ship between the counterpart-deposit rate and the official rate. 
The rate to be paid on w6n advances, the UNC rate, was generally 
close to the counterpart-deposit rate after 1950, being 2.5 w6n 
per dollar from October 1, 1950 to March 11, 1951, 6 w6n per 
dollar from then until August 28, 1953, and 18 w6n per dollar 
thereafter. Under the original agreement between the United 
States and the Korean government, w~n advances were supposed 
to be repaid in doliars at the official exchange rate prevailing at 
the time the advances were made by the Bank of Korea. There 
were very few redemptions at that rate, however, because of 
the American belief that the government was deliberately 
refusing to devalue. It was not until February 1953 that an 
agreement was finally reached under which advances would be 
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redeemed within twenty days, and all outstandinS, advances from 
earlier dates were repaid at the rate of 18 w~n per dollar.4" 
EXCHANGE CONTROL 
In the context of rapid inflation, a fixed exchange rate with 
infrequent and usually insufficiently large devaluations, and 
virtually nonexistent foreign exchange earnings, it was inevitable 
that a variety of quantitative restrictions and other measures 
would have to be taken to absorb excess demand. When, in 
addition, the Korean government itself re eived title to foreign 
exchange, as it did when w6n advance redemptions became 
important, the situation was further confounded. From 1945 
until 1960 (well past the period under review here) the foreign 
trade regime became increasingly complex and cumbersome. 
Most aspects, however, had their origins in the 1946-1953 
period, and those developments are worth noting. 
First, with regard to exchange comtrol itself, the bulk of trade 
was initially barter and the Chos6n Exchange Bank was formed 
for purposes of adninisttring it in 1947. The period also saw the 
introduction of tariffs in 1946 and the adoption in 1949 of a 
tariff system which lasted without major changes until 195'. In 
addition, the mechanism for licensing of imports and exports 
was developed in 1946, and the system that prevailed until 
1960 was adopted in 1949. Finally, the first export incentives, 
of a kind that would prevail for much of the rest of the 1950s, 
were introduced in 1951. 
To understand the background against which exchange-control 
procedures were formulated, it is necessary to recognize that a 
sizable portion of private foreign trade was conducted under 
barter arrangements from 1946 to 1953.46 Initially, in 1946 and 
1947, foreign traders, mainly from Hong Kong and Macao, 
carried out barter trade at southern Korean ports. Koreans were 
involved primarily as brokers for the Chinese, since they them­
selves had little experience or capital. 
After the Chosin Exchange Bank was established, a series of 
devices was developed to expedite barter trade. One of the early 
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ones was "trust shipping" wherein exFort documents could, in 
effect, be accompanied by an order for commodities to be 
imported.47 This system was obviously highly inefficient but, 
nonetheless, provided a sizable incentive to exporters. It set a 
pattern which has prevailed through much of Korea's ilioderni­
zation: exporting and importing have, to a large extent, been 
done by the same people. 
The years 1948 and 1949 saw a number of measures intro­
duced designed to reduce the restrictiveness of the barter 
system. In particular, an account was opened with Japan so that 
exporters were no longer constrained to import through the 
same Japanese trader to whom they exported. By late 1949, 
arrangements were being made whereby some expenditure of 
yell in other countries could also be permitted. These arrange­
ments had not progressed very far, however, when the Korean 
War broke out. The goods on the docks at Pusan were shipped 
to Japan on consignment, and other export activity virtually 
ceased. 
Before the outbreak of the Korean War, the Bank of Korea 
replaced the Chosbn Exchange Bank, absorbing its exchange­
control functions. All private foreign exchange was required by 
law to be turned over to the Bank of Korea, which held 
accounts denominated in foreign currencies to guard against 
,xchange risk. Throughout the Korean War, the Bank of Korea 
waz engaged in rceiving foreign cxchange, in redeeming w6n 
advances, and also in administering exchange control. "Loan 
funds" were established in 1952, which, in effect, required 
"guarantee deposits" from importers applying for foreign 
exchange.4" The system was discontinued in 1954 but was 
replaced by an equally complex series of charges. 
Tariff policy was also crystallizing in the period prior to the 
Korean War. In 1946, the U.S. Military Government impused an 
across-the-board 10 percent tariff, and only commodity imports 
financed by foreign assistance were exempted. That ta!iff was 
replaced in 1949. It is estimated that the new average tariff rate 
was 40 percent.49 
38
 
Trade-and-Payments,1945-1953 
The general purposes of the 1949 tariff reform were to raise 
additional revenue for the government and to give increased 
protection to goods manufactured in Korea. Thus, food-grains 
and non-competing capital goods and raw materials were to be 
imported duty free; 10 percent tariffs were established on 
"essential" goods for which there was little domestic produc­
tion, while tariffs of 10 and 20 percent were set respectively for 
unfinished goods not produced and goods produced in Korea; 
a comparable distinction was made for finished goods, with 
rates of 30 and 40 percent, while semi-luxury goods were 
dutiable at rates ranging from 50 to 90 percent, and luxury 
goods were taxed at rates of 100 percent and more. 
The system increased in complexity over time. The first 
change was in 1952, when tariff exemptions were set for 
machinery and equipment imports destined for "key" industries. 
Despite increasing complexity, however, the basic rate structure 
introduced in 1949 remained in effect throughout the 1950s. 
Along ,with exchange control and the tariff system, the system 
of administering quantitative restrictions started in 1946. 
Import and export licensing was instituted in that year and has 
prevailed continuously since, although there have been impor­
tant variations in the nature Jf the licensing system and the 
extent to which it has been restrictive. 
From 1946 until February 1949, the licensing system was 
remarkably simple: the auth jrities announced which com­
modities would be eligible for importation and which would 
not; no effort was made to regulate the quantity of eligible 
imports that would be permitted. In 1949, however, the system 
was replaced with one that lasted throughout the 1950s, under 
which import programs (which were quarterly until 1953) were 
announced, indicating not only the commodities that would be 
eligible for importation but the amount that could be imported. 
Under this system, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
licensed imports; quotas were separate for Japan and for other 
countries. 
An indication of the restrictiveness of the import licensing 
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system is provided by the fact that the first major export incen­
tive was an "export-import link" system introduced in 1951.50 
Under this system, certain commodities were designated that 
might be imported only by exporters. These exporters were 
then given permission to spend a specified fraction of their 
foreign exchange receipts-initially 1 to 5 percent, depending 
on the commodity-on these commodities. To provide an 
incentive for exporting, the markup on these items must have 
been substantial. The export-import link system, in one form or 
another, persisted throughout most of the 1950s and into the 
1960s. 
As of 1953, therefore, the basic characteristics of the trade­
and-payments regime as it would persist throughout the 1 950s 
were already set. The Korean currency was substantially over­
valued. Exports were a small fraction of imports which were 
financed primarily with aid receipts. Imports were permitted 
only under licensing and subject to quarterly import programs. 
And import licenses were extremely valuable with the domestic 
prices of most import commodities well above the amount paid 
for them by importers. 
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Trade and Aid, 1953 to 1960 
For the Korean economy, the years from 1953 to 1957 were a 
period of reconstruction, while the 1958 to 1960 period was one 
of very slow growth, if not stagnation. For purposes of analyz­
ing trade and aid, however, all these years can be viewed as one 
period: policy with respect to trade, aid, and exchange rates 
exhibited a high degree of continuity. 
During 1953-1957, economic growth proceeded at a fairly 
satisfactory rate-about 5 percent per annum in real terms-as 
the economy recovered from the devastation and destruction of 
the Korean War. It was also at this time that aid reached its 
peak, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of resources 
available to the Korean economy. Alchough UNKRA provided 
a significant flow of commodities to Korea in the 1953-1955 
period, the United States decided fairly shortly after the end of 
the war that aid to Korea should be bilateral. Therefore, most 
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of the aid received during the entire period came directly from 
the United States via bilateral channels, and even that part 
originating from UNKRA was financed largely by the American 
contribution. 
The trade-and-payments regime was heavily oriented toward 
import substitution over the entire 1953-1960 period. A major 
difference between the 1953-1957 period and the 1958-1960 
period was that aid flows, which permitted the growth of 
imports even with stagnant export earnings during the recon­
struction years, peaked in 1957 and began declining thereafter. 
The attempt to continue import substitution after 1957 there­
fore took place against the background of declining imports, a 
fact that had significant implications for resource allocation. 
Economists learn early in their careers that everything depends 
on everything else. Seldom has this been more the case than 
with the various components of trade, aid, and the payments 
regime during the post-war years. The exchange rate continued 
to be the football of the aid relationship and did not play a 
major role in equating the supply and demand for foreign 
exchange. Quantitative restrictions, therefore, played an impor­
tant role in allocating scarce foreign exchange. Production for 
export was discouraged both by the attraction of new resources 
to the sheltered domestic market and by the relatively unattrac­
tive real '.xchange rates. Imports, therefore, were financed 
largely by aid funds, while private capital flows, like exports, 
were negligible. Even with a huge aid-financed import surplus, 
however a sizable premium accrued to those who were able to 
buy imports, as the domestic price of most importables rose 
well above landed cost. This, in turn, orovided a sizable incen­
tive for import-substitution oriented production and also created 
a source of corruption. 
Because of the high degree of interdependence among the 
various facets of aid, trade, and the payments regime, it is dif­
ficult to consider each aspect separately. Nonetheless, it seems 
desirable to begin by considering the trade-and-payments regime 
within which exports, imports, and aid functioned, even though 
it should be recalled that the trade-an, I-payments regime was 
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partially determined, both directly and indirectly, by negotia­
tions over aid flows. Brief consideration can then be given to the 
behavior of exports over the reconstruction years. Then some 
indication of the scope of import substitution can be provided, 
and the composition of imports and the volume of aid analyzed.' 
Finally, the aid relationship that surrounded exchange-rate nego­
tiations and determination of commodity flows can be discussed. 
EXCHANGE RATES 
AND EXCHANGE CONTROLS 
At the end of the Korean War, a massive 300 percent devalua­
tion was agreed upon.2 Already there were several different 
exchange rates in effect for various categories of transactions, 
and the number of rates, as also the complexity of the rate 
structure, had increased over the war years. The exchange control 
and import licensing system that had begun in 1949, however, 
also continued, with import programs converted to a semi­
annual rather than a quarterly basis. The Korean trade-and­
payments regime during the 1953-1960 period can, therefore, 
be best described as a combination of a multiple exchange-rate 
system and of quantitative controls. Throughout the period, the 
complexity of the regime was increasing as export incentives, 
special treatment for commodities imported for specified pur­
poses, and other exigencies led the authorities to devise new 
regulations, incentives, and categories. 
Despite the ever-increasing complexity of the system, import 
licenses became more valuable as time progressed, at least until 
1957. The allocation of aid funds and of licenses became trouble­
some, as the licenses became increasingly valuable. -
EXCHANGE RATES 
Nominal rates 
Table 9 gives data on nominal and real exchange rates for the 
1954-1957 period. The data are comparable with those in 
Table 8. That is, they represent nominal rather than effective 
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TABLE 9 Nominal and Real Exchange Rates, 1954-1957 
Dec. 15, 1953 

Nov. 10, 1954 

Dec. 13, 1954 

Jan. 10, 1955 

April 18, 1955 

Aug. 15, 1955 

Average 1956 

Average 1957 

Dec. 15, 1953 

Nov. 10, 1954 

Dec. 13, 1954 

Jan. 10, 1955 

April 18, 1955 

Aug. 15, 1955 

Official 

Rate 

18.0 
18.0 
18.0 
18.0 
18.0 
50.0 
50.0 
50.0 
152.5 
104.0 
101.0 
76.3 
74.6 
154.8 
Counter-
part 
Deposit 
Rate 
18.0 
18.0 
18.0 
35.0 
35.0 
50.0 
50.0 
50.0 
152.5 
104.0 
101.0 
148.3 
145.2 
154.8 
Japan Other 
Export Export U.S. 
Dollars Dollars Greenbacks 
Nominal Rates (current won per dollar) 
- - 38.7 
77.7 74.0 65.6 
80.9 78.0 71.1 
92.3 83.5 77.2 
75.6 46.6 74.8 
95.0 82.0 80.2 
107.0 100.8 96.6 
112.3 105.7 103.3 
Real Rates (1965 w~n per dollar) 
- - 328.0 
449.1 427.7 379.2 
454.4 438.2 299.4 
391.1 353.8 327.1 
313.7 193.4 310.4 
294.1 253.9 248.3 
Military
 
Payments
 
Certificates
 
(MPC) 
29.3 
53.0 
57.6 
62.9 
60.5 
66.2 
81.0 
84.5 
248.3 
306.4 
323.6 
266.5 
251.0 
205.0 
TABLE 9 (Continued) 
Official 
Rate 
Average 1956 136.6 
Average 1957 117.6 
Source: Same as Table 8. 
Counter-
part 
Deposit 
Rate 
136.6 
117.6 
Japan 
Export 
Dollars 
292.3 
264.2 
Other 
Export 
Dollars 
275.4 
248.7 
U.S. 
Greenbacks 
263.9 
243.1 
Military 
Payments 
Certificates 
(MP) 
221.3 
198.8 
tri 
0. 
Trade and Aid, 1953 to 1960 
exchange rates. 3 Throughout most of the period, effective 
exchange rates were above nominal rates because of tariffs, sur­
charges, and other pricing measures superimposed on the 
exchange rate. Estimates of effective exchange rates are given 
for the 1955 to 1960 period in Table 10. There are no estimates 
of effective rates available for the earlier years. 
The nominal exchange rates in effect on December 15, 1953, 
are reproduced in Table 9 to provide a basis for comparison. 
A major devaluation at that time had tripled the official 
exchange rate, although in real terms it was well below its pre­
1950 level. As can be seen, the nominal exchange rate was 
constant throughout 1954, both for official transactions and for 
redemption of w6n advances. As a conscquence, the real 
exchange rate for transactions carried out at the official rate and 
the counterpart-deposit rate fell sharply, reaching about half the 
December 1953 level by January 1955. 
To counteract some of the effects of severe overvaluation 
(which, as indicated above, was done as a deliberate policy to 
increase the real value of the dollars received in exchange for 
w6n advances), special export rates were introduced during 
1954. One of these was for "Japan Export Dollars." This rate 
was the dollar rate at which exporters of commodities to Japan 
could sell their yen to importers. Another "export dollar rate" 
applied to dollars earned in other markets. The Japan export 
dollar rate was generally above the other export dollar rate as 
total imports from Japan were constrained not to exceed earn­
ings from exports to Japan. Both export dollar rates were well 
above the official rate and the counterpart-deposit rate. Indeed, 
they were also above the U.S. greenback rate and the military 
payment certificate rate. 
Effective Rates 
Although there was no official devaluation between 1955 and 
1960, the continuous imposition and alteration of various 
charges on purchases of foreign exchange and incentives for 
exports meant that effective exchange rates were altered 
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frequently throughout the period. For the 1955-1960 period, 
data are available to provide estimates of effective exchange 
rates. Table 10 gives estimates of nominal, effective, real (PLD) 
and purchasing-power-parity (PPP) effective exchange rates.4 
Charges on imports are examined separately, so that attention 
can focus on rates applicable to exports at this juncture.' As 
comparison of the export EERs with the export dollar rates in 
Table 9 indicates, the subsidies to exports were relatively small­
probably less than 1 percent of exporters' receipts per dollar of 
exports. It was these special rates themselves that provided the 
incentive, such as it was, to export. Manipulation of the Japan 
dollar and other export dollar meant that export incentives did 
not depreciate with inflation. The real export EER, given in 
Table 10, increased throughout the period; it was 223 in 1955, 
252 in 1957, and 319 in 1960. Even if the effects of inflation 
are allowed for, therefore, incentives for export appear to have 
increased. To be sure, the volume of exports was extremely small 
even as late as 1960. This resulted from the bias of the regime 
against exports as reflected in the exchange rate and in the 
implicit premiums on domestic production of import substi­
tutes.6 
Chargeson Imports 
Increasing overvaluation of the exchange rate also occurred with 
respect to imports. Had there been no quantitative restrictions 
on international transactions, the inflow of imports would have 
been significantly greater than even that level which was 
financed by aid. Exchange control continued, however, so that 
some commodities were eligible for importation at rates close 
to those shown in Tables 9 and 10, while other commodities 
could not be legally imported at all. 
Perhaps the most startling feature of Table 10 is the extent to 
which the EER for imports was below that for exports. This 
reflects the fact that it was predominantly quantitative restric­
tions, and not the exchange rate itself, that determined import 
flows and the level of protection to domestic industries. 
47
 
TABLE 10 Nominal, Effective, and Purchasing-Power-Parity 
Exchange Rates for Imports and Exports, 1955-1960 
A. 	Official Exchange Rate 
(w~n per dollar) 
B. 	Average Export Dollar Premiums 
(w~n per dollar) 
C. 	Export Subsidies per Dollar Export 
(w~n per dollar) 
D. 	Export Effective Exchange Rate (EER) 
(A + B +C) 
E. 	Price-Level-Deflated (PLD) EER for 
Exports (D divided by 1965 price 
index) 
F. 	Purchasing-Power-Parity (PPP) EER 
for Exports (E times average price 
level of trading partners) 
G. Tariff Equivalents (wZn per dollar) 
H. EER for Impoits (A +C) 
I. 	 PLD EER for Imports 
1955 

36.8 
n.a. 
n.a. 
72.2 
n.a. 
223.8 
n.a. 
42.1 
n.a. 
1956 

50.0 
n.a. 
n.a. 
102.8 
n.a. 
268.3 
n.a. 
57.3 
n.a. 
1957 

50.0 
n.a. 
n.a. 
108.9 
n.a. 
252.6 
n.a. 
58.4 
n.a. 
1958 

50.0 
64.0 
1.2 
115.2 
288.7 
280.6 
14.4 
64.4 
160.4 
1959 

50.0 
84.7 
1.3 
136.0 
333.3 
325.6 
32.8 
82.8 
202.9 
1960
 
62.5 
83.9 
1.2 
147.6 
326.5 
319.6 
37.7 
100.2 
221.6 
i 
TABLE 10 (continued) 
1955 1956 1957 
J. PPR EER for Imports 130.5 149.6 135.5 
Sources: Kwang, Suk Kim, "Outward-Looking Industrialization Strategy: The Case of Korea," 
Krueger, eds., Trade andDevelopment in Korea, (Seoul, 1975). 
Frank, Kim, and Westphal, pp. 70-73, for 1958 to 1960. 
Note: See Appendix A for definitions of the exchange rate measures used here. 
1958 1959 1960 
155.9 198.2 216.9 
p. 24 in Wontack Hong and Anne 0. 
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Charges on imports were significant and the EER was 
considerably above the nominal exchange rate, increasingly so as 
the period progressed. Aid was the primary source of foreign 
exchange, and sales of w6n for foreign troops was second. It 
thus fell to the government to allocate foreign exchange for 
imports both because of exchange control and because the 
foreign exchange was initially received by the government. ' 
Tariffs and other import charges probably did not affect the 
composition of imports in any significant way; that was achieved 
primarily through quantitative restrictions. What tariffs and 
other charges did do was to absorb some of the differential 
between import and domestic prices at the going exchange rate. 
it will be recalled that tariffs had been imposed in 1949, with 
rates ranging from 10 to 100 percent. These rates remained in 
effect, virtually unaltered, until 1957. At that t;rme, they were 
amended to take into account the altered ability of the 
domestic economy to provide various goods. In particular, a 
number of commodities were shifted from the schedules that 
applied to non-domestically produced goods to the schedules 
that applied to domestically produced goods. The net result was 
an increase in the simple average of rates by 4.1 percentage 
points. 
It is difficult to estimate how much tariffs contributed to 
effective exchange rates. Data on duties collected are available, 
but the Korean government was shifting fiscal years in 1955 and 
1956 (to conform to the American dates) and, as a consequence, 
tariff collections are reported for a fifteen-month 1955 and an 
eighteen-month 1957, with no data recorded for 1956. Customs 
duties and the w6n value of imports (both in millions of wbn) 
reported are listed in Table 11.8 The large fluctuations in these 
figures for 1954 to 1957 make one suspect that the change in 
fiscal year dominates the data. of course, to the extent that 
imports of "luxury" goods were increasingly discouraged, a 
lower average collection rate might have been expected. After 
1957, tariff collections as a percentage of imports rose, and 
tariffs probably constituted an increment to the nominal 
exchange rate of about 25 percent. Given the vast disparity 
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TABLE 11 	 Customs Duties Collected and 
W6n Value of Imports, 1953-1960 
Customs Duties Total Duties as a 
Receipts Imports Percent ofImports 
1953 351 6,200 	 5.7 
1954 999 	 4,400 22.7 
1955 1797 a 17,000 	 10.5 
1957 1571 a 22,100 	 7.1 
1958 2969 18,900 	 15.7 
1959 3560 15,200 	 23.4 
1960 5150 21,900 	 23.5 
Note: a 1 9 5 5 customs duty receipts were multiplied by 0.8, those for 1957 by 0.66 
to make them comparable with import data. 
between the official rate and the rate actually paid for imports, 
it is probable that factors other than tariffs contributed more 
to the wedge between the EEP.and the NER than did the tamiff, 
although the relative importance of tariff and other cha"ges 
undoubtedly varied by commodities. This is seen in Table 10, 
where the import EER exceeds the NER by 9, 66, and 60 
percent in 1958, 1959, and 1960, respectively. 
Several other regulations raised importers' costs. In the 
immediate post-war period, a major means of financing imports 
was through lending funds to commercial traders. One ]- n 
fund was allocated to exporters and raw material users; t6 ,ther 
was allocated among industries fox imports of capita, roods. 
These loans were supposed to be repaid in dollars within two or 
three months after receipt. They financed about 75 percent of 
private imports during the period when the loan fund was in 
effect-from late 1952 until mid-1954. 9 Initially, when a 
would-be importer received a '-)an, he was required to place a 
w6n deposit with the Bank of Korea; when the shipping docu­
ments were delive, ed, the borrowers were required to make an 
additional deposit equal to something between 9 and 23 w6n 
per dollar (compared to the official rate of 6 w6n). After 1953, 
however, deposits of 20 and 18 wSn per dollar were required 
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against the first and second loan funds, respectively; applicants 
for the first fund (for raw materials, and so on) were also 
required to place the w6n equivalent of their loan in a one-year 
time deposit at 4 percent interest. 
The loan system was replaced in mid-1954 by an auction 
system in which blocks of funds were auctioned off to the 
highest bidder. During 1954, bids ranged from 46 to 69 w6n 
per dollar.1 When it is recalled that the official exchange rate 
was 18 w6n per dollar, while export cates were two to three 
times that level, it is evident that the official e:-change rate held 
little meaning for most categories of transactions other than 
w6n advances."' 
The auction system, too, was abandoned in mid-1955, and 
foreign exchange for imports was allocated at the official 
exchange rate (after the devaluation) by lottery among appli­
cants for import licenses. It vas during this period, prior to the 
devaluation, that the premium on import licenses probably 
reached its peak. While premiums remained substantial over the 
next several years, it is likely that they were declining as a 
percentage of import value.' 
2 
By mid-1957, the lottery system also had been amended; 
foreign exchange was allocated among bidders on the basis of 
the amount of national bonds they were willing to buy. Given 
the vast disparity between the official exchange rate and the 
value of a dollar of foreign exchange, the implicit cost of 
national bonds purchased per dollar must have been substantial. 
Data, however, are not available with which it can be estimated. 
The System as of 1960 
Over the 1953-1960 period, the official rate was sufficiently 
unrealistic that it could not reasonably be expected to have 
allocated foreign exchange. The consequence was an uneasy 
compromise between allocating foreign exchange at something 
close to the official rate, letting the fortunate recipients capture 
the implicit value of the premium, and auctioning off the foreign 
exchange, with the result that the government earned the 
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implicic premivrms. Perhaps of equal importance from the view­
point of the effect on domestic producers, the system was in a 
cons.-anz state of flux: no method of allocating foreign exchange 
remained in effect for more than a year and a half. That there 
was uncertainty as to the future availability of foreign exchange 
under any system, auction or lottery, must have increased the 
protection afforded to the domestic market by the foreign 
trade regime. 
A snapshot picture of exchange rates as of 1960 is provided 
by the structure reproduced in Table 12. Even that table does 
not include the tariffs applicable to individual import trans­
actions or the subsidies for exports, although the latter were 
relatively small, as seen in Table 10. As this table indicates, sales 
of w~n to U.N. forces continued to be carried out at the official 
exchange rate, while most other export transactions were 
effected at a rate twice the official rate. On the import side, the 
rate structure was more complex. Imports made by the Korean 
govern mnent and some aid-financed imports were effected at the 
offic.al exchange rate, although in many cases the resale of the 
commodities was at a price much higher than that paid for the 
imports, so that the government's profits were reflected else­
where. At 80 w6n per dollar-not significantly above the official 
rate-cotton and wheat imports w.,ere permitted. For most 
transactions, however, the import tate (before tariffs) w'.s 
between 110 w6n per dollar and 134 w6n per dollar. Thus, the 
variation in effective exchange rates across commodity categories 
on the import side appears to have been sizable. While some 
commodities were imported at rates well below those applicable 
to export earnings, many others were imported at exchange rates 
equal to those applicable to exports and, in addition, duties had 
to be paid on them. Inspection of the range of exchange rates, 
and recognition that tariffs were high on goods produced 
domestically, indicate that some imports faced much higher 
EERs than others. When, in addition, it is recalled that many 
commodities were either entirely ineligible for importation or 
subject to severe quantitative restrictions, the apparent anomaly 
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of an import-substitution-oriented regime with a higher EER for 
exports than for imports disappears. 
QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS 
As shown above, a number of implicit charges, such as w6n 
deposits against foreign exchange loans, applied to particular 
TABLE 12 	 Structure of Nominal Exchange Rates as of
 
February 23, 1960
 
(wSn per U.S. dollar)
 
Buying 	 Selling 
65 (official rate) 65 (official rate) Government imports. 
Applies to voluntary Aid-financed imports for specified 
sales of foreign projects. 
exchange to the Bank 
of Korea, U.S. off- 80 (official rate plus 15 w~n tax) 
shore procurement, Specified aid-financed imports (cot­
sales of w~n to the ton and wheat) by certain importers 
U.N. forces, and (non-project non-end users). 
other inrisibles. 
123.3 	 (official rate plus 15 w~n tax plus 
43.3 w~n variable tax) Other aid­
financed imports. 
133 (transfer rate) 110.5 (official rate plus 15 w~n tax plus 
Exchange credited to 30.5 w~n variable tax) Imports 
import accounts financed with exchange supplied by 
and sold to importers. the government. 
134.0 	 (transfer rate) Imports paid with 
exchange purchased from holders of 
Import Accounts. 
Source: IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions,1960, p. 230. 
Note: Other rates applied to trade with Japan and missionary transactions. Export
subsidies, tariffs, and other charges are not included. 
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categories of transactions. Despite the multiplicity and com­
plexity of exchange rates, however, tLey were not the chief 
instrument employed to contain the demand for imports; 
quantitative restrictions were dominant. 
As previously mentioned, beginning in 1949, quarterly import 
programs had been published, listing commodities that would 
be eligible for importation and the value of imports of each 
category that would be permitted. There were three levels of 
categories on the lists-section, group, and item-and substitu­
tion within groups was possible with permission of the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry. This sytem continued until the 
middle of 1955, although the programs became semi-annual 
after 1953 and, of course, the list of cr nmodities was altered to 
suit current conditions. 
Any quantitative restriction system under which items not 
listed are ineligible for importation-a positive list system-is 
inherently restrictionist, since the import prohibition implicit in 
failure to list an item provides a high degree of protection. In 
addition, the facts that would-be importers must apply to a 
ministry for a license and that the application is reviewed for 
conformity with the import program provide additional disin­
centives to importation, both because of the delays and red tape 
surrounding licenses and because of uncertainty as to whether 
the license will be issued (either because the commodities 
applied for might be construed to be outside the list of 
permitted imports, or because the quota might be oversub­
scribed and the application either only partially fulfilled or 
denied). 
There is little information about the detailed working of the 
system prior to the 1955 devaluation. Imports were then 
partitioned into two groups of eligible commodities-special 
imports and ordinary imports. The former were eligible for 
importation only with proceeds from export sales; the latter 
could be imported with foreign exchange either sold by the 
gove nment or earned from exporting. Once an item appeared 
on a list, no license was required. There were a few commodities 
for which prior approval was still necessary, and implicit 
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prohibition continued to prevail for commodities riot listed, 
although the Ministry of Commerce and lndustry was empow­
ered to grant licenses for commodities not isted upon applica­
tion and arproval."3 
Thus, after 1955, a trader wishing to import commodities 
listed in the import program first had to apply for foreign 
exchange. The allocation of this foreign exchange was by lottery. 
Once the trader had received his allocation, be could import 
any item on the list of ordinary imports without further paper­
work except, of course, for the opening of a letter of credit. The 
fact that some commodities could be imported only with 
export earnings heightened the effective exchange rate applicable 
to those exports; there is no record, however, of the differential 
value of such eligibility. 
The 1955 alterations in the quantitative control system 
undoubtedly resulted in some liberalization, particularly for 
those imports no longer requiring licenses. The months prior to 
August 1955 must, therefore, be regarded as the period during 
which the constraints of quantita ive restrictions reached their 
height in Korea. After that date, the devaluation, and later the 
auctions in accordance with bids to purchase national bonds, 
absorbed some of the excess demand for foreign exchange, 
thereby doing some of the work in containing demand that had 
earlier been done by QRs (Quantitative Restrictions). 
The 1958-1960 years saw little change in the import regime. 
As of 1960, imports were divided into two groups of eligible 
items. The first list was AA (Automatic Approval) and con­
sisted of "essential" commodities. The second list was composed 
of items deemed "less essential" for which an import license 
had to be obtained. 4 That the implicit protection accorded to 
some commodities under the system was very large is evidenced 
by the fact that, when the 1961 devaluation raised the nominal 
exchange rate to 130 w6n and the regime was liberalized, a 
variable exchange tax was imposed upon imports of those com­
modities still subject to quota where premiums continued to 
accrue to import licenses. These rates were in addition to regular 
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tariffs. They range& from 10 percent to 100 percent. For com­
modities in the atter category, this must have implied a pre­
devaluation implicit price of 260 w6n per dollar-well above 
any of the premium-exclusive EERs given in Table 12. 
EXPORTS, 1953 TO 1960 
The most important fact about exports in the 1953-1960 period 
is that they were a relatively unimportant sourcL c.f foreign 
exchange. The second most important fact is that they were 
stagnant, so that there was no apparent basis on which to hope 
that they might become important. The first assertion is readily 
documented by the evidence that net capital imports were more 
than 6 times exports in 1953 and 1954, and more than 10 times 
exports in every year from 1955 to 1959, reaching a peak of 19 
times exports in 1957. That they were stagnant is indicated by 
the fact that exports were 840 million in 1953 and did not 
reattain that level until 1961. 
It should also be noted that there was no other significant 
source of foreign ex-hange that was not associated with aid; 
private capital flows, vere negligible, and the services balance was 
positive only by vir':ue of the local currency expenditures of 
the United Nations forces.' These two phenomena together 
underline the central fact about the relationship between aid 
and trade in the 1950s: not only was aid, and related expendi­
ture by the military forces, the only major source of foreign 
exchange, out therc was also every expectation that it would 
continue to be so. 
These topics will be dealt with later. Here, focus is upon the 
behavior of exports, such as they were. In terms of the history 
of modernization of Korea, the topic would be unimportant 
were it not for later events. A question of considerable impor­
tance is why there was such a pronounced change between the 
insignificance of exports in the 1950s and their role in the 
1960s. 
57
 
Trade and Aid, 1953 to 1960 
Table 13 gives data on the commodity composition of exports 
for the 1953-1960 period. Several features are noteworthy. 
First, of course, is the small abso'ute size of the export sector 
and its failure to grow. The decline in the value of mineral 
exports (mostly tungsten) partly reflected a drop in metals 
prices on world markets, but the volume of exports also behaved 
erratically. The United Nations provides data on the volume of 
Korean exports of non-ferrous ores and concentrates, almost all 
of which must have been tungsten. Exports were 26.9 thousand 
metric tons in 1953, 27.7 thousand metric tons in 1954, then 
37.5 and 38.5 thousand metric tons in 1955 and 1956, followed 
by 14.5 thousand metric tons in 1957.6 Second, and related to 
the first, is the fact that the failure of exports to grow was not 
the result of a single category's poor performance: there was no 
sector, at least at the level of aggregation shown here, which 
grew systematically.1" Had there been consistent growth of 
some sub-sector, it must have remained very small not to be 
separated out for special treatment.' 
Third, Korea was relatively typical for a country with low 
per capita income in that more than three-quarters of her 
exports originated in primary products. The percentage dis­
tribution of exports is given in Table 14. Minerals were, to be 
sure, more important than agriculture, but it was the extractive 
industries, and not manufactures, that provided those export 
earnings Korea was able to realize. Of course, while Korea was 
typical of developing countries in having most of her exports 
originate in primary sectors, she was atypical in that exports 
constituted such a small fraction of GNP-less than 2 percent for 
each of the years under review. For most countries, of course, 
exports are a high fraction of GNP because export earnings 
provide the foreign exchange that makes imports possible in a 
relatively specialized economy oriented toward the production 
of primary commodities. In the Korean case, aid, and not 
exports, provided the foreign exchange needed to offset the 
specialization of the economy. Thus, while the small fraction of 
exports was atypical of poor countries, the dependence upon 
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TABLE 13 Sectoral Composition of Exports, 1953-1960 
($1,0O0s) 
Sector 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
Rice, Barley, Wheat - 16 247 - - - 775 3,762 
Other Agriculture 3,465 2,997 3,462 5,034 2,945 2,868 3,598 3,080 
Forestry & Fisheries 1,198 632 416 718 2,294 707 931 2,636 
Minerals 29,252 15,009 9,061 14,938 11,506 7,275 8,464 11,372 
Processed Foods & Beverages 80 259 405 214 183 1,936 2,383 4,146 
Textile Fabrics & Fiber Spinning 2,589 2,693 2,238 2,772 3,260 930 2,165 3,800 
Lumber & Plywood - - - - 41 212 - -
Chemicals & Rubber Products - 1,686 247 18 47 10 115 591 
Petroleum & Coal Products 1,133 688 387 - - 297 - -
Glass & Stone 1,021 17 91 135 - 124 121 -
Steel & Metal Products - 252 961 1,298 1,195 1,253 479 1,504 
TOTAL 39,586 24,243 17,604 25,154 21,521 16,451 19,165 31,833 
Source: Wontack Hong, FactorSupply, Tables A.11 and A.12. 
Note: Miscellaneous Manufacturing, Other Sources, and Unclassifiables are not listed, Luc are included in the totals. 
TABLE 14 Percentage Distribution of Exports 1953-1960 
Sector 1953 
Agriculture 11.8 
Minerals 73.9 
Total Primarya 85.7 
Manufactures 14.3 
Source: Data from Table 13. 
Note: aprimary includes Forestry and Fisheries. 
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Extent of Import Substitution 
imports-which showed up in the import/GNP ratio-was 
not. 
THE EXTENT OF IMPORT SUBSTITUTION 
The only aggregate estimate of the contribution of exports and 
import substitution to growth during the 1950s is that of Frank, 
Kim, and Westphal. They found that the total direct and 
indirect contributions of export expansion and import substitu­
tion in the late 1950s were approximately equal. As would be 
expected, however, the emphasis on import substitution shows 
up when the growth of the manufacturing sector is examined 
separately. For that sector, the direct contribution of export 
expansion to growth was 5.1 percent, while import substitution 
accounted for 24.2 percent.' 9 These estimates contrast sharply 
with estimates for the 1960s. 
Another comparison is perhaps also instructive. Frank, Kim, 
and Westphal used Chenery's estimates of the "normal" struc­
ture of countries at differing stages of development and capital 
inflows to contrast Korea's structure with the "norm." While 
such comparisons are always subject to qualifications, what is 
perhaps significant is that Korea's share of exports was well 
below that which would have been forecast, based on 1955 per 
capita income and the actual capital inflow, regardless of 
whether Korea is regarded as a large developing country or a 
large manufacturing developing country. Korea's actual structure 
in 1955 and 1960, and the "norm" for 1955, are shown in Table 
° 15. As can be seen, exports, manufactured exports, and imports 
all had shares of GDP well below what would have been fore­
ca3t on the basis of the structural norms. While this evidence is 
by no means conclusive, it strongly suggests that the inward­
oriented nature of the Korean economy during the 1950s was 
far greater than would have been expected for Korea's level of 
development. In the absence of capital inflows, the deviation of 
exports from their norm would have been even greater than the 
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TABLE 15 Korea's Actual Structure for 1955 and 1960 
versus the "Norm" for 1955 
1955 Actual 1960 Actual 1955 Norm 
Per capita GNP $79 $86 $79 
Capital inflow as 
%of GNP 7.7 8.5 7.7 
%of exports in GDP 1.7 3.4 9.8 
Industry %of GDP 13.0 15.6 17.0 
%of manufacturing 
exports in GDP 0.4 1.2 1.4 
Imports as %of GDP 10.0 12.7 17.6 
data given above suggest: Chenery's equations show that a 
country with a per capita income of S79 would be expected to 
have imports of about 16.1 percent of GDP. 
Despite the emphasis on import substitution in manufacturing 
during the 1950s, it is of interest that Korea's share of industry 
in GDP fell below that predicted for large manufacturing 
countries. While the 1960s were to show a different pattern, one 
would hardly have classified Korea as a "manufacturing" 
country in the late 1950s. Import substitution clearly failed in 
its purpose in the sense that manufacturing had not become a 
dominant sector. 
Another measure of the extent of import substitution is 
provided by the data in Table 16, which gives the ratio of 
imports to domestic consumption by sectors for the years 1953 
to 1960. Primary Production, Beverages and Tobacco, Leather 
and Leather Products, and Printing and Publishing are omitted 
from the table, since domestic consumption was supplied by 
domestic production in those sectors throughout the period. 
Inspection of the data in Table 16 suggests that, regardless of 
how much the regime was oriented toward import substitution, 
the actual extent of import replacement was relatively small. To 
be sure, there are some sectors (such as chemical fertilizers) in 
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TABLE 16 Sectoral Ratios of Imports to Domestic Consumption, 1953-1960 
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
Processed Foods .019 .013 .012 .003 .022 .078 .058 .044 
Textiles 
.108 .135 .146 .051 .037 .053 .055 .071 
Apparel 
.015 .003 .004 .018 .013 .044 .008 .004 
Lumber, Wood & Furniture .000 .024 .010 .001 .001 .217 .110 .013 
Paper & Products .428 .372 .414 .181 .208 .475 .341 .304 
Basic Chemicals 
.145 .127 .162 .092 .077 .414 .310 .303 
Coal & Petroleum Products .152 .066 .089 .010 .045 .600 .561 .336 
Glass & Clay Products - .066 .047 .065 .003 .140 .116 .024 
Fertilizers 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 .967 
Non-metalic Mineral Products .083 .030 .028 .009 .§±16 .179 .054 .073 
Basic Metal Products n.a. .401 .311 .169 .085 .448 .273 .211 
Fabricated Metal Products .001 .061 .047 .042 .021 .099 .043 .095 
Machinery .388 .359 .236 .222 .007 .405 .441 .450 
Electrical Machinery .155 .413 .291 .122 .194 .549 .388 .435 
Transport Equipment .334 .236 .023 .043 .010 .195 .175 .036 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing .071 .120 .119 .147 .159 .301 .173 .081 
Source: Suk Tai Suh, "Import Substitution and Economic Development in Korea," (Mimeo, December 1975), Table 5-2. 
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which the investment of the 1950s did not bear fruit until the 
early 1960s, and that is not reflected in the data. 
Even taking those factors into account, the data show surpris­
ingly little change in import shares. Such import suabstitution as 
did occur is reflected in only relatively small declines in the 
import-consumption rates, largely because much of the incre­
mental production absorbed excess demand that was initially 
unsatisfied. That is, foreign exchange availability in the early 
post-war years was so limited that desired imports exceeded 
actual imports by sizable amounts. When domestic production 
increased, it served mostly to meet some of the previously 
unsatisfied excess demand, rather than to replace imports. 
This pattern is reflected in a number of sectors. For example, 
in Textiles and Apparel there was a considerable increase in 
production during the 1950s. Yet, in the early post-war years, 
imports were limited in overall amount. As can be seen, the ratio 
of textile imports to domestic demand did decline between the 
1953-1955 period and later years; however, imports had only 
accounted for 10-15 percent of domestic consumption prior to 
1955, so that the decline could not be very great.2' 
It is generally thought that import substitution was concen­
trated on light industry, especially consumer goods, and that 
opportunities for further moves in this direction had been 
exhausted by the late 1950s. According ,oKwang Suk Kim, 
The Republic of Korea ...started out with :n industrialization 
strategy based on a policy of import substitution. She completed 
the easy import substitution in nondurable consumer goods and 
their inputs by around 1960. Instead of emphasizing further import 
substitution in machinery, durable consumer goods and their 
intermediate inputs, however, Korea changed its industrialization 
strategy from import substitution to export promotion in the early 
22 
1960s. 
Suk Tai Suh has provided estimates of the dollar value of 
production in different sectors over the 1953 to 1960 period. 
3 
According to his estimates, domestic output in millions of U.S. 
dollars rose as shown in Table 17. As can be seen, manufacturing 
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TABLE 17 The Dollar Value of Production 
in Different Sectors, 1953-1960 
(S millions) 
Primary Light Heavy and Chemical 
Industry Manufacturing Industries 
1953 997 417 109 
1954 942 564 146 
1955 1,106 632 144 
1956 1,210 684 151 
1957 1,310 732 179 
1958 1,318 811 205 
1959 1,232 893 264 
1960 1,343 976 330 
increased in importance relative to primary industries with the 
value of manufacturing output rising from just over 50 percent 
of the value of primary production in 1953 to an almost equal 
amount in 1960.24 
Suk Tai Suh's data indicate that Heavy and Chemical Indus­
tries output increased approximately threefold between 1953 
and 1960, while Light Manufacturing output rose two and a 
half times. A certain amount of the chemical and heavy 
industry expansion was in consumer goods-coal briquets, 
toiletries, and so on. Moreover, the absolute increase in outpt-, 
of light industry was greater than that for heavy industry. 
Thus it seems reasonable to conclude that it was import 
substitution, and not export promotion, that was the major 
source of industrial growth in the 1950s, and that resources were 
pulled primarily into activities producing for the domestic 
ma rket. 
IMPORTS AND AID 
The contribution of aid to Korean modernization had two 
distinct aspects: 1) aid financed the major part of commodity 
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imports; and 2) negotiations between the aid donors and the 
Korean government influenced economic policy in a variety of 
ways. 
AID FINANCING OF IMPORTS 
Table 18 summarizes aid received by the Korean government 
from the major donors over the 1953-1960 period and, for pur­
poses of comparison, includes the dollar value of total imports, 
imports as a percent of GNP ii current and constant prices, and 
the current account deficit as a percent of GNP. There are a 
number of reasons why the figures must be taken as only 
approximately indicating orders of magnitude. First, aid did not 
always finance imports dollar for dollar. Foreign exchange 
reserves also rose and fell and other components of the current 
account balance fluctuated. The year 1957 illustrates this, as 
recorded aid is 87 percent of imports. Despite this, reserves rose 
S17 million in that year, there was a negative balance on services 
account, and exports represented more than 5 percent of 
imports. Second, the overvaluation of the w6n resulted in an 
underestimate of the contribution of aid to GNP, and also 
imports as a fraction of GNP, since imports were valued at their 
landed cost, and not at the prernium-inclusive domestic prices. 
This can be seen by comparing imports as a percent of GNP in 
current prices and in constant prices. For years until 1958, 
measurement at constant (1970) prices shows the share of 
imports to be greater than does measurement based on current 
prices. Third, it can be argued that the trade deficit seems a 
better measure of the importance of aid, since the deficit was 
possible only because of aid flows.2" As with the measures given 
here, however, other factors entered into year-to-year fluctua­
tions in that figure, and it also tends to misstate the economic 
contribution of aid. The appropriate conclusion is that there is 
no ideal measure of the importance of aid, but the orders of 
magnitude represented in Table 18 provide a rough idea of its 
role.26 
Regardless of the necessary qualifications, it is apparent that 
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TABLE 18 	Aid Received and its Importance, 1953-1960 
(S millions) 
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
 
U.S. Bilateral 12.8 108.4 205.8 271.0 368.8 313.6 219.7 245.2 
CRIK 158.8 50.2 8.7 0.3 - - - -
UNKRA 29.6 21.3 22.2 22.4 14.1 7.7 2.5 0.2 
Total 201.2 179.9 236.7 293.7 382.9 321.3 222.2 245.4 
Total Imports 345.4 243.3 341.4 386.1 442.1 378.2 303.8 343.5 
Aid as a % of Imports 58.3 73.9 69.3 76.1 86.6 84.9 73.1 71.4 
Imports as a % of GNP 
(current prices) 12.9 7.3 9.8 13.1 12.0 10.7 10.1 12.6 
Imports as a % of GNP 
(constant prices) n.a. 8.8 11.2 13.0 14.3 11.7 9.3 10.4 
Current Account Deficit as 
a % of GNP n.a. 6.2 8.7 11.7 10.5 8.7 7.5 9.3 
Sources: BOK, Economic StatisticsYearbook, 1960 and 1974, and IMF, InternationalFinancialStatistics, (May 1976). 
Note: Imports as a fraction of GNP is calculated including imports of both goods and services; current account deficit as fraction ofGNP 
is imports of goods and services less exports of goods and services at current market prices. 
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aid financed the vast majority of imports. When it is recalled 
that dollar receipts by the Bank of Korea against w6n advances 
are not included in the aid total, it is evident that intergovern­
mental relations were a far more impoi'tant determinant of 
foreign exchange availability than was policy to promote 
exports. 
As Table 18 indicates, even when aid is valued at the official 
exchange rate, it accounted for a very large fraction of GNP. If 
one takes aid as a percentage of imports, and multiplies that by 
imports as a percent of GNP (to obtain an implied estimate of 
aid as a fraction of GNP-a not entirely trustworthy procedure), 
the result indicates that aid was equal to 6-7 percent of GNP in 
1953-1954, and rose in relative (and absolute) importance in 
the 1955-1957 period, reaching almost 14 percent of GNP in 
1957. 
The macroeconomic implications of this flow are profound: an 
import surplus of the size financed by aid was strongly 
deflationary and permitted budget deficits with much less 
inflationary pressure than would otherwise have resulted.17 
Simultaneously, the additional flow constituted the economy's 
entire source of capital formation in the early post-war years. 
Equally important, however, was the nature of the imports 
provided. 
A breakdown of aid financial expenditures on a calendar year 
basis is given in Table 19.25 As can be seen, the totals Io not 
quite coincide with those in Table 18, although UNKRA 
expenditures are included in both. The reason appears to lie 
both in the discrepancy between authorizations and expendi­
tures, and in the difference between fiscal and calendar years. As 
can be seen, general program support was far and away the 
largest aid category; this (and PL 480) was used to finance 
imporLs. Even project support, which was much smaller, 
consisted largely of commodity support." Thus, while project 
aid made important contributions to specific sectors, the 
major impact of aid was via the imports financed under 
it. 
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TABLE 19 Categories of Aid Expenditures, 1954-1960 
($ millions) 
PL 480 
Supporting Assistance Technical Title I Title 
Non-Project Project Support Sale II & III Total 
1954 74.3 6.0 - - - 80.3 
1955 168.3 34.8 0.1 10.0 15.9 229.1 
1956 220.8 53.1 1.2 37.5 16.8 329.4 
1957 207.2 92.6 2.8 30.4 28.3 361.3 
1958 163.0 67.2 3.4 38.6 22.3 294.5 
1959 148.2 68.8 3.1 12.5 16.9 249.5 
1960 160.0 56.3 3.4 32.6 15.1 268.7a 
Source: USAID to Korea. Data are from Suk Tai Suh's Appendix, Table 11-1. 
Note: aThe 1960 total includes $1.3 million from the Development Loan Fund 
which is not included in any sub-category. 
COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF IMPORTS 
While the commodity composition of aid-financed goods is 
av.'ilable for each separate assistance program (FOA, MSA, 
CRK, UNKRA, etc.),'o no single breakdown for the total of 
all assistance is available, and the classifications of goods are not 
the same. For that reason, and also in light of the fact that aid 
financed such a high fraction of imports, it seems best to 
examine the commodity composition of total imports. That 
breakdown is given in Table 20, which shows that food imports 
were important throughout the period, although less so than 
they had been during the Korean War. For reasons that will be 
discussed later, the "manufactures" component, which con­
sisted largely of finished products (but also included such items 
as newsprint and ccment), was also sizable. 
Imports provided a large number of items that would other­
wise have been unavailable or ext, cnlely scarce in Korea. For 
example, 100 percent of fertilizer availability (included in 
chemicals) originated through imports until 1960. In the years 
1953-1955, over 10 percent of textile and clothing domestic 
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TABLE 20 	 Commodity Composition of Importr. 1953-1960 
(%distribution) 
Crude 	 Machin-ry 
Materials 	 a'. 
Foodand and Total Manu- Transport 
Beverages Fuel Primary Czemicals factures Equipment 
1953 47.6 6.0 55.0 16.4 22.8 3.4 
1954 17.3 5.8 24.7 15.2 41.9 13.6 
1955 159 22.0 37.9 17.5 18.5 16.8 C, 
1956 14.0 24.1 38.1 19.3 20.8 11.1 
1957 26.0 23.6 49.6 17.4 14.5 9.6 
1958 18.4 28.9 47.3 18.1 18.1 9.7 \0 
1959 9.0 33.9 42.9 22.6 14.6 13.7 
1960 9.2 27.4 36.6 22.2 15.4 11.7 
Sources: Wontack Hong, 'Trade, Distortions, and Employment," Statistical Appendix, Table C.42, 1955 to 1960; BOK, Annual Economic 
Review, 1955 and Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1953 and 1954. 
Note: An "unclassifiable" category is omitted, and thus totals do not add to 100. 
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consumption was met through imports. While figures fluctuated 
from year to year for other commodities, imports constituted 
more than 20 percent of domestic consumption in one or more 
years for the following sectors: Other Minerals (1954); Paper 
and Paper Products (1953 through 1960); Basic Chemicals (1958 
to 1960); Coal and Petroleum Products (1958 to 1960); Basic 
Metals Products (1954 and 1955 and 1958 to 1960); Machinery 
(1953 to 1956 and 1958 to 1960); Electrical Machinery (1954 
and 1955 and 1958 to 1960); and Transport Equipment (1953 
and 1954).31 
It is difficult to transform data on the commodity distribu­
tion of imports b; sector of origin into meaningful estimates of 
the distribution of imports among user categories. Some idea of 
the destination of imports may be gleaned, however, if one is 
prepared to be heroic and assign Food and Beverages and 
Manufactures (Standard International Trade Classifications 6 and 
8) to Consumer Goods, Crude Materials and Fuels and Chemicals 
to Intermediate Goods and Raw Materials, and Machinery and 
Transport Equipment (SITC 7) to Investment Goods. The 
composition of imports by category of final demand, in per­
centages, is illustrated in Table 21.32 
As can be seen, consumer goods-most of which required no 
further processing in Korea-predominated among imports early 
in the period under review. Even intermediate goods, which con­
sisted largely of fuel and fertilizer, were goods that required 
little or no processing in Korea. Perhaps most startling of aE, 
however, is that, in a specialized developing economy which 
undoubtedly had very little capacity to produce its own pro­
ducer goods, investmrent goods constituted less than 14 percent 
of all imports in each year from 1953 to 1960, and were less 
than 10 percent in 1953, 1957, and 1958. This reflects in part 
the conflicts between the ROK and American governments over 
economic policy. 
THE SCARCITY VALUE OF IMPORTS 
All pieces of evidence point to the existence of sizable premiums 
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TABLE 21 Composition of Imports by Category of Final Demand, 1953-1960 
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
Consumer Goods 70.4 59.2 34.3 34.8 40.5 36.3 23.6 24.t* 
Intermediate Goods 
and Raw Materials 22.4 21.0 39.5 43.4 41.0 47.0 48.5 49.6 
Investment Goods 3.4 13.6 16.8 11.1 9.6 9.7 13.7 11.7 
Imports and Aid 
on import licenses during -lie 1953-1960 period, but especially 
in the years 1954 to 1957. The rapid inflation, the over­
valuation of the currency, and the licensing system all suggest 
that the profit accruing to those who could command foreign 
exchange and import must have included a sizable scarcity rent. 
Efforts to obtain data with which to estimate the size of those 
rents, however, are fraught with difficulty. Ideally, what would 
be desirable for such estimates would be comparisons of landed 
cost of individual import items, normal (competitive) wholesale 
markups, and data on wholesale prices of comparable com­
modities. In actual practice, the best estimate of landed cost 
available is unit value; to attempt to convert that estimate into a 
w6n figure would already entail large margins of error, and the 
fact that most commodity categories are not homogeneous 
makes price comparisons virtually impossible.33 
Despite all these very real drawbacks, an effort was made to 
find some price data from which to infer premiums on imports. 4 
The outcome of that effort with respect to cement is representa­
tive of the best that can be done. Cement is homogeneous, price 
data are available on a comparable basis, and cement was an 
import commodity in the early 1950s, an import substitute in 
the late 1950s, and an export in the 1960s. Price data were 
unavailable for years prior to 1955, which is unfortunate, in 
view of the suspicion that premiums peaked at about that time. 
From 1955 on, the domestic price per ton was divided by the 
unit value (in dollars per ton) for one ton of imported cement. 
The computation yielded an implicit exchange rate for each 
year, which could then be compared to the official exchange 
rate. The results were an estimated ratio of the impiicit 
exchange rate to the official exchange rate of 2.09 in 1955 (after 
devaluation), which ratio thi.n rose gradually to a peak of 2.88 
in 1958, falling to 2.44 in 1960, 1.34 in 1961, and declining 
gradually thereafter (reaching 0.89 in 1969). The same general 
pattern prevailed for the few other commodities for which the 
exercise was undertaken. 
Two things stand out clearly from the results. First, if the 
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Westphal-Kim estimate of EERs is correct, premiums on cement 
imports probably equaled one to one and one-half times the 
cost, insurance, and freight (c.i.f.) price of the import at the 
official exchange rate, since the excess of EER over the official 
exchange rate is rather small. Second, the most striking result 
is that the official exchange rate was well below the implicit 
rate throughout t6e 1950s, and it was not until the devaluation 
of 1961 that the gap began closing. Any examination of the data 
strongly suggests that the 1950s (at least for 1955 and after) 
were homogeneous with respect to the relationship between the 
implicit (premium-inclusive) exchange rates and the official 
exchange rate. Since premiums of this size have s.gnificant 
implications for the allocative efficiency of the regime, further 
consideration is given to the issue in Chapter 5. 
COUNTERPART FUNDS 
When aid-financed c-mr'.odities are sold in the domestic market, 
the receipts from 'heir sale are counterpart funds. They 
represent the domestic purchasing power "counterpart" to tile 
aid flow, and it would be in error to count, as the aid contribu­
tiom, both the inflow of commodity imports and the counter­
part funds. 
Nonetheless, the ways in which counterpart funds are adminis­
tered can have important implications for resource allocation. 
On the one hand, since all economic entities are subject to a 
financial constraint, allocation of funds to one budget rather 
than another influences the relative abilitics of the recipients to 
compete for real resou,rces. On the other hanjd, the purchasing 
power absorbed by imports in effect "frees," for the same level 
of total expenditures, do.lestic resources. 
It has already been seen that imports, which were predom­
inantly aid-financed, represented a larger fraction of GNP than 
did investment in the early reconstruction years. It was largely 
through the allocation of counterpart funds to financing invest­
ment that imports filled this role. During the 1950s, central 
government expenditures by the Republic of Korea were 
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financed by counterpart funds to a very significant degree. In 
1957, for example, counterpart funds constituted 53 percent of 
government revenues, whereas regular sources-mostly taxes­
constituted about 34 percent of government revenues.
3 6 
For that reason, the ROK budgetary process was integrally 
linked to decisions concerning the allocation of counterpart 
funds. The American government, however, naturally partici­
pated in decisions as to how counterpart funds should be 
expended. Even when counterpart funds constitute a much 
smaller fraction of total government expenditures than was the 
case in Korea, frictions between donor and recipient are bound 
to arise. When the fraction of ROK expenditures subject to 
negotiation with American representatives reached the heights 
that it did, American participation in Korean decision-making 
became virtually all-inclusive. That leads directly to the final 
topic of concern during the 1953-1960 period. 
THE AID RELATIONSHIP 
During the 1950s the Republic of Korea was heaily dependent 
upon aid, not only for its growth prospects, but even for its day­
to-day functioning. Dependence extended n'ot only to imports 
(including such supplies as gasoline), but ai., to the expenditure 
of counterpart funds. American officials were involved because 
they held the purse strings over virtually all Korean decisions. 
With such heavy interdependence, it was natural that difficulties 
would arise between the ROK and Anerican officials. 
Several factors accentuated the difficulties in the dependency 
relationship in the early years. First, and probably most impor­
tant, aid to an underdeveloped country that was not a colony 
was without precedent. While the United States had, through the 
Marshall Plan, participated in the recovery of Europe, that 
experience itself raised a va, iety of diplomatic problems from 
which lessons had not yet been fully learned. The thorny 
questions associated with negotiating with the government of a 
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country that was heavily dependent and might, if aid were not 
forthcoming, again be attacked from the north, were probably 
unresolvable. 
Second, and not independent of the first reason, neither 
American nor Korean objectives seem to have been well defined. 
The Americans seem to have been uncertain as to whether the 
objective of aid was to enable self-supporting growth of the 
Korean economy after a period of time, or whether, instead, the 
feasible goal was simply to envisage providing support on a 
continuing basis for a country that could not hope to achieve an 
economy able to provide a satisfactory standard of living for its 
people in the absence of all unrequitcd flow of goods and 
services. On the Korean side, the situation appears to have been 
equally unclear. On the one hand, there seems to have been an 
element of attempting to maximize the volume of aid received, 
which in turn implied keeping the economy dependent and 
preventing it from becoming able to generate capacity to earn 
its own imports. On the other hand, economic growth was an 
objective of some considerable importance, although it seems 
generally to have lost out to the aid-maximizing objective in 
the early years, perhaps because of the same sort of pessimism 
about the economy's potential that characterized the second 
American view. 
AMERICAN RETURN TO BILATERALISM 
As indicated above, a decision that reconstruction, as well as 
the military effort, should be made multinational had been 
made in 1950 when the resolution creating UNKRA was passed. 
During wartime, however, UNKRA was unable to function 
effectively, because the military command reported to the 
United Nations via Washington, while the UNKRA link was 
directly to U.N. headquarters. Nonetheless, during most of the 
1950-1953 period, it was anticipated that UNKRA would be 
the agency responsible for the post-war reconstruction of Korea. 
To that end, Congress had passed an appropriation for $166 
million, subject to the stipulation that the American contribution 
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to total UNKRA aid could be no more than 66 percent of the 
total. 
Although other couatries pledged some support to UNKRA, 
their pledges fell far below the S85 million that would have 
enabled the entire American contribution to be spent. This 
combination of events virtually dictated that the aid effort 
should be essentially bilateral. 
As negotiations to end the Korean War were nearing com­
pletion, the question of post-war aid became more pressing. Two 
missions came to Korea to consider the future prospects. On 
one hand, Robert Nathan Associates were hired by the UNKRA 
group. They were engaged for a one-year period to study the 
Korean economy and to draw up a post-war reconstruction 
plan. The plan was never implemented, although some of its 
premises influenced subsequent events. In particular, the Nathan 
group based their planning on the assumption that South Korea's 
export prospects and comparative advantage lay in agriculture 
and minerals. The Nathan Plan, in effect, was a five-year 
program under which Korea would develop her agricultural and 
mineral exports in order to pay for manufactured imports.37 
The second mission was sent by President Eisenhower under 
the leadership of Henry Tasca. This mission was instructed to 
advise the administration on Korea's future prospects. It appears 
to have been given six weeks within which to complete this 
assignment.38 The Tasca report was responsible for the recom­
mendation that aid be carried out bilaterally under American 
auspices, although this took over two years to implement. It 
also presented a more sanguine picture of Korean prospects than 
was accepted by most observers, thereby implying that a 
relatively short-lived aid program might accomplish the task.39 
A division of labor between the multiple agencies operating in 
Korea in the immediate post-war period appears to have been 
worked out whereby UNKRA undertook specific industrial 
projects, while KCAC (Korean Civilian Assistance Commission) 
operated under the Foreign Operations Administration in social 
overhead projects and administered the funds formerly allocated 
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through CRIK. In its role as coordinator, FOA and its successor, 
the ICA, then assumed responsibility for negotiating with the 
Korean government as to the terms and amount of aid. 
It was the FOA, then, that dealt with Korean officials, with 
veto power over the use of counterpart funds and the power to 
decide on the level and composition of aid imports. From the 
American viewpoint, this implied that the entire range of 
policies affecting the Korean economy were the proper domain 
of discussion. The American government had been, and con­
tinued to be, highly suspicious of Korean inflation and govern­
mental expenditures relative to domestic sources of revenue. It 
wanted the Korean government to take measures that would 
increase domestic saving, thus reducing inflation and also 
"needed" aid. It was generally believed that, as long as inflation 
continued, American aid should be confined to goods that 
would relieve inflationary pressure; in particular, finished con­
sumer goods (and not commodities that would require further 
processing and hence Korean resources) should comprise the 
bulk of foreign aid to Korea. Thus, American concern with 
Korean policy was focused largely on domestic resource avail­
ability and inflation and its consequences. The American 
position seems to have been that additional Korean investment 
without saving would simply fuel inflation, rather than increase 
the rate of economic growth. It was this view that explains the 
high fraction of consumer goods imports in the early post-war 
years. 
KOREAN OBJECTIVES AND AID 
Whereas the American objectives focused on increasing domes­
tic saving to substitute for aid and to reduce inflationary pres­
sures, the Rhee Government appears to have had three other 
objectives: rebuilding the capacity that had been destroyed in 
the war; maintaining a strong military force; and increasing 
private consumption levels. As Cole and Lyman describe it: 
These objectives called for high levels of investment and of govern­
ment and private consumption, and they competed with each other 
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for the available supply of resources. In the short run the major 
means by which resources could be r-ipplemented was foreign assis­
tance. Therefore, the Korean government sought to mobilize addi­
tional resources by maximizing such assistance. 
40 
Along with this emphasis on maximizing aid, the Rhee Govern­
ment continued to reiterate its determination that Korea should 
once again be unified. Whether this was simply political rhetoric 
or not, it led to a considerable reluctance to undertake some of 
the investments that would have been warranted had it been 
accepted that reunification was not likely in the near future. 
For example, projected demands for electric power hinged 
crucially upon the assumptions made with respect to the 
availability of power from the north. To plan power production 
on the assumption that there would be no supplies from the 
north would have belied the government's insistence on the 
reunification goal. 
Out of all this came witat Cole and Lyman term an emphasis 
on short-run objectives: 
During the years when Korean leaders were concentrating on 
augmenting the supply of immediately available resources by obtain­
ing additional aid, they were less concerned with the longer-run 
effects of the uses to which those resources would be put. They 
were trying to cope with immediate or short-run problems of 
security, hunger, and survival, rather than with the future growth of 
4 1output. 
NEGOTIATIONS OVER AID LEVELS 
In light of American ambivalence as to aid objectives and the 
Korean determination to maximize aid levels as a means of 
reconciling their competing objectives, it was inevitable that 
bargaining over aid levels should have been accompanied by 
conflict. 
On the Korean side, the objective seems to have been to leave 
the gap between demand and supply to be filled by aid as large 
as possible: the exchange-rate overvaluation was perpetuated 
largely for this reason; inflationary financing of a relatively high 
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level ofgovernment expenditurcs further contributed. Moreover, 
there was little effort to increase domestic savings, which 
meant that virtually all gross do;:.estic capital formation was 
financed by aid; with aid at around 10 percent of GNP, gross 
domestic capital formation avciaged 11.9 percent of available 
resources (including aid) during the 1953-1957 period.42 
On the American side, pressure was therefore brought to 
bear to alter the exchange rate, increase taxes, and reduce deficit 
financing. Both the 1953 anld the 1955 devaluations seem to 
have been undertaken reluctaItly at the Urging of the American 
negotiators as a precolldition for receivi-Ig aid. 
Under these circumstances, bareaining over aid levels would in 
any event have been difficult. But, as described by Cole and 
Lyman, the situation was further confounded by the negotiation 
format which started with agreement upon a target rate of 
growth: 
Unfortunately, quite often this issue was posed, by both Korean 
and American officials, in terms of a direct conflict between 
domestic resource mobilization and foreign assistance. Conceptually, 
a target rate of growth and "required" military expenditures were 
assumed, so th.t any additional resources that could be diverted 
from domestic consumption were expected to be matched by a 
" reduction in external aid. 
The outcome of these negotiations was, as is evident from 
Table 18, a rising level of aid from 1953 to 1957. The resulting 
increased flow of imports enabled satisfactory increases in out­
put over the period from 1953 to 1957. It was only in 1957 
that the American authorities began making clear rhat aid levels 
would decline and that Korean policies would have to alter. It 
was the policy changes that iccomnlpanied the recognition that 
aid could not grow indefinitely that demarcate the reconstruc 
tion period, 1953-1957, from the characteristics of the economy 
over the 1958-1960 period. 
During these later years, the Korean government undertook a 
stabilization program, which is what accounts for the drastic 
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reduction in the inflation rzte in 1958. The chief thrust of the 
program was a sharp reduction in the rate of increase in the 
money supply. The extent to which aid bargaining was instru­
mental in bringing about the stabilization policies is not clear. 
What is clear is that both the more restrictive monetary policies 
and reduced import levels in 1958 that resulted from the aid 
cut had direct repercussions on the level of economic activity, 
especially on the manufacturing sector. The 1958 to 1960 
period was consequently characterized by stagnation of output. 
This phenomenon, in turn, forced recognition that aid levels 
would dec!ine in the future, and that stagnation would continue 
if the policies then being pursued with respect to the trade-and­
payments regime persisted. 
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The Transition to an Export.OrientedEconomy 
The period from May 1960 to 1965 constitutes a time of 
transition during which the entire orientation of trade and 
exchange-rate policy shifted. The Korean economy was restruc­
tured towa, 1 export promotion and away from the earlier 
emphasis on import substitution. Tie result was the start of 
exceptionally rapid growth of exports, the beginning of private 
capital inflows into Korea, and also the continued diminution 
of both the absolute and the relative importance of aid. For all 
these reasons, the period is of particular interest both in the 
context of understanding Korean modernization and also as a 
case of an exceptionally sharp and successful change in policies. 
In the latter regard, the Korean policy switch is perhaps the 
most dramatic and vivid change that has come about in any 
developing country since World War 11. The lessons that emerge 
from it are therefore important, not only for understanding 
Korean nodernizati~n, but also for other countries. 
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THE EVOLUTION OF TRADE AND
 
EXCHANGE-RATE POLICIES
 
It is us.ful to begin with a chronology of the policy changes 
that were effected over the transition period. Then exchange 
rates, quantitative controls, and export incentives are examined 
in more detail. 
CHRONOLOGY OF POLICY CHANGES 
In some respects, it is artificial to pick any particular date as the 
beginning of the transition. It will be recalled that the relative 
importance of quantitative restrictions had already peaked in 
1955 and that the degree of discrimination against exports was 
probably at its height at that time. Thereafter, some export 
incentives were added to the system, although the continuing 
overvaluation of the exch!ange rate meant that those measures 
merely offset some of the disincentives implicit in the exchange­
rate regimei.'
 
The first major step (after the 1955 reforms and the 1957­
1958 stabilization program) in altering t'ic orientation of the 
regime was undertaken as paic of the reforms inaugurated by 
the Chang Myon civilian government that came to power after 
the student revolution of May 1960. Iii January and February 
1961, there were two devaluations which were intended to unify 
the exchange rate and to reduce, if not eliminate, the degree of 
currency overvaluation. 
The military government that camq into power in April 1961 
continued to pursue policies supportive of exchange-rate unifi­
cation, increased the scope of export incentives, and liberalized 
and simplified the remaining quantitative controls over imports. 
However, it did not continue the restrictive monetary and fiscal 
policies of tlc stabilization program and, indeed, adopted fairly 
expansionary measures. The result was a sharp acceleration in 
the rate of inflation and, with that, an increa-c in the demand 
for imports at the fixed nominal exchange rate. The authorities 
were obliged, by 1963, to intensify once again the use of quotas 
and quantitative controls over purchases of foreign exchange. 
83
 
Transition to an Export Economy 
This represented, in effect, a setback in the move toward liberal­
ization. The disincentive to exports that would otherwise have 
resulted, however, was largely offset by the introduction of 
another export-import link system which permitted exporters to 
use their foreign exchange earnings to import commodioes not 
otherwise legally importable. This move transferred to exporters 
the premiums implicit on import licenses and served to maintain 
export incentives and to mitigate the effect of increasing cur­
rency overvaluac;on upon exports. 
The final steps in the transition to a consistent export­
promotion strategy were taken by the government after the 
elections early in 1964. Prior to that date, efforts had been 
made to encourage export promotion, but circumstances had 
prevented the governmeint from carrying out consistent policies. 
Thus, inflation had eroded pairt of the incentives provided, and 
the payments regime was of varying restrictiveness in response 
to balance-of-payments pressures. Nineteen sixty-four marks the 
watershed, after which date export-promotion policies were 
deeply embedded and consistently administered. 
In May 1964, a sizable deviuation was announced. Accom­
panying it, the import regime was once again liberalized and 
export incentives were increased. SimultaIeously, a number of 
monetary and fiscal reforms were undertaken which contributed 
importantly both to the government's ability to maintain the 
real exchange rate and to the success of the policy initiatives. 
Thereafter, fluctuations in the real exChange rate for exporters 
were substantially diminished, and policy changes were fewer 
and less significant than had earlier been the case. 
From May 1960 to 1964, tilerefore, the transition to an 
cxport orientation was marked by a nunber of twists and 
turns, as this brief' outline of major policy changes indicates. In 
the mcre detailed discussion of components of policy that 
follows, it should be borne in mind, however, that, despite 
changes in governments, switches in import liberalization, and 
alterations in the specifics of policy, there does not appear to 
have been any deviation from an increasing commitment to 
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encourage exports. It was this commitment that appears to have 
been the underpinning for most of the changes in the trade-and­
payments regime which took place during the 1960-1964 
period. The details of policies that were adopted appear to have 
resulted in large part in pragmatic response to the fortunes of 
exports: when expot performance was deemed satisfactory, 
policies were left unaltered; when, however, it appeared that 
export growth was faltering, changes were institited until 
satisfactory performance was again observed. 
Kwang Suk Kim has provided an assessment of the fa:tors 
that motivated the policy switch toward an export orientation: 
First, the economic growth performance in the late fifties and early 
sixties was frustrating to both policy-makers and the people, since 
tho possibility of rapid growth through import substitution seemed 
nearly exhausted by that time. By around 1960, Korea had virtually 
completed import substitution in nondurable consumer goods and 
in the intermediate products used in tbeir manufE cture. A growth 
strategy concentrating on import substitution in machinery, con­
sumer durables and their inteirmediate products did not seem to be 
an appropriate alternative because of the limitations imposed by the 
smallnss of the domestic market and the large capital requirements. 
Secondly, Korea's natural resource endowment is so poor that an 
alternative development strategy based on domestic resource utiliza­
tion was inconceivable. Thirdly, U.S. assistance, which financed most 
of the post-Korean war reconstruction, started to gradually decline 
in the early sixties. Faced with this reduction in foreign aid, Korean 
policy makers had to seriously consider an alternative source of 
foreign exchange to meet the balance of payments difficulties. 
Fourthly, the availability of a well-motivated labor force with a high 
educational level and relatively low wages provided the country with 
a comparative advantage in exporting labor-intensive goods. Lastly, 
one should mention the determination of the leadership to attain a 
high rate of growth, and a virtual lack of constraints on the 
-
ability tc make decisions and to carry them out. 
As Kim's discussion indicates, the export-promotion policies of 
the gcvcrnment were adopted as a means, not as an end. The 
belief that an export-oriented policy would result it. significantly 
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better growth performance underlay the switch to exporting. 
The fact that the growth rate did increase reinforced the com­
mitment to an export-oriented strategy. 
EXCHANGE RATES 
Table 22 extends the data on exchange rates given in Table 
10 to the period 1960-1965. The effects of the two major 
devaluations can readily be seen in Line, A. Whereas the price 
level rose 13 percent between 1960 and 1961, the official price 
of foreign exchange increased 104 percent. This large a change 
absorbed a great deal of the excess demand for imports and the 
scarcity value if import licenses. As a consequence, the official 
exchange rate became much more important as a factor in 
influencing the volume of exports, imports, and other inter­
national transactions. 3 Moreover, an increase in the real price of 
orforeign exchange that magnitude must have absorbed much 
of the premiums on imports subject to quantitative control 
while simultaneously increasing the prices of scme commodities 
whose importation had been relatively liberally permitted under 
the prior regine. Considerable unification of implicit, as well as 
explicit, exchange rates resulted. 
The second devaluation in 1964, from 130 wn to 256 w6n 
per dollar, 4 was not proportionately as large. Moreover, the 
intervening inflation had reduced the real price of foreign 
exchange so that the 1964 devaluation really served to restore 
the real exchange rate to its 1961 level. 
Unlike the 1961 situation, however, fiscal and monetary 
reforms were undertaken in conjunction with the 1964 devalua­
tion to try to assure future constancy of the real rate. By March 
1965, in fact, the w6n rate was allowed to float in a further 
effort to maintain its real value and provide assurance to those 
engaging in international transactions, and especially in export­
ing, that the new real rate was not simply temporary. 
A second difference between the two devaluations was in the 
relative importance that attached to the official exchange rate 
prior to each. Thus, while the 1961 devaluation increased the 
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TABLE 22 Nominal, Effective, and Purchasing-Power-Parity 
Exchange Rates for Exports and Imports, 1960-1965 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
A. Official Exchange Rate 
(wan per dollar) 62.5 127.5 130.0 130.0 214.3 265.4 
B. Average Export Dollar Premiums 
(wZn per dollar) 83.9 14.6 - 39.8 39.7 -
C. Export Subsidies per Dollar 
Export (w5n per dollar) 1.2 8.5 21.5 19.6 27.4 39.2 
D. Export EER (A+B+C) 147.6 150.6 151.5 189.4 281.4 304.6 
E. PLD EER for Exports 
(D divided by 1965 
price level) 326.5 294.1 270.5 280.6 309.6 304.6 ,-
F. PPP PLD EER for Exports 
(E times average price level 
of trading partners) 319.6 289.1 264.0 275.8 305.0 304.6 
G. Tariff Equivalents 
(w~n per dollar) 37.7 19.5 16.4 18.1 32.7 27.7 
H. EER for Imports (A+G) 100.2 147.0 146.4 148.1 247.0 293.1 
I. PLD EER for Imports 221.6 287.1 261.4 219.4 271.7 293.1 
J. PPP EER for Imports 216.9 282.2 255.1 215.7 267.6 293.1 
Source: Frank, Kim and Westphal, pp. 70-73. See Appendix A for a list of the symbols used and their delAnition. 
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price of foreign exchange from 62.5 to 130 w6n per dollar, 
there was a large offset on the export side as other export incen­
tives were equivalent to an additional 85 wvn per dollar in 1960 
and only 23 w6n per dollar in 1961. Consequently, the w6n 
receipts of the average exporter rose only from 147.6 to 150.6 
per dollar despite the devaluation. In real terms, there was a 
decline in the value ,fa dollar of exports from 1960 to 1961. 
By contrast, in 1964 export subsidies constituted a smaller 
fraction of the total incentive to export, so that the real value of 
a dollar's proceeds in fact increased with the devaluation. 
Several other features of exchange rates in the 1961-1964 
interval should be noted. First, measures were taken to insulate 
the real export rate from the effects of inflation. Despite infla­
tion rates of 9 and 20 percent in 1962 and 1963 respectively, 
the erosion that would otherwise have occurred in the domestic 
purchasing power of dollar export earnings was largely offset by 
increased premiums in 1963 and subsidies ill1962. The result 
was a decline of 8 perceit in 1962 illthe real value of a dollar's 
receipts, but an increase of 4 percent in 1963. For exports, 
therefore, the various incentive schenes provided ;:buffer 
against the effects of inflation at arfixed exchange rate. Indeed, 
the 1964 devaluation was enouglh to raise the real export rate 
above its 1961 level, although it renmained below its 1960 level. 
Second, the situation with regard to imports was the opposite 
of that for exports: though there was sonic reduction in the 
average tariff-equivalent per dollar uf imports at the time of 
devaluation, it was insufficient to offset the major part of the 
impact on the real cost to the importer of a dollar's worth of 
goods. The PLI) EER for imports therefore rose by 30 percent. 
Almost all of this increase must have resulted in a reduction in 
the value of import licenses to their recipients, to the extent that 
it did not, there was undoubtedly some unification of implicit 
exchange rates across various import categories. 
In further contrast to the treatment of exports between 
devaluations, the EER for imports hardly changed between 1961 
and 1963, so that the real cost of a dollar of imports fell 
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substantially. By 1963, indeed, it was below the level that had 
prevailed in 1960 prior to the devaluation. Thus, while the 
exchange-rate change may have resulted in increased reliance 
upon the pricing mechanism to allocate foreign exchange in the 
period immediately after devaluation, inflation prevented con­
t;,',uat;ln of that fviction. Whatever reduction initially took 
place in the variation in premiun-exclusive effective exchange 
rates, there ,,'as a sizable offset by 1963, as the importance of 
quantitative controls once again increased. 
QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS 
The 1961 devaluation was intended to reduce, if not virtually 
eliminate, reliance upon QRs. However, the transition from 
multiple exchange rates to a unified exchange-rate system' 
meant that there was a variety of commodities for which the 
gap between domestic price and landed cost would widen unless 
imports were allowed to increase sharply. Rathzer than accept 
that outcome, the government revised the quantitative control 
system in a manner to be described below and, in addition, 
levied special tariffs to absorb the differentials between landed 
cost and domestic price for a wide range of items. About 700 
commodities subject to import quota were placed in four 
separate catcgories, with special tariff rates (over and above tile 
regular tariffs to which they were subject) of 100, 50, 30, and 
10 percent. Commodities were, thereafter, reclassified among 
these categories as the domestic-foreign price relationship 
altered. The resulting system was, in consequence, a hybrid, as 
the import-control regime affected the quantity of imports but 
did not, in any significant way, generate large windfall gains to 
recipients of import licenses. 
The control regime itself was revised twice during 1961. By 
the end of the year, there were three categories of commodities: 
1) items that could be imported without any prior approval 
(automatic approval--AA imports) of MCI; 2) commodities that 
could be imported only after official approval had been 
obtained; and 3) prohibited items. These categories differed 
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from those in the first half of the year in that the AA classifica­
tion had earlier been divided into commodities importable with 
any source of foreign exchange and commodities importable 
without prior approval oniy when financed by export earnings. 
Within this framework, further liberalization of the import 
regime could readily have been accomplished by removing com­
modities from the prohibited and restricted list and shifting 
them to the AA list. Conversely, the regime could become more 
restrictionist by a transfer of commodities in the opposite 
direction. in fact, there was a tendency toward increased 
liberalization during 1962, but the shortfall in foreign exchange 
availability occasioned by the declining levels of aid and the 
increased need for foreign exchange to counteract the poor 
harvest brought about an abrupt reversal of that trend. 
Table 23 gives an indication of the behavior of the trade 
regime over the 1961-1965 period. The trend toward increasing 
restrictionismn after the second half of 1962 is immediately 
apparent. By thc second half of 1963, the number of AA import 
items declined to less than 10 percent of its level a year earlier, 
while the number of commodities requiring approval increased 
drastically. To be sure, a count of the number of items is not 
necessarily proof of greater restrictiveness, since it might be 
possible for fewer commodities to be subject to AA licensing, 
but the ease with which ministerial permission was granted could 
have increased for restricted items. There is no evidence, how­
ever, that this was t',c case. And, as will be seen below, the total 
value of imports fel sharply against the background of domestic 
inflation, further reinforcing the view that the restrictiveness of 
the import regime increased markedly after 1962.6 
The second major devaluation took place in May 1964. Details 
of the control program for 1964 are not available, but the data 
on total importable items given in Table 23 strongly suggest that 
the regime had become fairly restrictive by that time. Indeed, 
when the devaluation occurred, a new Temporary Special 
Tariff Law, similar to that which had absorbed the differential 
between domestic price and landed cost after the 1961 
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TABLE 23 Number of Items in Each Import Category, 1961-1965 
Automatic Semi- Total 
Approval Restricted Restricted Importable Prohibited 
First half 1961 1,237 (309 a ) 3 5b - 1,581 305 
Second half 1961 1,015 17 - 1,132 355 
First half 1962 1,195 119 - 1,314 366 
Second half 1962 1,377 121 - 1,498 433 
First half 1963 776 713 - 1,489 442 
Second half 1963 109 924 - 1,033 414 
NO 
First half 1964 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,124 617 
n.a. 496 631Second half 1964 n.a. n.a. 
First half 1965 1,447 92 19 1,558 624 
Second half 1965 1,495 124 4 1,623 620 
Source: Frank, Kim, and Westphal, p. 45. Their data for 1961 and 1963 are based on the original programs, while for the other periods,
breakdowns are based on realized figures. 
Notes: aThe total number of AA items for the first half of 1961 was 1,546 of which 309 were eligible only when financed by export
earnings and 1,237 were accorded AA treatment regardless of the source of foreign exchange. 
bFor the first half of 1961. restricted items were eligible for importation nnly with export earnings. Thereafter, restricted items refer to 
,hose commodities which could be legally imported only after ministerial permission was obtained. 
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devaluation, was put into effect. Unlike the earlier law, however, 
there were about 2,200 commodities affected (compared with 
700 in 1961) and there were only two categories with rates of 
90 and 70 percent. 7 
After 1964, liberalization of the import controls proceeded 
rapidly, as can be seen in Table 23. Even in the first half of 
1965, the number of AA items exceeded the maximum that had 
earlier been reached. As foreign-exchange receipts grew rapidly 
during 1965 and subsequent years, the degree of liberalization 
that was achieved in 1965 was maintained, and even, on 
occasion, extended. 
Thus, there is a second major contrast between the 1961 and 
1964 devaluations. Whereas the liberalization following the 1961 
devaluation was fairly short-lived, that following 1964 was far 
more pronounced and sustained. That was possible largely 
because the real exchange rate was maintained after 1964, 
which had not been the case after 1961. 
EXPORT INCENTIVES 
As already seen, the 1961-1965 period was the time when the 
commitment to carry out an export-oriented policy was trans­
formed into successful export perfornance. The means chosen 
to encourage exports varied pragmatically in accordance with 
the degree of saccess then being achieved in exporting. By 
1964-1965, the system of export incentives that was to be in 
effect during the following decade was fairly well established. 
Table 24 provides a list of the major export incenives that 
were used from 1950 onward, along with the dates for which 
each type of incentive was in effect. Some of the incentives, of 
course, served merely as an offset to the disincentive for export 
that the trade regime would otherwise have provided. Tariff 
exemptions on imports of raw matcrials, for example, would not 
by themselves constitute an "export incentive" but would 
merely serve to enable Korean producers to compete in inter­
national markets without negative effective protection." 
Before a discussion of the nature of each type of export 
incentive, a few observations on the entire list are in order. First, 
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TABLE 24 	 Types of Export Incentives and Dates of Operation, 
1950-1975 
Type of Export Promotion Scheme 	 Dates Applicable 
Tariff exemptions on imports of raw materials and 
spare partsa 1959-1975 
Tariff and tax exemptions granted to domestic 
suppliers of exporting firms 1965-1975 
Domestic indirect ard direct tax exemptions b 1961-1972 
Accelerated deprecia..on 1966-1975 
Wastage allowance subsidies 1965-1975 
Import entitlement linked to exports 1951-1955, 
1963-1965 
Registration as an importer conditional on export 
performanceC 1957-1975 
Reduced rates on public utilities 1967-1975 
Dollar-denominated deposits held in Bank of Korea by 
private traders 1950-1961 
Monopoly rights granted in new export marketsd 1967- 1971 
Korean Trade Promotion Corporation 1964-1975 
Direct export subsidies 1955-1956, 
1961-1964 
Export targets by industry 1962-1975 
Credit subsidies 
Export credits 1950-1975 
Foreign exchange loans 1950-1954, 
1971-1975 
Production loans for exporters 1959-1975 
Bank of Korea discount of export bills 1950-1975 
Import credits for exporters 1964-1975 
Capital loans by medin industry bank 1964-1975 
Offshore procurement loans 1964-1975 
Credits for overseas marketing activities 1965-1975 
Source: Frank, Kim, and Westphal, p. 40, covering the period to 1972. Data were 
updated to 1975 on the basis of information supplied by Korea Develop­
ment Institute. 
Notes: aTariff exemptions were shifted to a rebate system in July 1974. 
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TABLE 24 (continued) 
bDirect tax exemptions were abolished inearly 1973.
 
CThe value of exports req-.tLed to o.':- An importer's registration was gradually
 
increased. In 1958, it vas $10,000. By 197U, the minimum required export value
 
was $300,000.
 
dAuthority was granted in 1962, lut was virtually unused until 1967.
 
some of the incentives listed in Table 24 were included in the 
computation of effective exchange rates for export. For 
example, the value of direct export .3ubsidies per dollar of 
exports is included in the export EER,. The values Of some 
other incentives, such as the wastage allowa,-.e subsidies and 
most of the export-import link schemes, could , be calculated 
and therefore were not included in estimates of EERs. The 
result is that the estimates -f export EERs given in Table 22 are 
probably lowor-bound indications of the extnt to which exports 
were encouraged by the regime. Moreover, as the long list of 
types of export incentives and of the dates at which they came 
into effect suggests, it is probable that the value of export 
incentives not included in the EER computations increased over 
time. Second, as inspection of Table 24 shows, a majority of 
the incentives were already in effect in one forra or another by 
the early 1960s, and no signif;-ant new types of incentives were 
introduced after 1967. The structure of export incentives was 
therefore stable by 1965, although the relativc importance of 
different incentive schemes varied from time to time and also 
from commodity to commodity. Third and finally, even a simple 
listing of the types of schemes employed to encourage exports 
gives some idea of the extent of the commitmcnt of the govern­
ment to the export-promotion effort, and also of the pragmatic 
way in which new schemes were introduced. As those urged to 
export protested at various disabilities or disadvantages, means 
were found for removing such disadvantages; when exports 
lagged, new incentives were introduced or the value of existing 
incentives increased in order to spur export performance. 9 The 
incentives provided the authorities with flexible tools with 
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which they could induce the private sector to perform to the 
extent desired.' 0 Perusal of the list is indicative of the extent 
to which the entire machinery of government became oriented 
to the attainment of export goals. 
Some of the incentives listed in Table 24 are self-explanatory 
and others have been discussed before. Tariff exeniptions on raw 
materials and spare parts require little comment. Most countries 
have one scheme or another under which tariffs paid on 
imported inputs are rebated to the exporter after he has 
processed and shipped the goods. The Korean system went 
beyond this by exempting exporters from paying duties in the 
first place. if, at a later date, exports were less than expected, 
the importer was expected to pay duties on the difference. In 
addition to exemptions for direct exporters, the Korean incen­
tive system provided greater inducements than usually ericoun­
tered by also exempting romestic suppliers of exporters, starting 
in 1965. 
Domestic indirect and direct tax exemptions were introduced 
as part of the 1961 measures, and were probably of considerable 
importance. At that time, exports were exempted from the 
domestic commodity tax ,nd exporters from the business 
activity tax. In addition, exporters were permitted to reduce 
their income tax liabilities 30 percent on income from exports 
and 20 percent on salcs to tourists and the U.N. Command. 
These reduction rates were changed to 50 percent for both 
categories of transaction in 1962, and remained at that level 
until their abolition early i1 1973. Accelerated depreciation 
provisions, which did not apply to production for domestic 
sale, provided yet another tax indu:ement for exporting. 
Wastage allowances are a form of export subsidy that have led 
more than one observer to question the efficiency of the export 
drive. Wastage allowances were set as a proportion of required 
inputs that exporters were allowed to impoit, over and above 
established needs, per unit of output. if, for example, it was 
agreed that producers of a particular commodity required $0.40 
oi imported intermediate goods per dollar of exports, a wastage 
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allowance of, say, 25 percent might be established, thereby 
to import $0.50 of the inputs perpermitting the exporter 
wasdollar of exports. Theoretically, the wastage allowance 
designed to co,;er that fraction of inputs which might be 
broken ,.handling, or embedded in commoditiesdefective, 
not meet quality concrol. In practice,whose specificatons did 
wastage allowances apparently exceeded any reasonable estimate 
of genuine wastage. Many oif the in-,,-rted intermediate goods 
were not otherwise eligible 'or impoi'.ation for the domestic 
markcc, and they could be legally resold. The result was that the 
wastage allowance enabled many exporters to earn an additional 
profit, either by using the excess intermediate goods to produce 
for the domestic market and sell at a high price, or else by 
selling the intermediate goods to other producers for a price far 
in excess of their (duty free) imported price. 
The facts that wastage allowances overstated iaputs into 
export production and that exporters had an incentive in any 
event to overstate their requirements of imported intermediate 
goods have had consequences for r-sourc,' all-cation. These 
provisio.as also created an artificial incentive to employ imported, 
rather than domestic, intermediate goods and, in doing,so 
encouraged activities with lower domestic value added than 
have been induced under an alternative export-pro­might 
reasons, estimates ofmotion scheme." For this and other 
net exports, which are the appropriate measure of the impor­
tance of exports to the conomy and which should be used in 
estimating the growth of exports, are probably biased and sub­
of error than would otherwise be theject to a higher margin 
case. There is reason to believe that domestic value added in 
exports is probably understated in the statistics because 
imported inputs are probably overestimated. For purposes of 
estimating growth rates, however, there is no basis to determine 
over timc.whether the overestimation increased or decreased 
estimates of employment inThis phenomenon influences 

a number of other key statistics.
exports and 
Import entitlements linked to exports, or export-import link 
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schemes, have already been discussed in earlier chapters. These 
schemes represented a means by which the scarcity value of 
imports (at an overvalued exchange rate) could be transferred to 
exporters, thereby maintaining the incentive to export in the 
face of an unrealistic exchange rate. 
An interesting form of export incentive not often found 
among developing countries but used earlier by Japan arose in 
the provision, starting in 1957, that only those whose export 
performance nmet certain targets could become registered 
importers. This provision, like the link schemes, tended to 
transfer the implicit value of foreign exchange to the exporters 
who were, in fact, earning it. Interestingly enough, one could 
register as an exporter with a smaller volume of e:xports than 
needed for registering as an importer. In 1959, for example, 
mininmm exports required to register as an exporter were 
$20,000, while ininimuni exports required to be permitted to be 
registered as an importer were $100,000. Once a registration 
certificate was obtained, it did not automatically remain valid. 
Rather, export targets were raised for each successive year, and 
they had to bc met in order for an importer's registration to 
remain valid. As with so many other types of provisions, it is 
difficult to estimate how important this type of provision was as 
an incentive to exports. It does illustrate the extent to which 41l 
were goaded to perform well and to improve upon whatever 
performance had gone before. 
The next two incentives listed in Tal'le 24 require little com­
ment. Reduced public utility rates obviously made exporting 
relatively more profitable. The dollar-denominated deposits in 
the Bank of Korea were an inducement only in the 1950s when 
severe exchange control was in effect. After 1961, with unifica­
tion of the exchange rate, that incentive was no longer opera­
tive. Granting of monopoly rights to the first firm to enter a 
new market was used for a brief period, from 1967 to 1971, as 
a further stimulus to exports. 
The Korean Trade Promotion Corporation, or KOTRA, was 
established in 1964, and was designed to assist exporters with 
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marketin'.g activities. It has been an active organization, and has 
undoubtedly been important in assisting exporters in expanding 
into new markets and meeting quality and other technical 
requirements associated with marketing. 
Direct export subsidies, as already mentioned, were employed 
to offset the increased overvaluation of the w6n that followed 
after the 1955 and 1961 devaluations. The value of those sub­
sidies Aas included in the computation of EERs for exports, and 
little further comment is required. Unlike many of the other 
export incentives, the value of the subsidies can be estimated 
with fair accuracy. The only point that should perhaps be made 
is that the export EERs given in Tables 10 and 22 represent an 
average of the rates applicable to individual itenis; in fact, 
subsiiies were extended to different products at varying rates 
and were by no means uniform. 
The use of export targets started in 1962 and has played an 
important part in export-promotion policy since that time. 
Although a plan was in effect in 1962, the targets set forth in 
the First Five-Year Plan were well below performance and they 
therefore had little effect. However, starting with 1962, annual 
export targets were set, each target excee iig the realized level 
of the prior year by a sizable amount. It was these annual targets 
that were operationally significant. 
The targets were implemented in a variety of ways. In the 
first instance, fulfi!lment was the responsibility of the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry (MCI), and an "export situation 
room" was established to monitor export performance.2 Tar­
gets were assigned to industrial associations, firms, and regions. 
When exports were at or above their target levels, few changes 
were initiated. If, however, exports began lagging for a particular 
sector, efforts were initiated to rectify the situation. Measures 
extended all the way from threats (and presumably implementa­
tion) of sanctions to provisions of additional incentives and 
government measures to remove bottlenecks."3 In later years, 
the political imperative of meeting targets resulted occasionally 
in such practices as the alteration of dates of exports, the 
98
 
Export Performance 
speeding up of shipments, and other devices to assure that the 
statistics accorded with the target. 
The last category of incentives-credit subsidies-reflects both 
the degree to which the Korean government emphasized its 
export-promotion goals and also the fragmented state of the 
Korean capital market. Because there was an excess demand for 
credit throughout most of the period, exporters were favored 
not only with lower interest rates but also with preferential 
access to loans. The fact th'at loans were extended, even without 
interest subsidy, at lower rates of interest than borrowers were 
willing to pay implies that there was an element of subsidy, 
additional to the lower interest rates, in the preferential status 
of exporters. That element is not included in the data in Tables 
9 and 23. The interest-subsidy values recorded there reflect 
simply the lower interest charges to exporters. Interest-rate 
subsidies were, initially, much smaller than other forms of 
subsidy payments, totaling 255 million w6n in 1962 compared 
with 310 million w6n internal tax exemptions and 566 million 
w6n direct subsidy payments. Over the next two years, however, 
credit subsidization became inc-easingly important as an incen­
tive for exports. In 1964, interest-rate subsidies constituted 
more than one-fifth of total export subsidies; they remained at 
approximately that fraction of the total thereafter. " 
Some part of the interest rate subsidies probably served to offset 
imperfections in the Korean capital marlket and thereby enabled 
improved resource allocation and the success of the export­
promotion strategy. But there can be little doubt that there were 
also less desirable effects and that the availability of subsidized 
credit induced the use of more capital-intensive techniques than 
were probably optimal. The efficiency of resource allocation 
resulting from the trade regime is considered in Chapter 5. 
EXPORT PERFORMANCE 
The success of the export-promotion drive was truly phenomenal. 
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While it is impossible to p:ovide a precise assessment of the 
degree to which the export incentives were responsible for that 
performance (as contrasted with the alternative hypothesis that 
Korean development had proceeded sufficiently so that condi­
tions were in any event right for an export boom), there is no 
question that export performance exceeded even the most 
optimistic expectations. 
Table 25 gives the sectoral composition of exports for the 
1961-1965 period. It will be recalled that exports had stagnated 
in the 1950s, failing to reattain their 1953 dollar value until 
1961 (see Table 13). The first, and mhost obvious, change in the 
1960s was the reversal of the downward trend and the g,'owth of 
exports. From S31.8 million in 1960, they grew to S38.6 million 
in 1961, S54.8 million in 1962, S87.0 million in 1 963, $118.9 
million in 1964, and S175.0 million in 1965. This represented a 
sixfold increase in export earnings in the unbelievably short 
space of five years. Moreover, the rate of growth of exports 
appeared to be accelerating over most of the period: export 
earnings increased 21 percent in 1961, 42 percent in 1962, 58 
percent in 1963, 37 percent in 1964, and 47 percent in 1965. 
The most striking feature of the data in Table 25 is the fact 
that export growth was an across-the-board phenomenon: only 
Coal Products failed to maintain the export levels of the 1950s. 
Every other sector contributed significantly, and only two 
primary-based sectors did not more than double export earnings 
between 1961 and 1965. Three sectors which already had rela­
tively large exports in 1961 grew at exceptionaliy rapid rates: 
Textiles, Lumber and Plywood, and Steel and Metal Products. 
These three sectors accounted for S83.6 million of the total 
increase in exports of S136 inillion. In each of these sectors, 
moreover, the 1965 level of export earnings exceeded the 196! 
level by a factor of more than ten. No other sectors had coin­
parable records except for two whose 1961 and 1965 earnings 
were negligible (Leather Products, and Glass and Stone). Thus, 
whereas the three sectors had accounted for 18 percent of total 
exports in 1961, they accounted for almost 52 percent of total 
export earnings in 1965. 
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TABLE 25 Sectoral Composition of Exports, 1960-1965 
(S1,000s) 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
Rice, Barley, Wheat 508 8,960 809 2,352 3,242 
Other Agriculture 5,078 2,998 4,778 5,071 t,019 
Forestry and Fisheries 1,652 4,759 5,812 5,450 8,343 
Minerals 14,812 12,252 15,177 20,016 23,764 
Processed Food and 
Beverages 5,962 8,734 12,344 20,499 18,807 
Textile Fabrics, Products 
and Fiber Spinning 4,189 7,623 17,613 32,744 54,553 
Lumber and Plywood 1,217 2,289 6,309 11,421 18,177 
Wood and Paper Products 114 112 117 372 517 
Leather Products 1 2 1 74 546 
Chemical and Rubber 
Products 694 1,344 2,201 2,354 5,327 
Petroleum and Coal 
Products - - 2 83 -
Glass and Stone 24 90 729 1,931 2,752 
Steel and Metal Products 1,639 1,434 12,514 7,965 17,867 
Machinery (including 
electrical) 785 406 1,842 1,341 3,804 
Transport Equipment 150 1.042 2,242 853 1,629 
tk ,,ellaneous Manufacturing 1,718 1,402 2,787 5,021 8,791 
TOTAL 38,648 54,804 86,796 118,860 174,998 
Source: Wontack Hong, FactorSupply, Table A-1 2 
Note: Total includes "other services," scrap iron, and "unclassifiable" exports. 
By contrast, the three largest export sectors in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s had been Other AgricL.iture, Processed Food 
and Beverages, and Minerals. Although exports grew even for 
these predominantly primary-based industries, their share fell 
from 67 percent of exports as late as 1961 to 28 percent by 
1965. This shift in the composition of commodity exports is 
further reflected in the data in Table 26. The drop in the relativc 
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TABLE 26 Percentage Distribution of Exports, 1960-1965 
Average 
Sector 1950 to 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
Agriculture 19.9 14.4 21.8 6.4 6.2 5.2 
Minerals 53.0 38.3 22.3 17.5 16.8 13.6 
Total Primary 75.1 57.0 52.9 30.6 27.7 23.6 
Manufactures 24.9 43.0 47.1 694 72.3 76.4 
Sources: Data for the 1950 to 1960 average are from Table 13. Percentages for 1961 
to 1965 are derived from Table 25. 
Note: Total Primary includes forestry and flsherics, which are not listed separately. 
importance of primary-commodity exports and the increase in 
that of manufacturing exports was extremely abrupt. Mineral 
exports, which had accounted for more than half of export earn­
ings in the 1950s, declined from an average of 53 percent of 
total e:,ports in the 1950s to less than 14 percent by 1965, 
despite the fact that, in absolute terms, earnings had risen from 
$14.8 million in 1961 to $23.7 million in 1965. Indeed, the 
share of agriculture and minerals fell even more than the total 
primary percentage indicates, as exports from forestry and 
fisheries, primarily the latter, rose sharply (see Tab!e 13). The 
net result was that, by 1965, over three-quarters of Korean 
export earnings originated in manufacturing. To be sure, in 
value-added terms, the contribution of manufactures was some­
what less, as most manufactured exports had a relatively high 
import content. This consideration is dealt with in greater detail 
in Chapter 4, but it does not fundamentally alter the basic 
conclusion that the relative importance of manufacturing as a 
source of foreign exchange earnings increased markedly during 
the early 1960s, and that exports grew ovcr a wide range of 
manufacturing sectors. In the late 1950s, Korea had been .1net 
exporter of primary commodities and a net importer of mnanu­
factures. This balance was changing throughout the process of 
rapid export growth. 
The geographic destination of exports is also of interest from 
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the viewpoint of analyzing the reasons for Korea's successful 
transition to export promotion. Some observers of world trade 
patterns have argued that the phenomenal Korean success is 
essentially non-repeatable because it was Korea's close ties with, 
and proximity to, Japan that enabled the rapid growth of 
exports during the 1960s. This argument does not bear close 
inspection for two reasons: first, trade relations between Japan 
and Korea were not normalized until the mid-1960s; second, the 
period of rapid export expansion was accompanied by a decline 
in the relative importance of Japan as a destination for Korean 
exports. The total dollar value of exports, and percent of total 
expoits, going to Japan was as follows: " 
TABLE 27 	 Total Dollar Value of Exports, and Percentage of 
Total Exports. to Japan, 1960-1965 
Exports to Japa' % of Total 
($ millions) Commodity Exports 
1960 19.6 61.5 
1961 18.3 47.5 
1962 23.5 42.8 
1963 24.8 28.6 
1964 38.1 32.1 
1965 37.6 25.1 
As can be seen in Table 27, Japan's impor 'rom Korea did not 
even double during the period when Korea's exports rose six­
fold. Reflecting this, the Japanese share, which had been 61.5 
percent in 1960 (and had averaged 53.5 percent during the five­
year period 1955 to 1960), fell sharply between 1960 and 1965. 
The two geographic areas that absorbed an increasing share of 
Korea's exports during the 1960-1965 period were the United 
States (whose share rose from 11.1 percent in 1960 to 35.2 
percent in 1965), and East Asia other than Japan (whose share 
rose from 11.3 percent in 1960 to 22.8 percent ;n 1965). 
It seems evident, therefore, that rapid Japanese economic 
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can 
explain the rapid growth of Korean exports. Instead, Korean 
export growth was significantly greater in other markets than in 
Japan which, during the crucial years of transition to an export­
growth did not contribute a rapidly growing market that 
oriented trade policy, expanded her imports from Korea rela­
tively slowly. 
It is not possible to quantify the contribution of the export­
promotion policies described in the last section t, the success of 
the transition to an export-orientcd economy in the early 1960s. 
It seems evident that without those incentives, or at least a 
significant shift in incentives fron, those that had prevailed in 
the 1950s, the very rapid growth of export earnings could not 
have been realized and susrained. rhe government's commitment 
to the export-promotion policy, and its willingness to adjust 
incentives in response to the behavior of exports, must have 
been a powerful contributing factor, in that it provided 
assurance for those contemplating entering export markets that, 
if tley successfully competed abroad, profitability wNould 
continue. 
It also seems apparent that one cannot attribute Korea's 
success entirely to luck. World markets were growing during the 
1960s, and it was easier for the Korean export-promotion 
policies to have the desired effect against the background of 
have been if the worldgrowing world markets that it would 
economy had been stagnant. Other countries, however, were 
confronted with similar world market conditions and did not 
achieve aaything like the Korean results. Whether Korean 
polizies wotik have been successful against the background of 
seem tointernational recession is arguable; it does not, however, 
be possible to make the case that fortuitous external events 
explain Korea's successful export performance. 6 
IMPORTS 
As seen earlier, the 1961 devaluation was followed by a short­
lived liberalization of imports and then a reversion to greater 
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reliance upon quantitative controls, while the 1964 devaluation 
was followed by continuing liberalization. During the transition 
years as a whole, therefore, quantitative restrictions continued 
to play an important role in determining the commodity com­
position of imports, although their relative importance dimin­
ished fairly rapidly toward the end of the period. 
Table 28 gives the total dollar value of imports for each year 
from 1961 to 1965, and also the breakdown of imports by 
major categories in both dollar and percentage terms. The 
import boom that accompanied domestic inflation and occa­
sioned the reimposition and intensification of quantitative 
restrictions in 1963 is perhaps the most prominent feature of 
the statistics. ' Also to be noted is the sharp reduction in 
imports in 1964, the combined result of fairly tight import 
restrictions early in the year and the devaluation and accom­
panying special tariffs later in the year. 
By and large, the commodity composition of imports appears 
to have changed relatively little between the latter half of the 
1950s and the first half of the 1960s. To be sure, comparison is 
somewhat difficult in the presence of a sizable proportion of 
"
"unclassifiable ' imports in the late 1.950s. Even so, it would 
appear that imports of finished consumer manufactures had 
probably been curtailed to the extent deemed feasible by the 
mid-1950s, and that the breakdown of imports among raw 
materials, intermediate goods, and investment goods was much 
the same, regardless of the changed orientation of the economy, 
ii the two periods. 
Despite the shift in emphasis toward exporting, and the 
apparent stability of the structure of imports among end-use 
categories, import substitution continued in a number of 
industries in the early 1960s. In contrast to the widespread 
expansion of exports, the import-substitution thrust was rela­
tively more concentrated, and less across-the-board in nature, 
than in the 19503. Suk Tai Suh's data show sharp drops in the 
percentage of domestic demand satisfied by imports in paper 
and paper products (from 30 percent supplied by imports in 
1960 to 12.5 percent in 1965), coal and petroleum products 
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TABLE 28 	 Commodity Composition of Imports, 1956-1960 Average, and 1961-1965 
(S millions-figures in parentheses indicate percentages of total imports) 
Machinery & 
Foodand Crudc Mineral Transport 
Beverages Materials Fuels Chemicals Manufactures Equipment Total 
1956-1960 average 56.7 (15.3) 64.5 (17.4) 37.5 (10.1) 73.8 (19.9) 61.9 (16.7) 41.5 (11.2) 370.8 
1961 40.1 (12.7) 67.3 (21.3) 27.5 8.7) 61.6 (19.5) 45.2 (14.3) 42.4 (13.4) 316.1 
1962 48.9 (11.6) 93.6 (22.2) 30.8( 7.3) 94.5 (22.4) 83.5 (19.8) 69.6 (16.5) 421.8 
1963 121.0 (21.6) 112.0 (20.0) 34.2 ( 6.1) 80.1 (14.3) 96.4 (17.2) 115.4 (17.2) 560.3 
1964 68.3 (16.9) 101.1 (25.0) 28.3 ( 7.0) 84.5 (20.9) 51.4 (12.7) 69.6 (17.2) 404.4 
1965 63.5 (13.7) 114.0 (24.6) 31.5 ( 6.8) 103.3 (22.3) 77.4 (16.7) 73.7 (15.9) 463.4 
Source: BOK, Economic Statistics Yearbook. 
Note: For 1956 to 1960, an average of 9.4%of imports were placed in an "unclassifiable" category. In 1961, 10.1% were put in that 
category. After 1961, less than 1% were so classified. For that reason, the dollar figures do not sum to total imports, and the percentages
do not add to 100. 
Imports 
(from 34 percent in 1960 tu 3.4 percent in 1965),"8 chemical 
fertilizers (where 100 percent of domestic demand had been 
supplied by imports until 1960, and one-fourth was met by 
domestic production by 1965), and electrical machinery (from 
45-50 percent imported in 1960--1961 to 18 percent imported 
in 1965).' 9 In some cases, such as chemical fertilizers, these 
figures represent in part the gestation lag from the time of 
import-substitution investments in the late 1950s until output 
was realized some tim. later. By and large, however, the data 
correctly reflect the fact that the early 1960s was a time of 
transition: selective import substitution continued to take place 
simultaneously with the expaiision of production for export. 
Tht-c was, nonetheless, a sharp reversal in the relative con­
tribution of export expansion and import substitution to growth. 
It will be recalled that Frank, Kim, and Westphal estimate that 
the total contribution of export expansion to growth was 12.9 
percent from 1955-1960, while the direct contribution to 
manufacturing growth was 5.1 percent. By comparison, import 
substitution contributed 10.2 percent total, and 24.2 percent 
directly to manufacturing growth performance. Import substitu­
tion had contributed about five times as much in manufacturing, 
ad almost as much as export expansion in total. The Frank, 
Kim, and Westphal estimates for ensuing periods are divided 
into the subintervals 1960-1963 and 1963-1966. Their estimates 
of the respective contributions are shown in Table 29.20 Import 
substitution's overall contribution was negative during the 
period 1960-1963, and its contribution to manufacturing 
TABLE 29 	 Contributions of Export Expansion and Import 
Substitution to Growth, 1960-1963, 1963-1966 
1960-1963 1963-1966 
Direct Direct 
Manufacturing Total Manfacturing Total 
Export Expansion 6.2 6.3 29.4 31.4 
Import Substitution -0.9 - 6.9 14.4 8.9 
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growth was smaller in absolute value, but also negative. After 
1963, it would appear that import substitution again con­
tributed positively to growth, albeit by a far smaller percentage 
than export expansion. 
CAPITAL FLOWS AND AID 
It was seen in Chapter 2 that aid had begun to diminish in the 
late 1950s. That trend continued into the early 1960s. Current 
account deficits persistcd throughout the transition to export­
oriented growth. Moreover, it was anticipated that deficits 
would continue. Since aid was expected to decline in absolute 
importance, the government began adopting a series of measures 
to encourage the inflow of foreign capital. 
The first foreign loans, other than thos- financed by the 
American Development Loan Fund, were negotiated during the 
early 1960s, under the newly pas;ed laws for encouraging foreign 
capital. By and large, however, private foreign capital remained a 
relatively small source of foreign exchange earnings during the 
1961-1965 period. As with exporting, the early 1960s was a 
time of transition as policy shifted toward the inducement of 
foreign capital. Unlike exporting, however, capital flows did not 
begin increasing significantly until after the transition had been 
completed. 
Table 30 provides data derived from the balance-of-payments 
and national-income accounts which yield some indicaion of the 
relative importance of aid, and of other source , of foreign 
exchange, in financing real 'CsoLurcc accumulation during the 
1960-1(65 perind. Impnrt are recorded f.o.b., and therefore do 
not correspond with the data found elsewhere in this volume. 
As can be seen, private capital flows were negligible, and 
cumulatively negative, through 1962. Thereafter, they were 
positive but still relatively small. Until 1961, net foreign assis­
tance was of approxim itely the same order of magnitude as the 
current account deficit, and covered three-quarters or more of 
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TABLE 30 Current Account Balances, Private Capital Flows, and Aid, 1960-1965 
(S millions) 
Imports f.o.b. 
Current Account Balance 
Private Capital Flows 
Total Net Foreign Assistance 
Aid as %of Imports 
Imports as a %of GNP 
Current Account Deficit 
as a %of GNP 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
306 283 390 497 365 416 
- 262 - 198 - 292 -403 - 221 - 194 
3 - 2 - 4 61 7 17 
256 207 200 208 141 134 
83.6 73.1 51.2 41.8 38.6 32.2 
12.6 14.9 17.1 16.4 13.9 16.0 
9.3 9.5 11.9 11.5 7.8 7.4 
Sources: IMF, In.ernzationalFinancialStatistics, (August 1976), and BOK, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1976.
 
Note: Computations of the relative importance of imports, aid, and the deficit were made in the way described in Table 18. F4
 
Transition to an Export Economy 
imports. Thereafter, aid began diminishing rapidly as a propor­
tion of foreign-exchange resources, as exports began growing. By 
1965, imports were over S400 million (even on an f.o.b. basis), 
and accounted for 16 percent of GNP. Aid, however, financed 
only 32.2 percent of the import flow in that year, as exports had 
risen from about one-tenth of imports to over two fifths of 
imports. 
It should be emphasized that the transition to an export 
orientation was accomplished with an increase in the relative 
importance of imports as a fraction of GNP. The move to an 
outward-looking strategy implied changing the structure of the 
economy in such a way that both exports and imports increased 
in relative importance. 
Equally important from the viewpoint of understanding the 
transition and the role of the foreign sector in Korea's modern­
ization is the fact that the current account deficit, as a percent­
age of GNP, remained sizable even until the late 1960s. Foreign 
resources continued to be important as a source of savings, 21 
although those resources originated predominantly from private 
fcreign sources, especially after 1965. 
ENCOURAGING PRIVATE FOREIGN CAPITAL 
As already indicated, foreign-capital inflows did not become 
quantitatively important until 1966. In part, this was because of 
long lags between the time when foreign-loan agreements were 
approved and the time when resources began to be realized from 
those loans. In part, however, it was simply because the policies 
that induced the inflow of foreign capital required time to be 
developed, and initial successes with exporting were necessary to 
alter foreigncrs' cxpectatiouns as to Korean prospects. 
As early as January 1960, a Foreign Capital Inducement Law 
was promulgated. Prior to that date, the only foreign loans had 
originated from the AID Deve!opment Loan Fund, and total 
loan arrivals through 1961 totaled only $4.7 million. 2 In 1962, 
the government identified nine major projects included in the 
Five-Year Plan that would require foreign capital, and sent an 
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CapitalFlows and Aid 
economic mission abroad to attempt to secure financing for the 
projects. In that same year it supplemented the original law, 
enacting provisions whereby imports could be financed by long­
term export credits and also providing repayment guarantees. In 
addition, tax conces-'ons were granted as a further inducement 
to foreign capital. 
Frank, Kim, ard Westphal summarized the results: 
Because of the positive measures of the government to attract foreign 
capital, foreign loans and investments "finalized" increased sharply 
after 1962 and amounted to $222.7 million at the end of 1963 ... 
Foreign loans finalized at the end of 1960 were only about $18.8 
million. At the end of 1963, commercial loans finalized amounted to 
$127.5 million, larger than the $84.4 million of finalized foreign 
public loans. Actual "arrivals" of the foreign loans and equity invest­
ment were, however, relatively small in 1961-63 ... since finalized 
foreign loans and investment generally required a year or more 
before the goods and services financed by the foreign capital actually
3
 
arrived.1
 
The next measures were not taken until 1966. That year began 
the major inflow of foreign capital which so clearly demarcates 
the late 1960s, when foreign capital financed the carrent 
account deficit, from the early 1960s, the last years in which aid 
dominated the financing of the current account deficit and of 
imports. Further discussion can therefore be postponed until 
Chapter 4. 
AID DURING THE EARLY 1960s 
In most respects, aid during the early 1960s followed a course 
similar to the pattern set in the 1950s. It continued to originate 
exclusively from the United States and was predominantly in the 
form of grants rather than loans. Differences were twofold: 
1) there appears to have been considerably less friction between 
donor and recipient, partially as a result of the stabilization 
program and subsequent policy changes and partially because of 
the change in governments; and 2) whereas the Korean economy 
and economic policy were heavily dependent upon a sustained 
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Transition to an Export Economy 
flow of aid in the 1950s, the level of aid was already con­
siderably reduced from its 1957 high: and donor-recipient rela­
tions were predicated on the assumption that the phase-out of 
aid would continue. It was already mentioned that acceptance 
of this prospect was a crucial factor in leading to the decision to 
embark upon the export-promotion strategy. 
Table 31 provides data on the total aid flow and its breakdown 
into major components from 1961 to 1965. The data are com­
parable with tl.-)se given in Table 18. It will be recalled from 
that table that foreign assistance had reached $383 million in 
1957 and had already fallen to S245 million by 1960. As is 
apparent from Table 31, aid inflows remained at approximately 
that level through 1963, and then once again fell sharply to 
$165 million in 1964, remaining at about that level in 1965. 
Non-project assistance continued to be the major form of sup­
port, although PL 480 aid increased in both absolute and 
proportionate importance in the early 1960s. In fact, in 1964, 
PL 480 sales ai-ne exceeded the total of supporting assistance. 
Korea continued to be virtually unique among the deveioping 
countries in that the preponderance of aid was received in the 
form of grants rather than loans. There had been no loans 
received prior to 1959. Thereafter, some aid was channeled 
through the Development Loan Fund. However, by the end of 
1960, total receipts under DLF were on the order of $1.3 
million, less than 1 percent of aid in either year. As can be seen, 
they were somewhat larger in the early 1 960s, although the 
fraction of non-grant assistance remained very small. It was not 
until 1965 that the United States committed itself to long­
term loans as a mneamia Of continuing support. 4 
An indication of the types of activities supported by aid can 
be gained by inspecting the sectoral distribution of non-project 
and project assistance. In a 27-sector breakdown, chemical 
fertilizers were the largest single sector for non-project support­
ing assistance in the late 1950s and in the first half of the 1960s, 
with an average annual support level of $43.2 million for 1956­
1960 and $33.6 million in 1961-1965. Support for petroleum 
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'FABLE 31 Total Aid Received, by Source, 1961-1965 
(S millions) 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
Non-Project Supporting 
Assistance 113.6 126.6 102.7 72.8 79.2 
Project Assistance 29.8 21.7 13.0 5.5 4.3 
PL 480 Sales 32.6 36.1 62.7 94.7 54.4 
PL 480 Title II and 11 10.2 24.0 21.8 27.6 28.5 
Development Loans 3.2 10.5 20.0 4.5 2.6 
TOTAL 192.8 245.5 252.3 164.8 176.9 
Suu c: Data provided by USAID, Korea. 
Note: Data represent financial expenditures on a calendar-year basis. Data do lic 
correspond to bal.nce-of-pavmnrts figures given in Table 30 due to differences ii, 
timing, valuations, and concepts. For example, USAID payroll in Korea is included 
in this table, but not in Table 30. 
products was also sizable until 1963, averaging $20.2 million 
annually between 1955 and 1960, and $24.7 million bctwc-n 
1961 and 1963. The support level was $8 million in 1964, the 
last year for which there was non-project assistance to that 
sector. Assistance to rice, barley, and wheat, to other agricul­
ture, and to fiber spinning was sizable in the late 1950s but 
diminished sharply in the early 1960s. By contrast, project 
assistance was much more heavily concentrated. In the late 
1950s, public utilities and other construction accounted for over 
three-fifths of all project-commodity assistance. The only other 
sector to receive a significant share was ttansportation equip­
ment, but that had largely ceased by the early 1960s 2 
Counterpart funds (see pp. 74-71) continued to be used to 
provide tile domestic componet of financing investment proj­
ects, in much the same way as had occurred in the late 1950s. 
As with aid patterns in general, the only significant change was 
that domestic savings were increasing and, because of that, de­
cisions with respect to counterpart funds were relatively less 
important in the allocation of investment resources than had 
been the case e.arlier. 
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As with so many phenomena, then, aid in the early 1960s was 
in a state of transition. It continued to be important, accounting 
for over half the import bill and a very high fraction of investible 
resources. Nonetheless, its importance was diminishing, and the 
period was essentially one during which aid moved from center 
,rage. By the time the transition to an export-oriented economy 
was completed, the Korean government had also succeeded in 
attracting sizable foreign capital, which to a large extent sub­
stituted for aid in maintaining a high fraction of foreign savings 
in the tot,1. 
REASONS FOR SUCCESS OF THE TRANSITION 
By 1965, the success of the export-promotion policies in achiev­
ing rapid export growth was evident. Because that success was 
associated with a sharp increase in the rate of economic growth, 
the export orientation of the Korean economy became an ac­
cepted, and largely unquestioned, basis foi policy. There was no 
longer any doubt as to whether export growth should outpace 
GNP growth: the only question was by how much it should do so. 
A number of questions about the export-promotion strategy 
arc of considerable interest. Among the more important arc 1 ) the 
extent to which export-promotion policies were themselves re­
sponsible for, or contributed to, the more rapid rate of growth 
and 2) the efficiency of the export-promotion policies. Those 
questions must await analysis of the period of sustained and 
rapid growth of exports and real output from 1965-1972. At 
this stage, however, there is a third important question that can 
be addressed. This is the ainalysis of why Korea was so successful 
in changing her trade orientation. Many countries have, after 
all, embarked upon all export-pronlotion campaign at oil or 
more times. Often, exports respond to some extent witi a sharp 
spurt, only to fall off again. Whlen that happens, governments 
frequently are forced to retreat from their determination to 
achieve rapid export growth. In fact, in most countries, the 
strategy of import substitution has been adopted largely because 
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of pessimism with regard to the possibility of achieving sus­
tained growth of exports. Why was it, then, that Korea could 
embark upon such a strategy and somehow achieve sufficient 
success so that the policy became self-reinforcing? 
A number of factors contributed. First, and of considerable 
importance, was the fact that Korea's exports had languished 
during the 1950s. By 1960, at the time the stzategy switch 
occurred, therefore, Korea's exports were abnormally low rela­
tive to her size and stage of development. In that sense, there 
was something of an "export potential" waiting to be tapped. 
That potential provided a reservoir from which initial spurts in 
exports could occur in response to the incentives offered to 
them. After all, it did not require a very large increase in the 
absolute level of exports to result in a very sizable percentage 
increase, given the initially low base. 
The fact that there was some bacllog of ePort potential, 
however, was by no means sufficient to account for the initial 
success of the export-promoii,,' strategy. In particular, that 
potential could have remained tota'ly unrealized in the absence 
of a set of incentives that made exporting a profitable activity, 
on a par with alternative activities that private-sector entre­
preneurs might undertake. A large part of the initial success of 
the Korean export-promotion drive must be attributed to the 
fact that the incentives for export, both explicit (in the form of 
real exchange rates, export subsidies, and the other measures 
listed inTable 24) and implicit (in the form of expedited govern.. 
ment action and preferential treatment for exporters) were suf­
ficiently strong and sustained. Perhaps the most difficult 
challenge that most governments face in attempting to reverse 
earlier inward-looking policies is that of convincing would-be 
exporters that the commitment to the export strategy and 
incentives for exporting will continue. Ip the Korean c:qe, the 
government's commitment was exceptionally strong, and it was 
not only the fact of incentives, but the government's willingness 
to alter them to induce the desired performance that was 
undoubtedly important in bringing about rapid export growth 
in the early 1960s. 
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In that regard, an important piece ef evidence is that the 1961 
devaluation was not notably successful. Indeed, the real exchange 
rate and the value of export incentives began dropping sharply 
in 1962. Simultaneously, the tightening of quantitative rcstric­
tions must have increased the profitibility of import-substitu­
tion activities. However, the government reacted by providing 
export subsidies and other inducements to exporters which, it 
was shown, resulted in an increase in the real proceeds per dol­
lar of experts despite the appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
The 1964 devaluatiorn, and commitment to maintaining the 
real value of the exchange rate by adoption of the sliding peg, 
was undoubtedly a precondition for the export growth of the 
late I 960s. Accompanying th:' devaluationl were measures aimed 
at financial reform 26 which were necessary if Korea was to be 
able to induce private capital flows of any magnitude.27 With­
out the 1964 reforms, it is doubtful whether continued high 
rates of export expansion could have been realized. Had the 
success prior to that date been less, it is possible that the govern­
ment would not have had the political support and determina­
tion to carry out the reforms necessary to transform the initial, 
tentative, success with exporting into thc sustained drive it 
became in the late 1960s. 
The appropriate conclusion, therefore, would appear to be 
that the initial set of export incentives, combined with the low 
export base and the untapped potential that then existed, 
accounted for the rapid growth of exports in the 1961-1964 
period. While there were twists and turns in policy during the 
1961-1964 years, these were more the unintended result of 
other policies (such as the impact of inflation on the balance cf 
payments) than of ashy retreat from the export-promotion 
strategy. Export growth, in turn, reinforced the commitment 
to an export orientation, and did so in a way that enabled the 
devaluation and other reforms of 1964-1965. Thereafter, the 
government was able to maintain a continuity of policy which 
was undrubtedly necessary for the export expansion of the next 
decade. 
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Emerence as a Major Exporter,1966 to 1975 
Beginning in 1966, the policies that had been established during 
the transition years had their payoff: export growth was rapid 
and sustained, Korean exporters became established in inter­
national markets in a variety of lines, and Korea emerged as a 
major competitor in international markets. 
From any long-term historical perspective, the decade from 
1966 to 1975 will undoubtedly be viewed as homogeneous with 
regard to the trade-and-payments regime: the commitment to an 
export-oriente d strategy remained unchallenged; the policy 
instruments employed in pursuit of that strategy vere fairly 
stable with only minor and gradual changes; and the underlying 
trend in export and import growth remained much the same 
throughout. 
Viewed from the closer perspective of 1976, however, there 
were some shifts and changes that demarcate sub-intervals of the 
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decade. For that reason, it is convenient to begin with a brief 
outline of the chronology of those events affecting trade and 
payments. Thereafter, the trade-and-payments regime, and the 
behavior of exports, imports, capital flows, and foreign aid can 
be discussed in turn. 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE PERIOD 
Any attempt to divide Korea's trade-and-payments history into 
well-defined sub-intervals is bound to have an arbitrary element, 
but the most questionable division is any demarcation of the 
post-1960 period. Kwaig Suk Kim, for example, treats 1960 to 
1963 as the transition period, and regards the period from 1964 
onward (through 1973, the end of the period lie covered when 
writing in 1974) as years of rapid export growth.' Frank, Kim, 
and Westphal, by contrast, treat 1961 to 1966 as the transition 
period; they treat the years 1967 to 1972-the end of the time 
period they covered-as the years of sustained export growth. 2 
The reasons for the difficulty in placing the end of the transition 
and the start of sustained growth are not difficult to pinpoint: 
as shown in Chapter 3, policy instruments were frequently 
altered during the switch to export promotion in response to 
the degree of success in achieving rapid export growth, and it 
was not until 1967 that the last export-incentive measures were 
introduced (seeTable 24). One can, therefore, make an excellent 
case for dating the end of transition as the time when export 
growth was really sustained, which would be Kim's cutoff, and 
an equally valid case for dating the end of the transition as the 
time when stability in incentives had been achieved-either 
1966 or 1967. 
Once that demarcation is made, there is little doubt that the 
remainder of the period was characterized by rapid export 
growth, as exports rose from S250 million in 1966 to S835 mil­
lion in 1970, $1,624 million in 1972, and $5,081 million in 
1975. This rapid growth was reflected in Korea's rapidly 
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increasing share of world exports, which was less than 3/lOOths 
of 1 percent in 1960, rose to 14/lOOths of 1 percent in 1966, 
0.29 percent in 1970, 0.43 percent in 1972, and 0.61 percent in 
1975.
 
Within the period, however, there were slight changes in 
emphasis. These came about primarily as a result of the immedi­
ate balance of payments position and prospects. Until 1973, 
changes were ielatively minor and designed to offset shifts in the 
net foreign-exchange position. After 1973, the sharp changes in 
the international economy impinged upon the payments posi­
rion and influenced the overall direction of policy toward the 
trade seztor. 
By and large, one can characterize the changes as fluctuations 
in the extent of liberalization of the trade-and-payments regime. 
In 1967, after it became clear that rapid export growth was a 
reality, an effort to liberalize the import regime was made. This 
effort had several components, including the shift from a 
positive list (of permitted imports) to a negative list (of pro­
hibited imports), which left a long-term imprint on the regime 
and resulted in sustained liberalization. There was also an effort 
to reform the tariff structure, but overall tariff reduction was 
not achieved. 
After the middle of 1968, efforts comparable to the 1967 
liberalization were no longer made and, indeed, the regime 
turned somewhat more restrictive in response to payments 
pressures. Borrowing from abroad was increasing rapidly in the 
period: as of 1965, accumulated debt and debt-servicing obliga­
tions were simply not a factor with which the authorities had to 
cope. By the late 1960s, debt service obligations contributed as 
much, if not more, to concern about the payments position as 
did the trade balance. and the stringency of the regime altered in 
response to that. These shifts in emphasis-albeit relatively 
minor--were reflected in the stated objectives of the foreign­
exchange budgets and trade programs announced each year. For 
example, the 1970 budget placed emphasis upon curtailing 
imports of "nonessential goods" and increasing support for 
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export industries,4 and the 1971 and 1972 budget further 
emphasized restrictions upon imports.5 By 1973, the "general 
principles" were somewhat altered: 1) emphasis was to be 
placed upon increasing the capacity to repay foreign debts; 
2) higher "priority" was to be given to export industries; and 
3) restrictions upon imports were not to obstruct the "ef­
ficient supply of raw materials and of goods ,equired for 
stable economic growth." 6 For 1974, top priority was given to 
raw materials procurement, including assuring availability of 
foreign-exchange loans for impo-tcrq, 7 while for 1975 emphasis 
once again shifted to restraining imports. 
With each of these shifts, various categories of imports were 
shifted from AA to restricted status, and conversely. Import 
deposit requirements and other measures were simultaneously 
adjusted, and numerous other relatively minor measures were 
undertaken. None of them fundamentally altered the export 
orientation of the economy, however, and export growth 
remained the fundamental commitment of the government. 
Insofar as any change in that commitment can be discerned, 
it came relatively late in the peried, and seems to have 
originated from uneasiness stemming from the rapid world 
inflation and increase in the price of oil in 1973-1974.18 At that 
time, the first questioning of the extent of the commitment to 
export was heard. To be sure, there were no suggestions that 
the economy should reverse its fundamental orientation. Rather, 
there was a great deal of discussion of "dependence" on 
foreigners, and suggestions were voiced to increase the reliance 
of exporters upon domestically produced intermediate and 
capital goods. As the preparations for the Fourth Five-Year Plan 
got Linder way, debate over the export target reflected this 
concern. By mid-I 975, the Korean economy had demonstrated 
its resilience in the face of the oil price increase. By 1976, the 
policy questions implicit in the debate seem to have been 
resolved without a noticeable swing toward encouragement of 
production for domestic consumption. Nonetheless, the debate 
reflected the first time that the extent of emphasis on export 
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promotion was at all seriously questioned in public discussion. 
Even then, it should be noted, there were no advocates of a 
significant reversal of policy. 
Thus, if one were to attempt to identify sub-periods within 
the 1966-1975 period, the early years would be characterized as 
attempts at further liberalization of the regime within the con­
text of rapid export growth. The middle years, from 1968 to 
1972, were notable for the emergence of debt-service obligations 
as a significant component of the balance of payments and also 
for the failure of the Korean government to liberalize its import 
regime further despite the rapid growth in foreign exchange 
resources. The final years were marked by the upheavals of the 
international economy and the successful use of policy instru­
ments to enable the Korean economy to adapt rerrarkably well. 
THE TRADE-AND-PAYMENTS REGIME 
Table 32 gives the basic data on nominal, effective, real, and 
purchasing-power-parity exchange rates for the 1966-1975 
period. Despite much greater stability in real rates than had 
characterized earlier periods, the precise mechanism by which 
exchange rates were determined altered on several occasions. 
EXCHANGE RATE POLICY 
It will be recalled that the government had implemented a 
floating unified exchange-rate policy in March 1965. At that 
time, the rate was 270 w6n per dollar. It actually declined to 
256 w6n per dollar by the end of April, and then rose to 280 
win per dollar by the end of May. Starting in June, the Bank of 
Korea began undertaking limited intervention in the foreign 
exchange market. By August, the bank was selling exchange 
certificates at 271 per dollar. That completely repegged the 
exchange rate, which remained at that level throughout 1967. 
In 1968, intervention policy was again altered: the w6n was 
permitted to depreciate slowly in an amount deemed sufficient 
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TABLE 32 Nominal, Effective, and Purchasing-Power-Parity Exchange 
Rates for Exports and imports, 1966-1975 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
A. Official Exchange Rate 
(w~n per dollar) 27i 271 277 288 311 348 392 398 407 485 
B. Export Subsidies (wan per 
dollar) 
(Internal tax exemptions) 
(Customs duty exemptions) 
52 
(21) 
(21) 
62 
(23) 
(25) 
78 
(23) 
(40) 
80 
(31) 
(34) 
88 
(30) 
(40) 
103 
(37) 
(48) 
105 
(28) 
(66) 
94 
(22) 
(64) 
86 
(22) 
(55) 
81 
(34) 
(34) 
J.: 
(Interest rate subsidies) 
N)NC. Export EER (A + B) 
(10) 
323 
(15) 
333 
(15) 
355 
(15) 
368 
(17) 
399 
(18) 
451 
(11) 
497 
(7) 
493 
(9) 
493 
(13) 
566 
D. PLD EER for Exports 
(C divided by 1965 
price level) 297 2E5 283 275 273 284 275 255 180 163 
E. PPP PLD EER for Emports 
(D times index of price 
level of major trading 
partners adjusted for 
yen revaluation) 305 297 299 299 308 325 349 394 338 321 
F. Actual Tariff Equivalents 
(w~n per dollar) 25 26 26 25 26 22 23 19 19 25 
TABLE 32 (continued) 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
G. EER for Imports (A + F) 296 296 303 313 336 369 415 418 425 510 
H. PLD EER for Imports 272 256 242 234 231 233 230 216 155 147 
I. PPP PLD EER for Imports 280 266 255 255 260 270 290 332 288 287 
Source: Larry E. Westphal and Kwang Suk Kim, "Industrial Policy and Development in Korea," (mi.neo, World Bank Staff Working PaperNo. 263, August 1977), Table B. 
Note: The value of railroad and electricity discount is included in total export subsidies for 1971 and 1972. See Appendix A for an
explanation of exchange-rate concepts. 
".i 
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to maintain purchasing-power parity (that is, the wSn depre­
ciated by the weighted percentage difference in inflation rates 
between Korea and her major trading partners). That policy 
continued until June 1971, when there was an abrupt 13 
percent devaluation from 326 wSn per dollar to 370 w6n per 
dollar. The rate remained pegged at that level until the end of 
1971, then was a!lowed to depreciatc until June 1972 when it 
was again pegged, this time at 400 w6n per dollar. When the 
American dollar was rdevalued in February 1973, i. was decided 
to maintain the w6n-dollar rate. That decision, of course, 
represented a sizable devaluation relative to Japan. The 400­
w6n-pcr-dollar rate remained in effect until December 1974, 
when it increased to 484 w6n per dollar, the rate that prevailed 
until the end of 1975. 
In real terms, the decade really consists of two periods. The 
first lasted from 1966 to 1973. During that time, the export 
PLD EER was maintained even while the exchange rate was 
pegged by altering the value of export subsidies. The fluctuation 
in the PLD EER for exports during the years 1966-1,971 was 
less than 2 percent. Since world prices and exchange rates were 
fairly stable, the PPP PLD EER did not alter much, although 
world ;aflation after 1969 meant that the policy of holding the 
PLD EER virtually constant tended to increase the competitive­
ness of Korea's exports. The treatment of imports stood in 
sharp contrast to that of ,-xports. When the nominal exchange 
rate was constant, the real exchange rate for imports appreciated; 
when that happened, the government took measures to increase 
the restrictiveness of quantitative controls. Up until 1972, 
therefore, the exchange-rate regime was asymmetric: on the 
export side, it was recognized that the real return for exporting 
had to be maintained at a fairly realistic and coitiant level. 
Pricing incentives were therefore used to supplement the 
exchange rate. On the import side, the price of imports was not 
relied upon as the only or even the major means of allocating 
foreign exchange. Quantitative restrictions played a larger or 
smaller role, depending upon the foreign-exchange situation. 9 
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After the dollar devaluation in February 1973, the PPP PLD 
EER rose sharply to 396, compared to 308 w6n per dollar in 
1970. By 1974, it was 338 1970 w6n per U.S. dollar, and in 
1975 it was further adjusted to 321. This realignment was in 
part effected by failing to increase export incentives and in part 
by failing to alter the exchange rate promptly as Korean infla­
tion exceeded that in the rest of the world. 
The export incentives, which served to maintain the real 
export exchange rate at times when the nominal rate was 
stable, are given in row B of Table 32. They fail fully to 
reflect the value of all incentives, but provide an indication 
of the major ones. As can be seen, cu.toms-duty exemptions 
were quantitatively the most important of the three, and 
interest-rate subsidies were the least important. Direct tax 
preferences for exporters (but not indirect tax exemptions) 
were abolished in 1973 as were automatic tariff exemptions 
for exporters on impor~cd capital equipment. These changes 
reflected in part the effort to offset the increase in the PPP 
PLD EER which had come about over the preceeding several 
years. 
Even the customs-duty exemptions were altered after 1973: 
prior to that date, exporters had been exempt from the duties; 
in 1973, the Korean government decided to shift to a drawback, 
or rebate, system." The initial effect of this shift was not felt 
until 1975, however, and even then its impact was softened 
because exporters were given the right to postpone payment of 
duties for specified periods. It was announced that the grace 
period would be gradually reduced, and finally ended in 1979. 
By 1975, internal tax exemptions were as important as customs 
exemptions as an export incentive. Altogether, the value of the 
quantifiable subsidies exceeded 20 percent of the official 
exchange rate throughout the pe iod, and was almost one-third 
of the official rate in 1971. If the value of all the other export 
incentives could be quantified, the value of export incen­
tives would appear even greater. As explained by Cole and 
Lyman: 
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While the weight of incentives, both direct and indirect, shifted 
increasingly away from import substitutes v.nd tov d exports in 
1965 and 1966, a second major factor was also working in the same 
direction. This was the political and administrative backing for an 
all..out government campaign to expand exports, typified by the 
constant setting of seemingly unattainable export targets, their 
attainment, and then the setting of even higher targets. The president 
Sk a strong personal interest in export expansion and was primar­
ily responsible for continuously elevating the targets. He held 
monthly meetings to review the progres; of the export drive and to 
ensure that no administrative obstacles impeded export growth. 
Procedures were simplified; special consideration was given to 
exporters who were having difficulty filling their orders; and embassy 
staffs abroad, up to and including the ambassadors, were pressed 
into service as export-promoters . . . The political leadership made it 
clear that performance would be judged on what an individual or 
agency had contributed to the growth of exports. I I 
By 1969, exporters were being graded into four classes on the 
basis of their performance, and the National Medal of Honor 
was awarded to the highest achievers. Moreover, tax surveillance 
of the outstanding performers was deliberately relaxed as a 
matter of policy. 12 
For all these reasons, the relative inducement to export, com­
pared with import substitution, was probably even greater than 
the ratio of the export to the import EER that Table 32 
indicates. To be sure, there were some quantitative restrictions 
on imports of commodities for which import-substitution 
policies had been adopted, and the implicit value of that protec­
tion was undoubtedly very great for sonic domestic industries. 
However, as indicated above, import-substitution policies were 
carried out selectively, so that the weights attached to the value 
of the omitted QR-induced incentives would be relatively 
smaller than the weight associated with the additional export 
incentives. Even without taking into account the incentives 
whose value could not be quantified in Table 32, the export 
EER exceeded the import EER by 8 percent in 1966. There­
after, the gap widened to about 17 percent in 1968, and reached 
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about 25 percent in 1971, narrowing somewhat again after the 
devaluation of 1972. Even then, it remained at 11 percent in 
1975, even when calculations are based solely on the export 
incentives enumerated in Table 32.13 
EXCHANGE CONTROL
 
Despite oft-repeated statements of intent to liberalize, reliance 
on quantitative restrictions for governing foreign-exchange 
expenditures fluctuated over the 1966-1975 period, with at 
least a small trend toward increasing liberalization. The only 
significant and lasting move in the direction of liberalization 
was the shift from a positive-list to a negative-list system for 
controlling imports. 
If one had a complete enumeration of all possible commodities 
that might be imported, it would make little difference whether 
an import regime was based on a positive list-itemizing all tiie 
items for which approval to import would be granted-or a 
negative list under which permission would be granted unless 
the item were specifically listed as prohibited. In practice, there 
are so many commodities that complete itemization is impos­
sible, and tile distinction can be quite important: under a posi­
tive-list system, import licenses are granted automatically only 
when an authorized official can find the item specifically listed 
on the approval list; under a negative-list system, an official 
grants the license unless he finds the item on the negative list. A 
negative-list system is therefore considerably less restrictive than 
a positive-list system. 
The Korean government shifted from a positive- to a negative­
list system in July 1967. This makes comparison of til number 
each list prior to and after that date meaningless,14of items on 
since the shift itself represented a considerable liberalization of 
the import control system. After that date, commcdities were 
shifted between lists, both in response to the domestic supply­
demand situation and in reaction tc tile degree to which the 
foreign exchange situation was perceived to be comfortable. An 
indication of those trends can be gleaned from enumeration of 
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the items on each list. These data ar, ,iven in Table 33. When 
the shift to a negative-list system was made, it was intended as 
the beginning of a major liberalization effort. Indeed, as can be 
seen, this intent was carried out through 1968, as the number of 
prohibited items declined from 118 to 71. Thereafter, however, 
changes were effccted primarily by shifting commodities 
between the restricted and the AA list. The number of restricted 
commodities increased in 1969, fell a little in 1970, rose again 
in 1971 and 1972, declined in 1973, and increased in 3974 and 
1975. These data, despite their shortcomings, fairly accurately 
reflect the underlying trend in the regime: there were short-term 
shifts between more and less restrictionist content of the import 
regimc, but there was little underlying long-term trend. 
The same pattern was reflected in other aspects of control. All 
invisible transactions were licensed, and the amount of foreign 
exchange that could be purchased for various categories of 
transactions changed from time to time. Guarantee deposit 
requirements, likewise, were altered in light of the authorities' 
anticipations of import demands and foreign exchange avail­
ability. 
An enumeration of some of the changes made during the last 
half of 1968 illustrates both the variety of control instruments 
and the manner in which they were altered. As already indicated, 
the second half of 1968 vas :i period when concerns were being 
expressed about foreign exchange availability, so the period was 
one when restrictions were on the increase. At the end of June 
1968, the import program for the second half of the year had, 
on net, transferred 35 items from the automatic-approval to 
the restricted list. Early in July, guarantee deposit requirements 
were extended to all imports, whereas previously they had been 
required only against letters of credit; the amounts of such 
deposit requirem2nts ranged up to 200 percent. Later that 
month, regulations were changed for a variety of invisible trans­
actions, and platinum trade, both import and export, was sub­
jected to Ministry of Finance approval. Regulations for the 
trade of enterprises in export zones were also announced. In 
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TABLE 33 Number of Items in Each Import Regime, 
1968-1975
 
Automatic 
Prohibited Restricted Approval Total 
Second half 1967 118 402 792 1,312 
Second half 1968 71 479 756 1,312 
Second half 1969 74 530 708 1,312 
Second half 1970 73 524 715 1,312 
December 31, 1971 73 570 669 1,312 
Deceinber 31, 1972 73 571 668 1,312 
December 31, 1973 73 556 683 1,312 
December 31, 1974 71 563 678 1,312 
December 31, 1975 66 602 644 1,312 
Sources: Frank, Kim, and Westphal, p. 59 for 1967 to 1970; IMF, Arnual Report on 
Exchange Restrictions, various issues from 1971 to 1975. 
Note: After 1967, the enumeration of items within lists was done on an SITC basis. 
The total, 1,312. represents the total number of SITC categories. These data were 
issued by the Minis.ry of Commerce and Industry. There are, of course, sub-categories 
within each majur group. Thus, the 17,128 sub-items on the AA list after July 25, 
1967, were from 792 items. See Frank, Kim and Westphal, pp. 58-59. 
September, machinery imports through the government's Office 
of Supply were suspended, in the hope of encouraging substitu­
tion of domestic for foreign machines. Also, 134 sub-items of 
imports were added to the list which were subject to special 
tariffs of 70-90 percent at the discretion of the Ministry of 
Finance. Finally, in November, restrictions were imposed on 
importation of machinery from countries whose exports to 
Korea were more than double their imports. " 
These moves tended to increase the restrictiveness of the 
regime to sonie extent. A few changes went the other way: some 
items which had been eligible for importation only from 
Japanese Property and Claims Funds were shifted to eligibility 
for importation from Korean foreign-exchange resources; export­
ers were permitted for the first time to engage in forward trans­
actions in designated currencies, and foreigners entering Korea 
no longer had to register undesignated currencies and were 
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permitted to ex,:hange up to $100 upon departure without 
proof of original purchase. 16 
The pattern in other years was similar, both in that there were 
minor changes in many aspects of trade and payments and in the 
ways in which the restrictionist content of exchange control 
shifted with the current and prospective balance-of-payments 
situation. 
In sum, the trade-and-payments regime from 1967 onward was 
much more liberalized than that which had prevailed in the 
1950s or even the early 1960s. After that, however, further 
liberalization was sporadic and short-lived. In light of the very 
rapid growth of export earnings, and the government's announced 
program for continued liberalization, this failure to complete 
the task of removing quantitative restrictions is surprising. 
Frank, Kim, and Westphal provide a diagnosis as to the reasons 
for failure: 
Despite these and other attempts at further liberalization and reform, 
resort to the old price-distorting policies and controls was common. 
A nitmber of factors were involved. First, any adverse trendb in the 
balance of payments prompted a returp to the old methods... 
Secondly, as debt service payments bgan to rise, even though 
foreign exchange holdings seemed quit, adequate in the late 1960's 
and early 1970's, concern over futuve debt repayment: increased 
along with a fear for the vulnerability of the basic balance of pay­
ments. Restrictions on capital rnvements were strengthened in 
1970. Finally, and probably most important, certain vested interests 
in the business community had much to lose from further liberaliza­
tion and favored a return to price-distorting mechanisms. Since these 
interests wielded considerable political power, the tariff reform of 
1967 wrought few real changes ... The business interests, many of 
them exporters who benefitted greatly from tariff exemptions and 
wastage allowances, exerted pressure through the Ministry of Com­
merce and Industry, and thus fostered a bureaucratic struggle 
between two ministries. 1 
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EXPORT PERFORMANCE
 
Table 34 gives a breakdown of exports by sector of origin for 
the years 1966 to 1974. It should be remembered that many 
exports used a high proportion of imported intermediate inputs, 
so that the gross value of exports somewhat overstates their 
importance in this period. Nonetheless, it will be seen below that 
any reasonable adjustment for the growth of imported inputs 
still leaves an extremely high rate of growth of net exports. 
As in the 1960-1965 period, rapid growth occurred in almost 
every sector. Only minerals exports were stagnant. The growth 
in Agriculture and Processed Food exports reflects primarily the 
rapid expansion of seafood exports. Expoits originating in the 
fisheries and seafood-processing sectors were about $31 million 
in 1966 and rose to $166.1 million in 1973. The three industries 
that comprise the textile sector-Fiber Spinning, Textile Fabrics, 
and Textile Products-increased exports from about $80 million 
in 1966 to $1,431 million in 1974, thereby accounting for 
$1,350 million of the $4,208 million increment in total exports 
over the period. Thus, by 1974, despite very sizable growth rates 
in exports originating in virtually all sectors, textiles and their 
products accounted for 32 percent of all Korean exports."' 
Electrical Machinery, especially electronics, also expanded 
exports very rapidly, as did Plywood and the Miscellaneous 
Manufacturing sector. In all, there were exports of over $100 
million in 1975 in each of the following categories: woven 
textile fabrics, electrical machinery, and appliances, miscel­
laneous manufactures, fish, plates and sheets of iron and steel, 
veneer sheets and plywood, footwear, transport equipment, 
manufactures of metal, and non-metallic mineral products. 19 
In dollar value, the compound annual rate of growth of 
exports over the 1966-to-1975 period was 40 percent. While 
part of that growth, especially after 1972, reflected worldwide 
inflation, the compound rate of growth of exports from 1966 to 
1972 was 38 percent. The unit value index for Korea's exports, 
in dollar terms on a 1970 base, stood at 93.5 in 1966 and at 
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TABLE 34 Commodity Composition of Exports, 1966-1975 
(S Adlions) 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Agriculture, 
Forestry and 
Fisheries 30.7 32.2 38.6 49.0 57.2 62.8 78.9 126.1 182.9 n.a. 
Minerals 26.6 28.8 33.8 35.5 43.4 36.7 33.7 42.8 61.0 n.a. 
Processed Foods, 
Beverages and 
Tobacco 23.9 23.0 24.2 28.8 39.3 39.5 63.6 179.6 221.3 n.a. 
Fiber Spinning 14.7 19.5 22.5 31.3 50.9 72.9 93.9 164.9 174.2 n.a. 
Textile Fabrics 23.0 31.5 42.1 41.1 46.8 57.1 100.3 273.5 276.9 n.a. a' 
Textile Products 41.9 73.5 125.7 176.9 232.5 337.5 466.0 798.2 976.9 n.a. 
Lumber and Plywood 30.0 39.1 65.7 79.7 92.5 12P.Q 169.3 308.9 195.0 n.a. %0 
Wood Products, 
including Paper, 
Printing and 
Publishing, and 
Furniture 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.7 8.3 8.8 29.6 95.0 97.0 n.a. 
Leather Products 1.5 2.0 1.6 1.4 2.6 5.7 13.0 28.8 70.6 n.a. 
Rubber Products 5.5 8.3 12.1 11.8 18.0 36.5 54.2 90.2 192.2 n.a. 
TABLE 34 (continued) 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Chemicals 1.1 2.5 3.7 9.8 15.5 27.1 46.8 60.2 94.3 n.a. 
Petroleum and 
Coal Products 0 0 .1 2.2 4.7 6.9 16.2 32.8 108.0 n.a. 
Non-Metallic 
Minerals 1.6 1.0 .9 5.2 6.7 13.5 23.9 46.8 84.7 n.a. 
Iron and Steel 
and Steel Products 7.8 1.8 1.1 4.8 13.1 24.2 91.9 182.1 436.5 n.a. 
Metal Products 
Machinery 
Electrical Machinery 
Transport Equipment 
Miscellaneous 
Manufacturing 
TOTAL 
7.4 
3.1 
5.1 
1.2 
19.4 
247.6 
8.8 
3.8 
7.4 
3.2 
30.0 
320.3 
11.3 
3.8 
18.9 
1.7 
42.2 
455.2 
14.7 
8.4 
36.6 
8.0 
70.7 
622.6 
18.4 
8.0 
44.6 
9.5 
119.5 
835.2 
17.5 
11.3 
72.8 
7.5 
98.1 
1067.6 
29.7 
30.7 
134.7 
15.8 
137.7 
1632.6 
81.2 
55.5 
354.6 
28.1 
271.4 
3225.3 
156.1 
66.6 
527.5 
129.4 
400.6 
4456.2 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
5081 
Source: Hong, FactorSupply, Table A-12. 
Note: Total includes scrap and unclassifiables which are not listed separately. 
A Major Exporter,1966 to 1975 
100 in 1972. Part of that increase may have reflected improved 
quality of Korean exports and their increasing acceptance on 
world markets. However, even if the entire increase in export 
unit value from 1966 to 1972 reflected rising world prices and 
not quality improvemnt, the average annual increase in the 
volume of exports still exceeded 35 percent. 
After 1972, export prices moved in line with world prices and 
inflation. The quantum and unit-value indexes (on a 1970 base) 
for Korean exports are shown in Table 35. It would appear that 
TABLE 35 	 Quantum and Unit-Value Indexes 
for Korean Exports, 1972-1975 
Quantum Unit Value 
1972 194.6 99.9 
1973 305.2 126.3 
1974 333.4 160.2 
1975 410.0 148.4 
only from 1973 to 1974 did the rate of growth of export 
volume diminish; indeed, from 1974 to 1975, growth of export 
earnings of 14 percent was achieved despite a decline in export 
prices of about 7 percent. Contrasted with the impact of world 
events on other developing countries, the Korean ability to 
maintain momentum and adapt to altered world economic 
conditions was truly remarkable. 
By 1975, Korea was also diversifying her sales by geographic 
destination. In particular, considerable energy was devoted to 
the development of the export of "construction services." Under 
contracts, primarily with oil exporters of the Middle East, 
Koreans were undertaking to build roads, hospitals, apartment 
complexes, and other major construction projects. Under these 
contracts, Korean firms provided the management, supplied the 
Korean labor, and obtained most of the steel, cement and other 
construction materials from Korean factories. By the end of 
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1975, $1.8 billion in contracts had been signed, and there was 
great optimism about future prospects. To the extent that earn­
ings from these service-sector exports were already realized in 
1975, the rate of growth of commodity exports understates that 
of goods and services. 
The rapid increase in exports is reflected in the national 
income accounts: exports of goodls and services, which it will be 
recalled had been less than 2 percent of GNP in the 1950s, con­
stituted 10.3 percent of GNP in 1966, 14.7 percent of GNP in 
1970, 32.0 percent of GNP in 1973, and 30.2 percent in 1975. 
As mentioned earlier, however, part of chat increase was 
spurious, as most exporters used large quantities of imported 
intermediate goods in their production processes. The "wastage 
allowance" incentives granted to exporters, combined with the 
fact that the exchange rate for imports was overvalued for 
extended periods, probably increased the relative attractiveness 
of imported intermediate goods compired to what would have 
been -nost efficient. 
Because the wastage alowance provisions overstated the 
quantity of imported inpts required to produce exports, 
reliable figures on the import requirements for exports arc not 
available. There are some data, published by the Ministry of 
Finance, which estimate imports used directly in the production 
of exports. These figures probably provide an overestimate of 
the direct input requirements of imports for exports. However, 
they neglect indirect import requirements for exporting. Whether 
these two offsetting errors result in an over- or underestimate of 
total import requirements is difficult to judge. They do, how­
ever, give some idea of the order of "nagnitude of import 
requirements. 
Table 36 gives data on the value of imports used directly in 
export production, as well as the direct import-export ratio and 
the implied value of net exports for the 1963-1975 period. As 
can be seen, it is estimated that imported inputs fo. export did 
not become a significant factor until 1964. Over the next several 
years, imports for export mushroomed from about $7 million 
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TABLE 36 Estimation of Net Exports, 1963-1975 
Ratio of 
Net ExportsValue of Imports 

Gross Value ofExports for Export Net 
 to Gross Net Exports
Manufactures Tctal Production Exports Mfrs. Total to GNP 
(S millions) 
1963 58.9 86.8 0 86.8 1.00 1.00 4.9 
1964 81.7 118.9 6.9 111.9 .92 .94 4.4 
1965 130.5 175.0 10.4 164.6 .92 .94 6.1 
1966 189.4 247.;S 100.1 147.5 .47 .60 4.2 
1967 258.4 320.3 134.5 185.8 .48 .58 4.6 
1968 381.5 455.2 212.4 242.9 .45 .53 5.0 
1969 536.2 622.6 297.2 325.3 .45 .52 5.5 0 
1970 731.0 835.2 386.3 301.1 .47 .36 6.0 
1971 964.8 1067.6 506.3 561.3 .48 .53 7.2 
1972 1517.3 1632.6 608.0 1024.6 .60 .63 11.1 
1973 3030.7 3225.3 1620.5 1604.8 .47 .50 15.3 
1974 4207.7 4456.2 2111.9 2344.3 .50 .53 16.0 
1975 4648.1 5081.0 2218.4 2862.6 .53 .56 15.6 
Source: Wontack Hong, Statistical Appendix, Tables A-20 and A-21. The Ratio of Net Exports to GNP was derived by multiplying the
ratio of gross exports to GNP, as gi%,en in the national income accounts, by the ratio of net to gross exports. 
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in 1964 to $100 million in 1966. Despite the fact that the 
government took measures to try to induce exporters to increase 
° their utilization of domestically produced inputs," there seems 
to be little doubt that imports for export rose even more rapidly 
than exports, at least until 1970. If one assumes that all imported 
intermediate goods were used in the production of nanu­
factured exports, that would imply that the (direct) import 
content of manufactured exports was very close to 50 percent 
after 1966. Thus, the estimated growth rate of exports over the 
1966-1972 period would not be affected by using net, rather 
than gross, export figures, and the estimated rate of growth from 
1972 to 1975 would be reduced on1ly slightly. Of course, to the 
extent that tile data in Table 36 understate import requirements 
by neglecting the indirect component, this conclusion might be 
in errur. However, when it is recalled that the wastage allowance 
probably provides an offsetting error in the other direction, it 
seems evident that correction for the large size of imported 
intermiediate inputs for export does not significantly alter the 
conclusion that South Korea's export performance was truly 
remarkable .21 
The 1966-1975 period witnessed changes in the geographic 
destination of Korea's exports, but many of these were reversed 
with the decade. The Japanese share, which had been falling 
sharply during the early I960s, continued to decline until 1969 
when it reached a low of 21.4 percent of Korean exports. There­
after, it rose somewhat, but by no means reattained the level of 
the late 1950s. The U.S. share continued to rise in the late 
1960s, reaching just over half of Korea's exports in 1968 and 
1969, and then declined in the early 1970s. By 1975, the U.S. 
share of Korea's exportF was 30.2 percent, compared to 35.2 
percent in 1965 and 47.3 percent in 1970. Exports to Asian 
countries other than Japan fell from 23.9 percent of total 
exports in 165 to 9.8 percent in 1970, but thereafter 
rose to 14.9 lercent in 1975.22 This was mostly offset 
by changes in the share of the rest of the world (not includ­
ing Europe), notaLly the Middle East, whose share of Korean 
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exports rose from 3.6 percent in 1965 to 10.9 percent in 
1975. 
IMPORTS 
The combined use of both price and quantitative restrictions to 
influence both the total amount and the commodity composi­
tion of imports has already been discussed. The fluctuations in 
the real price of imports, as seen in the import PLD EERs in 
Table 32, were offset in part by variable tariff levies, altered 
guarantee deposits, and other measures. 
Exporters' demands for imported intermediate inputs, capital 
goods import requirements, the price and quantitative measures 
discussed above, and the extent of inflationary pressure emanat­
ing from governmental monetary and fiscal policy all combined 
to influence the level of imports and their commodity composi­
tion. The data are given in Table 37. 
As comparison with Table 28 reveals, the major shift in import 
composition from earlier years was an increased share of 
Machinery and Transport Equipment in total imports and an 
offsetting reduction in the share of Chemicals. To be sure, all 
categories of imports, at least at the level of aggregation 
presented here, grew rapidly in absolute amount. Even imports 
of Chemicals, whose share fell from over 20 to less than 10 per­
cent of the total, rose from $103 million in 1965 to over $200 
million in 1971 and 1972 and to $790 million in 1975. 
It is not possible to associate the behavior of imports in various 
commodity categories with their zlassification in the import 
programs. In general, license applications for raw materials, 
intermediate goods, and capital goods were subject to automatic 
appi'oval unless domestic productive capacity was extensive, in 
which case they were on the restricted list. Consumer goods 
deemed "essential" and not domestically produced-mostly 
food, beverages, and some manufactures-were also placed on 
the automatic approval list. The restricted list contained items 
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TABLE 37 	Commodity Composition of Imports, 1966-1975 
(S millions-% distribution in parentheses) 
Machinery 
Foodand Crude Mineral and Transport 
Beverages Materials Fuels Chemicals Manufactures Equipment Total 
1966 73 (10) 159 (22) 42 (6) 135 (19) 136 (19) 172 (24) 716 
1967 95 (10) 215 (22) 62 (6) 113 (11) 201 (20) 310 (31) 996 
1968 169 (12) 275 (19) 75 (5) 128 (9) 281 (19) 533 (36) 1463 
1969 303(17) 345(19) 111 (6) 137 (7) 335(18) 593(33) 1824 
1970 321 (16) 420 (21) 136 (7) 164 (8) 353 (18) 589 (30) 1984 
1971 403 (17) 484 (20) 139 (8) 201 (8) 430 (18) 685 (29) 2394 
1972 365 (14) 475 (19; 219 (9) 223 (9) 477 (19) 762 (30) 2522 
1973 576 (14) 948 (22) 312 (7) 345 (8) 902 (21) 1157 (27) 4240 
1974 829 (12) 1307 (19) 1054 (15) 631 (9) 1167 (17) 1848 (27) 6852 
1975 959 (13) 1171 (16) 1387 (19) 790 (11) 1053 (14) 1909 (26) 7274 
Source: BOK, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1976. 
Note: Figures do not add to totals due both to rounding and to the exclusion of a "not elsewhere classified category," which was as 
small as U.S. S30,000 in 1966 and as large as $14.2 million in 1974. 
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whose importation might compete with domestic production or 
whose utilization might cover a wide range of applications. 
Prohibited items, by and large, were "luxury goods" and goods 
deemed injurious to welfare. 23 
It should be noted that the rapid growth of imports esulted in 
an increased share of imports in GNP over die years of rapid 
export growth. It will be recalled that imports averaged just 
over 10 percent of GNP in the late 1950s. Their share rose some­
what in the early I 960s, reaching almost 16 percent in 1965. By 
1968, imports of goods and services constitut, .d 26 percent of 
GNP at current market prices, and they remained at about that 
level from then until 1972.24 They then rose in relative impor­
tance still further, representing 43 percent of GNP in 1974 and 
40 percent in 1975. Thus, the years of rapid export growth were 
accompanied by increased relative impoitance of imports. Fart 
of this, as already mentioned, was the natural conseqLtence of 
the high import content of exports. Much, however, reflected the 
increasing openness of dhe Korean economy. 
One final aspect of the import regime deserves mention-the 
tariff structure and attempts to alter it. One of the remarkable 
aspects of Korea's trade-and-payments regime over the period 
since 1953 has been the remarkable stability of the tariff struc­
ture. It was seen in Chapter 2 that an attempt at tariff reform 
in 1957 left the basic structure fundamentally unchanged. With 
the devaluations of 1961 and 1964, "special tariffs" were 
imposed to absorb any premiums generated by the import 
programs on import licenses. Other than that, and changes in a 
very small number of tariff rates for specific commodities, the 
:tariff regime remained basically unaltered until 1 9 6 7 . s 
In that year, another effort at fundamental reform was under­
taken. That reform was part of the attempt at that time to 
liberalize the regime, and the original intent of the reform 
appears to have been to lower the tariff rates on a wide variety 
of commodities. Table 38 gives the legal tariff rates for some 
categories derived from the old and the revised tariff schedules. 
As can be seen, the rate structure was little altered by the 
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TABLE 38 Representative Legal Tariff Rates 
Before and After Tariff Reform, 1967 
(simple averages of rates within sectors) 
Old Rate New Rate 
BTN Section % % 
4. Prepared foodstuffs, etc. 84.3 95.1 
5. Mineral products 15.9 25.2 
6. Products of chemical and allied industries 27.6 29.7 
9. Wood and wood articles 40.1 44.2 
11. Textiles and textile articles 59.0 71.0 
15. Base metals and articles thereof 32.9 35.6 
1',. Machinery and mechanical appliances 27.4 30.6 
20. Miscellaneous manufactured articles 78.9 81.9 
Source: Frank, Kim, and Westphal, p. 60. 
revision and, if anything, rates tended to rise rather than fall. 
The tariff reform had begun in response to a consultant's recon­
mendsotion that the tariff structure be siimplified, with a basic 
rate of about 20 percent on most imports and a special rate for 
a few commodities where there were special reasons for extra 
protection. 26 For the reasons discussed above, that aspect of the 
liberalization failed, as the groups benefiting from protection 
were able to exert enough political influence to ward off the 
reductions in tariff rates that would otherwise have been made. 
Yet another change in the tariff structure was effected in Feb­
ruary 1973. Some tariffs were raised and some lowered; the 
number of items subject to tariff increased from 3,174 to 
3,985 while the average rate of duty fell from 38.8 to 31.3 
percent.27 The ratio of actual tariff collections to imports over 
the period does show a declining trend, evident in Table 39.28 
Since actual collections originate only from imports subject to 
duty, it is difficult to estimate the degree to which the declining 
ratio reflects a lower average tariff rate or a higher fraction of 
duty-exempt imports. Moreover, these data do not fully reflect 
all charges against imports. There were "special tariffs" applicable 
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TABLE 39 Actual Tariff Collection and Imports, Selected Years 
4. Imports (S millions) 
1966 
716.5 
1968 
1464.1 
1970 
1985.0 
1971 
2395.0 
1972 
2522.0 
1973 
4241.5 
1974 
6844.6 
i 
Tariffs collected 
(S millions) 
Tariffs/Imports 
69.4 
0.10 
140.2 
0.10 
183.4 
0.09 
154.5 
0.06 
138.8 
0.06 
184.3 
0.04 
288.5 
0.04 
Source: See Foonote 28. 
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at rates of 70-80 percent for a large variety of goods on the 
restricted import lists, as discussed in Chapter 3. These rates 
were designed to absorb scarcity premiums on import licenses. 
In addition, the government had authority to alter tariff rates 
by 50 percent of c.i.f. value by administrative fiat.29 
Despite all these qualifications, one conclusion emerges 
clearly: the actual duty rates collected were not very high. if 
one takes total duty collections as a percent of total imports in 
1966, for example, they were 8 Fercent; even in 1968, the figurt. 
was only 10 percent. While these figures undoubtedly represent 
a weighted average of rates for imports subject to duties and for 
duty-exempt commodities, tariff rates were nonetheless rela­
tively moderate throughout the 1966 to 1975 period.3" 
CAPITAL FLOWS 
It was seen in Chapter 3 that policies to attract foreign capital 
inflows were implemented starting in the early 1960s. Prior to 
that time, there had been virtually no foreign direct investment 
or lending-commercial or public-to Korea. 3 In the years fol­
lowing the passage of the Foreign Capital Inducement Law, 
foreign capital flows increased markedly, although from a very 
small base. In 1966, a number of revisions were made in the law, 
designed to increase further the attractiveness of lending and 
investing in Korea. Changes made at that time included: the 
removal of any minimum requirement for Korean participation 
in equity capital; provision for governmental assumption of 
management responsibilities in the event that any foreign­
financed firms threatened default; limitation of governmental 
guarantees so that debt service liabilities from them could not 
exceed 9 percent uf annual foreign-exchange receipts (thereby 
insuring the worth of the governmental guarantee); and increased 
tax exemptions and tax holidays for foreign firms and investors. 
While the Foreign Capital Inducement Law, as amended, 
increased the attractiveness of lending and investing in Korea, 
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the interest rate reforms of 1965 were even more significant in 
attracting commercial lending to Korea and in making foreign 
borrowing attractive to Koreans. 3 " The interest rate reforms 
had increased the rate of interest to about 26 percent for bor­
rowing from domestic sources, with loans for favored prospects 
extended at 18 percent. However, the prevailing interest rate on 
dollar-denominated loans was about 12 percent, and those with 
government guarantees were extended at even lower rates. 
Foreign lenders were willing to lend large amounts to Korean 
firms, backed as they were by governmental guarantees and the 
rapid growth of the Korean economy and of foreign-exchange 
earnings. 
The fact that the exchange rate applicable to capital-account 
transactions for the Korean win remained relatively stationary 
over extended periods in the late 196 0s meant that the real rate 
of interest paid by Korean firms for foreign loans was generally 
negative, and certainly far less than the rate paid on domestic 
borrowing. Indeed, it would have required an annual rate of 
depreciation of the currency of about 14 percent to equalize the 
attractiveness of domestic and foreign borrowing. " In fact, the 
average annual rate of currency depreciation was about 3.2 
percent over the 1965-1970 period, and the actual nominal 
interest rate on foreign loans was between 5.6 and 7.1 percent." 
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that foreign bor­
rowing mounted rapidly in the late 1960s. Table 40 gives data 
on new borrowing, interest and principal repayments, net bor­
rowing, and net indebtedness, for the period from 1959 to 
1975. As can be seen, there had been no borrowing before 1959. 
From 1959 to 1962, all borrowing was done by tile govern­
ment-primarily from the Development Loan Fund. As of the 
end of 1965, total indebtedness was $301 million, of which 
$176 million was public and the remainder private. Thereafter, 
borrowing and net indebtedness grew rapidly. Total indebted­
ness tripled between the end of 1965 and the end of 1967 and, 
by the end of 1971, was ten times the level it had been at the 
end of 1965. After 1965, borrowing by the government and 
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private sectors was about equal in magnitude: by 1975, net 
government debt was $3,125 million and private debt was 
$3,571 million. Almost all of this was long term: at the end of 
1975, the private sector owed only $284 million with a matur­
ity of three years or less. 
TABLE 40 Loans, Debt Service, and Net Indebtedness, 
Commitment Basis 1959-1975 
(S millions) 
New Debt Service and Repayniet Net Net 
Borrowinig Principal Interest Total Borrowing Indebtedness 
6.71959 6.7 .0 .0 .0 6.7 
5.0 .2 .1 .3 4.8 11.61960 
14.31961 3.1 .4 .1 .5 2.6 
1962 55.5 .6 .2 .8 54.7 69.2 
1963 92.2 5.3 .6 5.9 86.3 156.0 
5.7 1.6 7.3 39.8 197.41964 47.1 
1965 111.1 7.2 2.7 9.9 101.2 301.3 
1966 233.8 10.8 4.8 15.6 218.2 524.3 
1967 455.6 25.6 10.2 35.8 419.8 954.3 
1968 616.8 67.7 15.9 83.6 533.2 1568.4 
1969 637.1 108.2 29.5 137.7 499.4 2097.4 
1970 681.9 209.3 52.6 261.9 420.0 2570.0 
1971 722.4 247.2 79.9 327.1 395.3 3044.2 
1972 858.7 301.0 113.3 414.3 444.4 3601.9 
1973 1224.4 344.4 160.9 505.3 719.1 4481.9 
1974 1778.8 391.2 217.0 608.2 1170.6 5869.4 
1975 1202.5 376.1 271.4 647.5 555.0 6695.8 
Source: Data kindly provided by the Economic Planning Board. 
By contrast, direct investment was relatively much smaller 
early in the decade and began increasing rapidly only in 1972. It 
rose from about $20 million in 1965 to $61 million in 1970 and 
$110 million in 1972, as can be seen in Table 41. Even as of 
June 1973, cumulative foreign direct investment approvals from 
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1966 were only S513 million, of which $301 million had arrived. 
Of the $513 million approved, $305 million were from Japan 
and $170 million from the United States. In value terms, the 
sectors in which there was the most investment were textiles 
and apparel ($126 million, 61 projects), electric and electronics 
($84 million, 127 projects), and hotels and tourism (S52 mil­
lion, 9 projects).3" Thus, it was lending, and not direct invest­
ment, that provided a substantial source of foreign exchange in 
the late 1960s. As foreign grant aid declined in both relative and 
absolute importance, direct investment, commercial lending to 
the private sector, and loans to the government partially replaced 
it. Some of the government borrowing, of course, represented 
concessional loans, discussed further below. 
The value of exports is given in the fifth column of Table 41, 
and the sixth and seventh give the debt-service ratio-principal 
and interest repayments as a fraction of exports-and the ratio 
of capital flows to exports for the 1965 to 1975 period. The 
fact that -outh Korea had virtually no outstanding debt as of 
1965 is reflected in her unusually low debt-service ratio of 
0.057. The rapid increase in debt, and accompanying debt­
service obligations, resulted in a sharp increase in that ratio in 
the late 1960s despite the rapid growth of exports. By 1971, 
debt-servicing and repayments obligations stood at over 30 
percent of export earnings-a high ratio by any standard. 
This led some observers to question the soundness of Korea's 
expansion during that period. In fact, the balance-of-payments 
concerns in the late 1960s and early 1970s were attributable to 
mounting questions about the debt. The real difficulty arose 
because of the differential interest rate payable on foreign loans. 
That, combined with the fixing of the exchange rate for 
relatively long intervals, enabled speculation against currency 
changes. It was in Korean businessmen's interest, if they could, 
to borrow immediately after a devaluation but to attempt to 
buy dollars to repay their loans prior to any anticipated devalua­
tion. This phenomenon occurred, for example, prior to the 
adjustment of the exchange rate to 370 w6n per dollar in June 
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TABLE 41 Net Borrowing, Direct Investment, Debt Service, 
And Export Earnings, 1965-1975
 
(S millions)
 
Debt Capital 
Net Direct Total Debt Service FlowsI 
Borrowing Investment (1) + (2) Service Exports Ratio Exports 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (4)/(5) (3)/(5) 
1965 101.2 20.1 121.3 9.9 175.1 .057 .69 
1966 218.2 2.2 220.4 15.6 250.3 .062 .88 
1967 419.8 19.9 439.7 35.8 320.2 .112 1.37 
1968 533.2 24.2 557.4 83.6 455.4 .184 1.22 
1969 499.2 28.2 527.4 137.7 622.5 .221 .85 
1970 420.0 61.4 481.4 261.9 835.2 .314 .58 
1971 395.3 45.2 440.5 327.1 1067.6 .306 .41 
1972 444.4 110.4 554.8 414.3 1624.1 .255 .34 
1973 719.1 264.7 983.8 505.3 3225.0 .157 .31 
1974 1170.6 139.9 1310.5 608.2 4460.4 .136 .29 
1975 555.0 n.a. n.a. 647.5 5081.0 .127 n.a. 
Sources: Same as Table 40 for columns (1) and (4). Exports from BOK, Economic Statistics Yearbook and Direct Investment from 
Wontack Hong, "Trade, Distortions, and Employment Growth," Table 4.15. 
Note: Direct investment is recorded on a commitment basis. For the first ten months of 1975, direct investment approvals were $179 
million. See Suk Tai Suh, "Statistical Report on Foreign Assistance .nd Loans to Korea," KDI Monograph 7602, (Mimeo, 1976), p. 71. 
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1971, as foreign-exchange reserves (which had been growing 
rapidly in earlier years) declined from a peak of $61b million in 
October 1970 to $573 millionl in May 1971. As inspection of 
Table 40 shows, the repayments of loans were sizable at about 
that time, aid new borrowing had leveled off, thus resulting in 
a decline in net borrowing in 1970 and 1971. 
As the last column in Table 41 indicates, rapid growth of 
exports prevented the emergence of what could otherwise have 
been a serious problem. Borrowing from abroad reached its 
peak-in relative importance-in 1967 and 1968. It was a very 
important offset to the deop in aid taking place at that time, as 
net foreign loans and investments were equal to 1.37 and 1.22 
times export earnings in those two years. Thereafter, the rapid 
giowth of expor: earnings outpaced the growth of indebtedness, 
and the relative importance of capital inflows as a source of 
foreign exchange dropped sharply. By 1972, foreign borrowing 
and investment were equal to only about one-third of export 
earnings. As mentioned above, it was at about that time that the 
authorities were struggling with debt-management problems anid 
attempting to restructure their obligations. 36 
Public lending-much of which was at concessional terms­
will be discussed later in this chapter. Here, focus on commer­ks 
cial transactions. Of total private debt of $1,871 million in 
1970, $111 million was short-term anid the rest had maturities 
in excess of three years. A total of $488 million was held by 
American lenders, and $288 million by Japanese. The remain­
der-including the entire short-term debt--had originated from 
international financial markets. Thus, the relative importance 
of the United States arid Japan was far less in Korea's access to 
international capital markets than in terms of her markets for 
her exports." 
Commercial loans were extended to all sectors of the 
economy, not simply manufacturing. Table 42 gives a break­
down of the sectoral destination of both commercial and public 
loans. As can be seen, Electricity, Transportation, and other 
social overhead capital sectors received almost as much from 
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commercial sources as did Manufacturing. Within Manufacturing, 
Textiles, Chemicals, and Petroleum sectors were the largest 
commercial borrowers, accounting for 57 percent of manufac­
turing commercial borrowing. Since access to international capi­
tal markets was regulated by the government, these data reflect 
government-set priorities. 
By the early 1970s, Korean credit-worthiness was recognized 
in international capital markets. Just as Korean exporters were 
establishing themselves in international commodity markets, 
Korean firms were developing their contacts and learning the 
vagaries of the international capital market. 
This experience was of great importance in easing the adjust­
ment to the shocks from the international economy in 1973­
1974. When the oil price increased late in 1973, the potential 
harm to the Korean economy was massive: imports of petroleum 
and petroleum products had been $218 million in 1972 and were 
$296 million in 1973; they then rose to $1,020 million in 1974 
-the increase alone represented in increase of 17 percent in the 
1973 level of total imports. Moreover, unlike some counrrie, 
where there were offsetting and important increases in expoit 
prices to cushion the impact, there was little such effect for 
Korea: import prices (including raw materials in addition to oil) 
rose 107 percent from 1972 to 1974, while export prices 
increased only 60 percent, much of which must have reflected 
the increased price of imported inputs used in exports. 
If South Korea had exported and imported the same qu,­
ties in 1974 as in 1972, her export earnings would hav: .,n 
1,305 billion w6n and her 1972 imports would have cost 2,104 
billion w6n-an incremeat of 600 billion w6n over the actual 
trade deficit in that year, compared with a GNP of 3,875 billion 
w6n. This represented 15.5 percent of 1972 GNP-a huge 
amount. Had the adjustment had to be completed immnediately, 
it would have been extremely difficult. In fact, Korea was able 
to increase her net borrowing from abroad by over $275 million 
in 1973 and by another 450 million in 1974 (see Table 41), 
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TABLE 42 Sectoral Distribution of Foreign Loans, 1959-1975 
($1,000s) 
1959- 1967- 1972- TOTAL 1959- 1967- 1972- TOTAL 
1966 1971 1975 1966 1971 1975 
CommercialLoans Public Loans 
Primary Sector (1-6) 52.3 195.2 194.8 442.3 14.1 71.0 242.8 327.9 
Manufacturing Sector 220.2 2368.5 5106.9 7695.7 39.7 272.3 663.7 975.6 
Textiles (10-12) 65.2 462.1 722.9 1250.2 13.8 31.2 23.2 68.3 
Textile Fibres (10) -10.0 389.9 573.9 1003.8 13.8 31.2 23.2 68.3 
Lumber and Plywood (13) 0.4 47.0 39.5 86.8 _a - - -
Paper and Products (15) 1.2 50.1 31.7 83.5 - - -" 
Chemicals (19-21) 43.6 499.3 1228.0 1770.9 13.9 186.4 309.9 501.2 
Basics & Fertilizers (19 + 21) 40.0 257.7 476.1 773.9 13.9 186.4 30%..9 501.2 
Petroleum (22) 38.8 491.1 846.8 1376.6 - - -
Metals (25-26, 28) 3.8 297.2 798.8 1009.8 - 8.3 253.2 261.5 '0 
Iron & Steel (25) - 80.8 337.0 417.8 - 8.3 253.2 261.5 
Non-Metallic (24, 27) 51.1 408.7 520.8 980.6 12.0 34.8 27.3 74.0 
Non-Metallic Minerals (24) 51.1 365.2 474.6 890.9 12.0 34.8 27.3 74.0 
Machinery (29, 30) 12.5 55.2 100.4 168.1 - 8.2 47.4 55.6 
Non-Electrical (29) 0.04 10.7 5.2 16.0 - 8.2 47.4 55.6 
Transport Equip,.znt (31) 2.9 84.6 652.8 740.3 - - -
TABLE 42 (continued) 
1959- 1967- ;972- TOTAL 1959- 1967- 1972- TOTAL
 
1966 1971 1975 1966 1971 1975
 
CommercialLoans PublicLoans 
Other Mfg. (32 + the rest of 7-32) 0.3 63.2 165.3 228.8 _a 3.4 11.6 14.9 
Social Overhead Capital and Service 12.7 1367.3 2462.0 3842.0 183.8 1055.1 2779.7 4018.5 
Electricity (35) 2.1 694.1 1356.5 2052.7 26.3 277.6 523.0 826.9 
Transportation (39) 3.0 542.7 942.3 1488.1 104.6 525.5 1424.7 2054.8 
Others 7.6 130.5 163.1 301.2 52.8 252.0 832.0 1136.8 
All Sectors 285.2 3931.0 8025.8 12242.0 254.6 2377.9 7785.5 10417.9 . 
Source: Wontack Hong, Statistical Data, Tables B-29 and B-32. 
-Note:a means data were not separately listed for the sector. Amounts in those sectors were presumably small. 
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thus enabling a much smoother adjustment than would other­
wise have been possible. To be sure, there were moments of 
doubt as to whether all debt-service obligations could be n et 
and moments when foreign lenders' confidence appeared som,­
what shaken. Nonetheless, Korea's ability to borrow abroad was 
a necessary condition for her to weather the oil price increase 
and resume growth as rapidly as she in fact did. The ability to 
borrow abroad gave policy-makers the time to alter instruments 
of domestic policy and to adapt to altered circumstances. Had 
Korea instead been forced to curtail imports abruptly, the result­
ing dislocations would have prevented the rapid resumption of 
export growth. The fact that Korea was credit-worthy, was not, 
of course, fortuitous. On the contrary, it was her earlier bor­
rowing-and-repayment history, itself the result of the export­
promotion strategy, that stood her in such good stead. 
AID AND OFFICIAL CAPITAL FLOWS 
It was seen in Chapter 3 that aid was already diminishing in 
both absolute and relative importance in the early 1960s. That 
trend continued during the latter half of the 1960s. hi addition, 
the United State: !',st its position as the sole provider of aid and 
switched most of its aid from grants to loans. After 1972, grant 
aid ceased, and total U.S. assistance-PL 480 and loans-dropped 
sharply. 
Table 43 gives the overall outlines. Comparison of those data 
with the numbers in Table 31 indicates that total American aid, 
including loans, grants, and PL 480 sales, was fairly steady from 
1966 to 1972, and then declined sharply. The totals, however, 
do not tell the full story. Non-project supporting assistance, 
which had been the largest single component of aid in the late 
1950s, fell continuously until, by 1972, it was negligibl. Even 
project assistance, which had not been nearly as important as 
supporting assistance, fell to levels of around S5 million annually 
in the late 1960s and phased out in the early 1970s. Until the 
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TABLE 43 Total Aid Flows From the United States, 
1966-1975 
(S millions) 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Non-Project Supporting 
Assistance 
Project Assistance 
PL 480 Sales 
PL 480 Loans 
54.8 
5.2 
35.0 
28.5 
59.8 
5.6 
58.0 
31.6 
43.7 
9.9 
58.5 
47.3 
16.7 
7.5 
64.9 
118.5 
14.2 
6.4 
54.7 
67.8 
9.4 
5.1 
30.8 
84.9 
.6 
3.4 
3.7 
197.0 
-
3.3 
-
61.0 
-
2.1 
-
-
-
.9 
-
84.0 
E 
0 
Development Loans 
TOTAL 
49.7 
173.2 
74.8 
229.8 
38.0 
197.5 
31.9 
239.7 
38.8 
181.8 
55.7 
185.9 
36.8 
241.4 
27.7 
92.1 
44.1 
46.2 
192.2 
277.0 
Source: USAID to Korea. See note to Table 31. 
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early 1970s, PL 480 sales remained at about their levels of the 
early 1960s, and the two loan categorles-PL 480 and develop­
ment loans-rose sharply, thus offsetting the decline in other aid 
categories. 
It is difficult to obtain comparable data on aid from other 
countries and international institutions because the Koean 
government treats all loans as being in the same category, regard­
less of whether terms are concessional or not. The one sizable 
official transfer that might be regarded-in terms of its economic 
impact-as having the same effect as aid was the Japanese settle­
ment of 1965. Under the terms of that agreement, the Japanese 
government was to provide $300 million in grants and $200 
million in public loans over the ten-year period from 1965 to 
1975.38 This, from the Korean viewpoint, represented a repara­
tion settlement and did not constitute aid. It nonetheless 
provided a sizable transfer of resources which supplemented 
those from foreign borrowing, foreign investment, and current 
account earnings. " 
There are two ways in whiY one can attempt to estimate the 
volume of concessional loans received during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. One is to regard all government borrowing as con­
cessional. A breakdown by source of government loans is also 
available so one can also get an idea of the relative importance 
of the United States and Japan. The loan data are shown in 
Table 44. These numbers would suggest that, at least before 
1969, concessional loans from sources other than the United 
States and Japan could not have been a significant factor in total 
foreign exchange availability, since the residual is fairly small. 
The second piece of evidence consists of data on the interest­
rate structure and grace periods for public and private loans. 
Those data are given in Table 45 and cover all borrowing from 
1959 to 1974, without a breakdown by year. Comparison of the 
structure of interest rates, the grace period, and the repayment 
period strongly suggests that probably at least three-quarters of 
all public borrowing was concessional: less than one-third was 
subject to interest rates in excess of 5 percent, and the weighted 
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TABLE 44 Government Borrowing, 1966-1975 
(S millions) 
1966 1967 Q68 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Net Government 
Borrowing 
Japanese Loans 
American Loans 
Residual 
127.5 
44.3 
64.4 
18.8 
105.0 
27.2 
64.0 
13.8 
102.4 
17.9 
79.5 
5.0 
155.9 
11.1 
61.4 
83.4 
288.2 
88.5 
55.1 
144.6 
323.2 
26.3 
124.4 
172.5 
565.9 
176.7 
275.4 
113.8 
596.6 
106.4 
188.4 
301.8 
446.9 
175.7 
35.0 
236.2 
586.9 
0.7 
102.8 
483.4 
o 
p 
. 
Source: Same as Table 40. 
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TABLE 45 Foreign Loans by Interest Rates and Terms of 
Repayment, 1959-1974 
(commitment basis) 
Commercial Loar., 
$ Million 
Interest Rate (Weighted Av. 
0-1% 
1-3% 31.5 
3-4% 
4-5% 97.6 
5-6% 1,418.6 
6-7% 791.7 
7-8% 426.5 
8-9% 200.9 
over 9% 182.9 
floating rate 1,017.7 
Grace Period (Weighted Av. 
0-1 Years 793.5 
1-2 Years 1,008.1 
2-3 Years 1,189.9 
3-4 Years 628.4 
4-5 Years 212.0 
5-9 Years 334.4 
over 9 Years -
Repayment Period 
(Weighted Av. = 10.1 Yrs.) 
3-10 Years 1,957.5 
10-15 Years 1,872.3 
15-20 Years 336.7 
20-30 Years 
30-40 Years 
%Share 
7.1%) 
(0.8%) 
(2.4%) 
(34.0%) 
(19.0%) 
(10.2%) 
(4.8%) 
( 4.4%) 
(24.4%) 
= 2.5 Yrs.) 
(19.0%) 
(24.2%) 
(28.6%) 
(15.1%) 
( 5.1%) 
(8.0%) 
-
( 47.0%) 
( 44.9%) 
( 8.1%) 
Public Loans
 
$ Million % Share
 
(Weighted Av. =4.1%) 
173.6 
972.0 
711.2 
134.0 
767.4 
6.2 
( 6.3%) 
( 35.2%) 
( 25.7%) 
( 4.8%) 
( 27.8%) 
( 0.2%) 
(Weighted Av. = 7.2 Yrs.) 
782.3 ( 28.3%) 
661.2 ( 23.9%) 
1,320.9 ( 47.8%) 
(Weighted Av. = 26.0 Yrs.) 
10.5 ( 0.4%) 
937.5 ( 33.9%) 
698.0 ( 25.3%) 
1,:06.5 ( 36.4%) 
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TABLE 45 (continued) 
CommercialLoans Public Loans 
$ Million % Share $ Million % Share 
Repayment Period (continued) 
over 40 Years 111.9 ( 4.0%) 
Total 4,166.5 (100.0%) 2,764.4 (100.0%) 
Source: EPB, "Foreign Capital Inducement and Investment Policy," (Mitneo, 1975). 
average interest rate cn loans to the government was 4.1 percent 
(compared with 7.1 percent for loans to the private sector). In 
confirmation of this, almost three-quarters of loans received by 
the government had a grace period in excess of five years, with 
very long repayment periods. 
It would thus appear that, as a first approximation, most 
loans to t'ie Korean government during the 1966-1972 period 
can be regarded as concessional.4 ° That being the case, the data 
provided in Table 42 give some idea of the sectoral destination 
of those loans. The agricultural products loans are undoubtedly 
financed primarily from PL 480. It is apparent that a much 
higher fraction of public loans than of private loans was used to 
finance social overhead capital and that, contrary to the situa­
tion with regard to private loans, more than half went to sup­
port activities not clearly identifi, I by sector. Thus, of the 
$845 million loans to the Korean government used to finance 
social overhead activities, less than $300 million were directed 
toward electricity, transport, and communication. 
One other aspect of the change in aid patterns between the 
early 1960s and the later years should also be noted: as the data 
given above indicate, Americans and Japanese were the major 
sources of loans to the Korean government up until about 1968. 
Thereafter, their relative importance diminished as other lenders 
extended credit, primarily concessional, to the Korean govern­
ment. Not only was the sum of aid-both loans and grants­
smaller than had been the case in the late 1950s and the 
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composition of 2id different, with much greater proportion of 
it consisting of concessional loans, but the relative importance 
of the direct American contribution had decreased markedly. 
This was, of course, in accordance with American policy of 
shifting its aid toward the international lending agencies; but, 
even so, it markcd the continuation of the trend toward 
reduced Korean interdependence with the United States. 
Thus, as with other aspects of Korea's international economic 
relations, the period of the late 1960s-and early 1970s saw the 
emergence of Korea with a much more balanced and diversified 
set of international links to nations than had earlier characterized 
her international economic relations. She was no longer crucially 
dependent on aid, and was able to enter the international finan­
cial markets to seek desired financing. When concessional loans 
were available, they cut the cost of borrowing but did not 
represent the only feasible source of foreign exchange. Conces­
sional loans originated from diverse sources, not simply the 
United States. In marked contrast even to ten years before, it 
was no longer the case that the only available source of financ­
ing was concessional aid, and there was no longer heavy reliance 
upon one country or one source of financing. 
Thus, the thirty-year modernization history witnessed, as one 
of its major aspects, Korea's transformation from an econom­
ically weak aid recipient, with links to the international 
economy primarily via her dependence on the United States and 
aid-financed imports, to an economically viable major exporting 
nation fully able to enter into international commercial and 
financial markets on commercial terms. 
Obviously, elimination of the extreme dependence that 
prevailed in the 1950s was a prerequisite for modernization; the 
questions of how the trade-and-aid sector contributed to overall 
growth and of the efficiency of trade and aid are the topics of 
Chapter 5. 
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FIVE 
The A Uocative Efficiency of Trade andAid 
In an important sense, all four preceding chapters have been 
partially addressed to the topic that constitutes the focus of this 
chapter. it is impossible to chronicle the history of aid without, 
at least implicitly, providing some indication of its role in 
resource allocation. Any documentation of the growth of 
exports in the 1960s of necessity conveys a considerable amount 
of information about the efficiency of the export-promotion 
strategy. 
It is not the purpose of this chapter to tread that ground 
again. Much of the analysis needed to evaluate microeconomic 
aspects of trade, aid, and capital flows has already been under­
taken. Nonetheless, a variety of questions remain. To what 
extent was aid efficiently allocated and utilized? Could its 
timing or magnitude have been improved upon? Was the trade­
and-payments regime optir-ial, or could variations in policy have 
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enabled still better performance? While definitive quantitative 
answers to these and related questions are not possible, it is 
nonetheless worthwhile to provide some estimates and to assess 
the available evidence with respect to the efficiency of trade 
policy and aid. 
This chapter focuses on the allocative efficiency of the trade 
regime, capital flows, and aid. The macroeconomic features, the 
contribution of foreign resources, exports, and other trade flows 
to aggregate growth, employment, and output levels will be 
examined in Chapter 6. 
EFFICIENCY OF THE TRADE REGIME, 
1945-1959 
TRADE AND PAYMENTS, 1945-1959 
There is little that needs to be said about trade and payments in 
the 1945-1950 period. Decisions were so completely dominated 
by short-term exigencies that it is difficult to determine what 
feasible alternatives might have been. Moreover, even if one 
could identify ways in which things might have been done better 
in the short run, there is the consideration that the benefits of 
such improvements would, in any event, have been lost during 
the Korean War. 
As for tile Korean War years, many of the same statements 
apply-in the conditions of those years, the concept of efficiency 
makes little sense. What was unfortunate during the war years 
was exchange-rate policy. While the physical controls on trade 
(enforced by military control of the ports) undoubtedly pre­
vented the realization of desired transactions at the increasingly 
overvalued exchange rate, a pattern was set. And, if one were to 
pinpoint the single most important source of inefficiency during 
the 1954-1959 period, it was without question the effects­
both direct and indirect-of the overvaluation of the exchange 
rate, and especially the response to incentives that were created. 
Those effects centered on the pattern of import substitution, 
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the stagnation of exports, and the competition for the enormous 
profits accruing to those who did obtain imported goods; the 
resources devoted to those activities and the corruption that 
resulted diverced considerable resources from the reconstruction 
effort. 
As seen above, exchange-rate policy resulted from the inter­
action of aid policies, the military effort, and the Korean 
government. It is the effects of those policies on the trade-and­
payments regime, and the interaction of the regime and the 
import-substitution policies of the 1950s, that are of concern 
here. 
Lack of' data, especially reliable data, makes it extremely dif­
ficult to attempt any quantitative assessment of the magnitude 
of distortions caused by the "foreign exchange shortage" ofL'ae 
1950s. Certainly there were large differentials between the 
landed cost of imports and the prices they could command in 
the domestic market; the tariff structure itself fails to convey an 
accurate impression of the magnitude of protection accorded 
domestic industry due to import restrictions, since not all who 
wished were able to obtain foreign exchange for imports at 
prevailing prices. For commodities not domestically produced, 
scarcity premiums for permitted imports were often sizable and 
constituted large prizes for those fortunate enough to get import 
rights. 
There is no entirely satisfactory way of estimating the size or 
importance of these premiums. As seen in Chapter 2, an attempt 
to compare price series for comparable commodities from unit­
value import statistics and domestic wholesale-price data was 
relatively unsuccessful. Lack of product homogeneity, erratic 
year-to-year fluctuations in unit value statistics, changes in the 
quality and/or specification of product for which a domestic price 
quotation was available, and other data problems were of suffi­
cient magnitude to render these data of very questionable value. 
For cement, the estimated markup over landed cost appeared to 
have been in excess of 100 percent, but it was the only com­
modity for which data problems were not overwhelming. 
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It seems preferable, therefore, to eschew such data and to rely 
instead upon estimates of import volume relative to GNP for 
guidance as to orders of magnitude. Starting with these data, 
and estimating a "normal" price and share of imports in GNP, 
one can estimate the domestic price that would have been 
necessary to clear the domestic market as a function of the price 
elasticity of demand for imports. That price, in turn, can be 
compared with estimates of the real exchange rate for imports, 
and the differential can be taken as an estimate of the premium 
accruing to foreign exchange recipients. 
In order to carry out the computation, the first problem was 
choice of a "normal" year; 1970 was chosen. It was assumed 
that import demand in that year, net of imports for re-export, 
constituted a "normal" percentage of GNP, and that the real 
exchange rate prevailing in that year was approximately at 
equilibrium. With those assumptions, it was possible to take 
data from the 1950s and to estimate the probable value of 
premiums on foreign exchange. The computations are given in 
Table 46. Row A gives imports as a percent of GNP, as estimated 
in the national income accounts, at constant 1970 w6n. Row B 
gives exports as a percent of GNP, again in constant 1970 w6n. 
Row C then provides the basic estimate of "domestic" imports, 
that is, those satisfying domestic demand.' These are defined as 
total imports less imports employed in producing exports. As 
can be seen, "domestic" imports in 1970 were 17.45 percent of 
GNP, compared with a range of 8 to 13.5 percent over the 
period 1954 to 1959. 
The price of imports necessary to clear the domestic market 
with the actual volume of imports was then estimated on three 
alternative assumptions about the magnitude of the price 
elasticity of demand for imports. That is, it was assumed that, if 
imports had constituted 17.45 percent of GNP in any year in 
the 1950s, a domestic price of 260.1 (1970) w6n per dollar in 
the domestic market would have equated the domestic price 
with landed cost. To be sure, this assumption is somewhat 
arbitrary, but it is not evident in which direction error may lie. 
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TABLE 46 Estimates of Scarcity Value of Imports, 1954-1959 
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1970 
A. Imports as %of GNP, 
(constant 1970 wan) 8.8 11.2 13.0 14.3 11.7 9.3 24.8 
B. Exports as % of GNP, 
(constant 1970 w~n) 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.9 2.1 14.7 
C. "Domestic" imports (A - .5B) 
-* 
as % of GNP 8.15 10.50 12.40 13.55 10.75 8.25 17.45 M 
D. Price of $1 of 1970 imports with 
demand elasticity of: 
D1. 1/2 1113.8 864.6 732.0 669.8 844.4 1100.0 260.1 
D2. 1 556.9 432.3 366.0 334.9 422.2 550.1 260.1 
D3. 2 408.5 346.2 313.1 292.5 341.1 405.1 260.1 
E. Actual import PPP PLD EER 130.0 130.5 149.6 135.5 155.9 198.2 260.1 
F. Scarcity premium (in 1970 w~n) 
per dollar of imports 
Fl. (Dl - E) 983.8 734.1 582.4 534.3 -'88., 901.8 0 
F2. (D2 - E) 426.9 301.8 216.4 199.4 266.3 351.9 0 
F3. (D3 - E) 278.5 215.7 163.5 157.0 185.2 206.9 0 
TABLE 46 (continued) 
G. 	 Scarcity premium as % of EER 
Gl. (Fl E) X 100 
G2. (F2 +E) X 100 
G3. (F3 E) X 100 
H. 	 Premiums as % of GNP 
Hi. (0.01 X Gi X C) 
H2. (0.01 X G2 X C) 

H3. (0.01 X G3 X C) 

1954 

757 
328 
214 

61.7 
26.7 
17.4 
1955 

562 
231 
165 

59.0 
24.3 
17.3 
1956 

389 
143 
109 

48.2 
17.7 
13.5 
1957 

394 
147 
116 

53.4 
19.9 
15.7 
1958 

441 
170 
119 

47.5 
18.4 
12.8 
1959 1970 
454 0 
177 0 
104 0 
37.5 0 
14.6 0 
8.6 0 
Efficiency of the Trade Regime 
On the one hand, it can be argued that the rising share of 
imports in GNP in the late 1960s may have reflected, at least in 
part, the increasing specialization of the Korean economy; on 
the other, it can be equally forcefully maintained that the low 
level of productive capacity in the Korean economy in the 1950s 
made the economy eveii more "dependet" upon imports than 
in the 1960s. To the extent the latter argument is valid, it might 
be that the share of imports in GNP in the 1950s would have 
had to be higher than in the 1960s for the same real exchange 
rate. For present purposes, the main point is that the estimates 
of premiums are biased upward if it is believed that the income 
elasticity of demand for imports in Korea is less than unity or 
that an earlier year should be chosen as indicative of "nor­
malcy," and estimates of premiums are biased downward if it is 
believed that the income elasticity of demand for imports is 
greater than unity, or that a later year than 1970 should be 
used as a base.' 
Rows D1, D2, and D3 provide estimates of r-Oe market-clearing 
price (in 1970 w6n) of a dollar's worth of imports under the 
assumptions that the demand elasticity (for imports, not 
importables) was 1/2, 1, and 2. 3 Obviously, the lower the 
demand elasticity, the higher the domestic price to clear the 
market would have had to be.' 
Row E gives the import PPP PLD EERs for 1954 to 1959. 
It will be recalled (from Chapter 2) that estimates of PPP 
PLD EERs for imports are not aiailable for years prior to 
1955. The number for 1954 represents th_2 author's esti­
mates of the highest the real import exchange rate could 
have been, given available infornation about the nature of 
the trade regime. 
The three rows under F then express the scarcity premium 
per dollar of imports as the difference between the domestic 
price (as calculated by the manner described under D) and the 
landed cost (represented by the PPP PLD EER). For ease of 
comparison, those scarcity premiums are expressed as a fraction 
of the real EER in rows G, and rows H provide an estimate of 
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the value of premiums (the ratio of imports to GNP times the 
premiums as a fraction of landed cost). 
The most obvious characteristic of the estimates in Table 46 
is the very large orders of magnitude implied by them. Accord­
ing to the estimates, there was no year when the scarcity 
premium on import licenses might have been less than the real 
exchange rate itself. The estimates conform with the impression 
from other sources-that the relative importance of scarcity 
premiums was declining throughout the 1950s. Even with the 
highest elasticity of demand, however, scarcity premiums are 
estimated to have constituted about 17 percent of GNP in 1954, 
falling to about 8.6 percent in 1959.' 
While the numbers given in 'Fable 46 are far too hypothetical 
to be taken as definitive, they provide still further basis for the 
belief that the scarcity of imports in the 1950s, and the value 
attaching to obtaining licenses, was of sufficient magnitude to 
have constituted a major distorting influence within the 
economy. With premiums of even half the estimated height, 
import licenses were surely very valuable. The economic costs 
associated with individuals' efforts to obtain those licenses were 
surely substantial. The resulting resource misallocation must be 
a factor of considerable importance in cxplaining Korea's 
economic performance in the 1950s. 
Accounts of the 1950s by Koreans confirm that corruption 
was widespread and that political activity was centered upon 
obtaining rights to imports. This focus must have been detri­
mental to the reconstruction effort, since an ability to obtain 
imports at the prevailing EER must have been substantially more 
profitable than undertaking to expand production capacity. 
While data are unavailable, it is a reasonable conjecture that part 
of the rapid growth after 1960 may have resulted from the 
reallocation of resources previously allocated to trading in 
imports toward socially more profitable ventures. 
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EFFICIENCY OF IMPORT SUBSTITUTION 
IN THE 1950s 
The sizable premiums on imports accrued largely on items for 
which domestic production either had not started or was mani­
festly unable to meet more than a fraction of domestic demand. 
For, in the context of foreign exchange shortage, the authorities 
were reluctant to allocate foreign exchange toward items that 
could be domestically produced. 
The conseq'ience, of course, was relatively high levels of 
protection of those domestic industries that sprang up in 
response to the incentives provided by the trade-and-payments 
regime. To judge from accounts of contemporary observers, 
domestic industries in the import-substitution years displayed 
most of the characteristics of import-substitution industries in 
other countries: generally poor quality control, high levels of 
under-utilized capacity, heavy dependence on imports of critical 
inputs, use of relatively capital-intensive techniques, relatively 
6
slow growth of employment in manufacturing, an d so on. 
An important question is the extent to which the import­
substitution phase was a necessary or desirable precondition for 
later export-based growth. Unfortunately, data are not availabli 
on which to base a definitive judgment-no estimates of implicit 
levels of protection in the 1950s are available, and it is impos­
sible to provide quantitative estimates of the extent to which 
the newly started import-substitution industries had high costs. 
Several considerations are relevant, however, to putting some 
limits on the range within which the truth must lie. On the one 
hand, a number of factors served to keep the inefficiencies 
associated with import substitution within bounds and to render 
much of the investment economically justified. On the other 
hand, some pieces of evidence strongly suggest that there were 
excesses and inefficiencies that could have been avoided and 
that, therefore, there were ,ots of the program that were 
wasteful and in no way contributed to later rapid growth. 
To turn first to considerations suggesting that import substi­
tution was probably not as excessive as it has been in some other 
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instances, there is, first of all, the fact that it was less than a 
decade from the end of the Korean War, when the policy 
started, to the early 1960s, when it was abandoned. Starting 
from a very low base, the seven-year period of import substitu­
tion was simply not long enough to induce the development of 
high-cost intermediate and capital-goods industries. Indeed, given 
the destruction that accompanied the Korean War, a sizable 
fraction of total investment in the early years was directed to 
rebuilding destroyed industries that had formerly supplied the 
domestic market. It was seen in Chapter 2 that, despite the fact 
that manufacturing growth was largely accounted for by import 
substitution, the share of imports in total consumption by sector 
did not decline significantly. This was because much of the 
growth in output was destined to satisfy pent-up domestic 
demand. 
It was probably these phenomena that accounted for the 
relatively painless transition to exporting in the early 1960s. If 
large investments had been made in high-cost capacity for inter­
mediate and capital goods in the 1.950s, subsLantial disruption 
would have resulted from enabling exporters to obtain raw 
materials and intermediate goods at world prices. Yet this access 
was necessary for tile export drive of the I960s: had the govern­
ment been unwilling to witness tile decline of domestic inter­
mediate goods industries, their high-cost structure would have 
provided a substanti.l impediment to the export-promotion 
strategy. For purposes of understanding the way in which 
import substitution did or did not provide a foundation for 
later export-oriented growth, the most important consideration 
is probably the fact that import substitution did not, in any 
essential way, proceed to intermediate goods. It was therefore 
not difficult to open the domestic market to imports of those 
commodities to be used in export production, and there are no 
mentions, in contemporary accounts, of adjustment dificulties 
in domestic industries. 
While all the factors listed above suggest that the excess costs 
of import substitution were probably far less than have been 
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experienced in other circumstances, and when the policy has 
been carried out for a longer period of time, that does not prove 
that there were no excesses. Indeed, the very height of the 
estimated premiums on imports and knowledge of the magni­
tude of implicit protection provided for domestic industry 
indicate that there must have been substantial variance in 
domestic cost levels relative to international cost levels both 
between firms, within industries, and between industries. About 
the only indication that can be gleaned derives from production 
data. InI general, after a change in incentives, one would expect 
that high-cost industries' outputs would contract for awhile, 
whereas indust.-s able to compete successfully would continue 
expansion. Their expansion per se could then be taken as 
evidence that earlier investment had been economic. 
One partial test of the extent of extreme inefficiency is, there­
fore, to examine the number of industries that did not reattain 
their production levels of the 1950s by a particular date.7 For 
purposes of evaluation, the year 1964 was chosen. By that year, 
real GNP already exceeded its highest level of the 1950s by 
more than 25 percent. Industries whose output remained at 
levels lower than those attained in the 1950s can therefore be 
judged to have had significant difficulties in adjusting to altered 
incentives. That excess capacity remained provides a strong 
presumption that investment had been uneconomic and did not 
contribute to later development. 
The Economic Statistics Yearbook provides production data 
for the 1955-1964 period for 101 manufacturing industries. 8 Of 
those industries, there were 20 for which the highest level of 
output reached in the 1950s exceeded that of the early 1960s, 
and had not been reattained by 1964. Those 20 must consist 
primarily of adversely affected high-cost import-substitution 
industries. Production of ethyl alcohol, for example, averaged 
about 30 thousand kiloliters in the late 1950s and fell to about 
half that level by 1964. Similarly, production of leather soles 
for shoes reached 5.7 million p'yZng in 1958, and never exceeded 
3.9 million between 1960 and 1964. Output of glass products 
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peaked 39,000 metric tons in 1956, and fell to 11,000 in 
1962, reaching 24,000 by 1964. While some of the other 
declines in production were not proportionately as severe as 
these, many were. It must be concluded that a majority of these 
industries were probably ill-advised import-substitution ventures. 
To be sure, some may have resumed growth after 1974, but idle 
capacity over a fivc-year period is presumptive evidence of 
considerable inefficiency.? 
Nonetheless, the fact that only about 20 percent of the indus­
tries covercd experienced sustained declines is suggestive that 
excesses were limited. It is probable that other industries were 
able to adjust to changed conditions. Obviously, counting the 
number of industries whose output declined does not indicate 
their relative importance. In the absence of value statistics, a 
reasonable weighting system cannot be devised. Suffice it to say 
that, based on the data, this author would judge that the 20 
declining industries' share of manufacturing value added was 
probably substantially below their unweighted proportion of 
industries. Certainly, for the industries whose output was still 
below levels of the 1950s by 1964, considerable investment 
must have been wasted during the import-substitution years. 
However, as a fraction of total investment and output in the 
1950s, it would appear that the majority of industries were able 
to adapt to the altered incentives of the 1960s. 
MICROECONOMIC ASPECTS OF AID 
Two microeconomic aspects of aid must be separately assessed: 
the sectoral distribution of aid among economic activities; and 
the interaction of aid officials with the Korean government, 
which influenced policies affecting resource allocation. 
It is always difficult to evaluate the sectoral allocation of aid. 
On the one hand, there is the consideration that, insofar as aid 
flows are directed toward specific activities, the recipient can 
redirect his own resources so that the net impact of aid in 
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allocating resources may be quite different from that which an 
accounting of aid allocations would indicate. On the other hand, 
even if aid could not be interchanged with domestic resources, it 
is difficult to devise criteria with which to assess the optimality 
of the sectoral distribution of aid. 
The situation in Korea in the 1940s and 1950s makes any 
microeconomic evaluation even more difficult. It was seen in 
Chapter 2 that aid really financed virtually all imports in the 
1950s. Because it was so large, aid must be evaluated in terms 
of the efficiency of overall resource allocation in the 1950s. 
Even that allocation was affected primarily by overvaluation of 
the exchange rate and the accompanying import-substitution 
policies, so that it is primarily in terms of aid interaction with 
Korean government officials that the microeconomic aspects of 
aid must be discussed. 
Before that is considered, however, a few salient features can 
be noted. First, aid emphasis upon education, both in the 1940s 
prior to the Korean War, and again during the reconstruction 
years, was crucial to building a foundation upon which the later 
success of the export-promotion policies could be based. 
Virtually all observers credit the quality of the Korean labor 
force as being a major permissive factor in enabling rapid 
growth; to a large extent, it was earlier aid efforts that provided 
such a basis. Second, there can be little doubt that relief supplies, 
both from 1945 to 1948 and from 1950 to 1954, were 
appropriately directed toward consumer goods and basic agri­
cultural inputs; no other policy would have made sense. Finally, 
the role of the U.S. Military Government in undertaking land 
reform should not be discounted when it comes to evaluating 
the effects of aid upon Korean growth. 
Thus, if fault can be found with some aspects of the aid 
program, and particularly the resulting exchange-rate policy, in 
the k te 1950s, such a finding does not in any sense imply the 
failure of aid; indeed, in both its macro- and microeconomic 
aspects, aid was essential in buying time for Korea to recon­
struct and develop. 
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It was in formulating economic policy that difficulties arose in 
the 1950s. As discussed earlier, the most important source of 
resource misallocation and microeconomic inefficiency lay in 
the complex and misguided exchange-rate policies of the 1950s. 
Had exchange-rate policy been more realistic, there would have 
been fewer irrationalities in import substitution than there in 
fact were. 
It was seen in Chapter 2 that the pattern for currency over­
valuation was set during the Korean War and had unfortunate 
consequences for the entire decade. It is fully understandable 
why and how, in the midst of wartime exigencies and in the 
absence of accumulated experience with the diplomacy of aid 
(from both the donor and the recipient viewpoint), the exchange­
rate question became such a political football. Nonetheless, with 
full benefit of hindsight, it is obvious that settlement of military 
obligations in a way that did not provide the Korean government 
with a strong incentive zo leave the currency overvalued would 
have been vastly suverior to the practices actually followed. 
Once those practices started, currency overvaluation, with all its 
consequences, became a major problem for aid negotiations and 
economic policy during the rest of the 1950s. , 
EFFICIENCY OF THE
 
EXPORT-PROMOTION STRATEGY
 
EXCHANGE-RATE POLICY IN THE 1960s 
As seen in Chapters 2 and 3, the real effective exchange rate for 
exports had reached a realistic, and probably even undervalued, 
level by the late I950s. Tihe import rate, by contrast, remained 
substantially overvalued until at least 1961. After the 1964 
changes, the exchange-rate system was, for all practical purposes, 
unified. That change undoubtedly resulted in considerable 
improvement in the efficiency of the exchange-rate regime coin­
pared to the 1950s. 
After 1964, the restrictiveness of quantitative controls on 
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imports was much reduced compared with that in the 1950s, 
although licensing was tightened somewhat in response to pay­
ments difficulties. For exports, the real effective rate was held 
fairly constant by using a variety of subsidies and other export 
incentives. As Table 32 shows, these included internal tax 
exemptions, customs-duty exemptions, and interest-rate sub­
sidies. In addition, the "wastage allowance" described in Chap­
ter 3, and favorable treatment accorded to successful exporters, 
constituted sizable, if unquantifiable, additional incentives for 
exporting. 
While the overall bias of the exchange-rate system toward 
exports was probably not excessive (see the estimates of ERPs 
for 1968 below), the use of the wastage allowance and interest­
rate subsidies was a less efficient means of encouraging exports 
than reliance upon the exchange rate would have been. The 
wastage allowance was significant primarily because the import 
exchange rate, especially for duty-free goods, was overvalued. 
The effect was to encourage the use of imported inputs and to 
discriminate against domestic sources of raw materials and inter­
mediate goods." Nonetheless, it would have encouraged 
uneconomic use of imported inputs only ii1 those instances 
where domestic inputs could have competed at a unified 
exchange rate. It is therefore doubtfml whether the wastage 
allowance was a significant deterrent to -levelopment of inter­
mediate-goods and raw-materials industries in Korea, although 
it was an important incentive for exporting. While there were 
undoubtedly instances of disadvantaged industries, the quanti­
tative importance of foregone domestic output of inter­
mediate goods and raw materials must be judged to be rather 
small. 
Similar considerations applied to customs duty exemptions 
which, insofar as they only rebated duties paid on imported 
inputs, were really an offset to a disincentive for exports that 
otherwise would have b,en present. Even the internal tax 
exemptions can be viewed as a generalized incentive for export 
that would have had little resource-misallocation effects over 
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and above those inherent in the bias of the trade-and-payments 
regime. 
The same, however, cannot be said for interest-rate subsidies. 
For, insofar as exporters received access to subsidized credit, 
their incentives for using capital, and especially imported capital 
goods, were greater than they should have been. Interest-rate 
policy affected the choice of activity and technique in a variety 
of ways. First, there was the intere,--rate subsidy that accrued 
directly to exporters and whose value i included in computa­
tions of effective exchange rates. Second, exporters received 
preferential treatment in their loan applications, and loans were 
made at implicitly subsidized interest rates. Third, exporters 
were given preferential access to foreign loans, which were 
guaranteed in dollars, subject to an interest rate less than half 
that payable on domestic borrowing. To the extent that devalua­
tion was unanticipated or unlikely, the differential between the 
domestic and the foreign rate of interest led both to subsidiza­
tion of loans and to distortions in the international capital 
market. This latter affected both the efficiency of capital flows 
and choice of technique, discussed below, and exporters' costs 
of capital. Insofar as access to foreign loans meant that the real 
interest rate confronting exporters was well below the oppor­
tunity cost of resources, the result was an implicit subsidy to 
exporters. 
Wontack Hong has estimated the average interest rate paid, in 
nominal and real terms, on various classes of loans. His estimates 
of nominal and real interest rates on deposit money bank (DMB) 
loans and loans of the Korea Development Bank (which 
together accounted for somewhere between 27 and 45 percent 
of the financing of gross domestic capital formation in each 
year from 1967 to 1975) are given in Table 47, along with the 
Frank, Kim, and Westph,,l estimates of the nominal and real 
interest rates on foreign commercial loans (which averaged 
about 25 percent of GDCF). 
The estimated nominal interest rates are weighted averages of 
all new loans in the year in question. Real rates of interest are 
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TABLE 47 Weighted Average Interest Rates on Loans 
By Deposit Money Banks, Korea Development Bank, 
and Foreign Commercial Sources, 1961-1975 
(%per annum) 
Foreign 
DMB Loans KDB Loans CommercialLoans 
Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real 
1961 13.3 0.1 n.a. n.a. - ­
1962 13.4 4.0 8.4 -1.0 - ­
1963 13.1 -7.5 8.3 -12.3 - ­
1964 13.3 -21.3 8.4 -26.2 - ­
1965 16.2 6.2 9.2 -0.8 5.6 -2.5 
1966 21.4 12.5 11.8 2.9 5.7 -2.4 
1967 21.8 15.4 12.5 6.1 6.1 -2.0 
1968 21.2 13.1 12.7 4.6 5.9 -2.2 
1969 20.5 13.7 12.2 5.4 7.1 -1.0 
1970 17.6 8.4 12.5 3.3 7.0 -1.1 
1971 16.4 7.8 12.4 3.8 - ­
1972 17.7 3.7 9.9 -4.1 - ­
1973 13.9 7.0 9.7 2.8 - ­
1974 14.0 -28.1 9.7 -32.4 - ­
1975 n.a. n.a. 11.2 -15.3 - -
Sources: Wontack Hong, Statistical Appendix, Table 4.8 of mimeo for DMB and 
KDB loans; Frank, Kim, and Westphal, p. 116, for foreign commercial loans, 
1965 to 1970. 
estimated by subtracting the percentage rate of increase in 
prices from the nominal inter,:st rate. To be sure, when the 
expected rate of inflation was below the actual rate, borrowers 
may not have perceived that the interest rate they were obtain­
ing funds at was as favorable as it actually was, but the converse 
holds for periods during which the rate of inflation was expected 
to be higher than it actually was. The real rate of return 
to capital in Korea must surely have exceeded 10 percent, if not 
more, over the 1965-1975 decade. As can be seen, it was only 
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in the years 1966 to 1969 that the real rate of interest on 
DMB loans was anywhere at all close to that level; in other years, 
there was a substantial subsidy elemeiit in the real interest rate 
charged. 12 
It is apparent that all loan recipients were therefore implicitly 
subsidized when loans were granted. Given the very high 
priorities attached to promotion of exports, export projects and 
short-term export financing were among the top-priority cate­
gories for lending and for eligibility for foreign loans. For 
deposit money banks, for example, an increasing fraction of 
loans went to finance short-term export credits.' 3 By 1973, 
new export credits exceeded the net increase in bank notes and 
coins issued in that year. " Likewise, the KDB was under 
instructions to accord financing of equipment and other 
exporters' needs top, priority in allocating their funds (which 
included the Japanese foreign credits). 
While the precise fraction of all credit that was allocated to 
exporters cannot be estimated, it is evident that, in conjunction 
with the urgency assigned by the government to export 
promotion, the very existence of credit rationing provided a 
sizable implicit subsidy to exporters. But, in addition to that, 
exporters paid lower nominal interest rates than those shown in 
the table. The availability of such credit and the preferential 
interest rates must have, o1 occasion, induced the choice of 
relatively more capital-intensive techniques than would have 
been desirable had exporters had tu pay the opportunity cost of 
capital. Likewise, there were probably occasions when industries 
that were more capital-intensive than Korea's comparative 
advantage would have dictated embarked on exporting ven­
tures."5 It will be seen below, however, that this phenomenon 
could not have dominated the export drive. 
EFFECTIVE RATES OF PROTECTION
 
AND INCENTIVES, 1968
 
It was seen in Chapter 4 that there was significant liberalization 
of the trade-and-payments regime during the 1964-1967 period. 
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Efficiency ofExport Strategy 
Thereafter, there were minor changes in the incentives provided 
for exports and the restrictions and charges upon imports, but 
these appear to have been confined to a fairly narrow range. To 
all intents and purposes, the salient characteristics of policy 
toward exports, imports, and import substitutes had stabilized 
by 1967, and the regime was little altered after that date. It is 
possible, therefore, to examine data for a single year after 1967 
to evaluate the allocative efficiency of the regime. 
if all policies affect prices of outputs and inputs, the best 
measure of the incentives confronting producers in an economy 
is the effective rate of protection (ERP). Appropriately 
measured, ERP estir".ates provide an indication of the degree of 
protection and/or subsidization accorded to different value­
adding processes. 6 A higher ERP for one industry than another 
reflects a greater incentive for domestic production (due to a 
greater differential between the value added that is possible 
domestically and that prevailing internationally) of the more 
protected industry.'" Very high ERP rates are usually symp­
tomatic of relatively inefficient resource allocation resulting 
from protection, as producers are enabled to compete despite 
costs of production well above world levels; insofar as tile same 
resources could be employed in other industries with much 
lower (and even negative) effective protection rates, significant 
gains in resource allocation could be achieved. This is because 
additional resources employed in the low-ERP industry could 
enable the economy to export part of that output (or import 
substitutes in the low-cost activity) and obtain imports of the 
high-ER P commodity with a considerable net saving of resources. 
To be sure, effective rates of protection sometimes enable 
domestic producers to obtain monopoly profits within a 
sheltered domestic market; such monopoly positions also have 
undesirable effects although they are not necessarily indicative 
of the same degree of resource misallocation. 
High ERPs, and variations in them among industries, therefore, 
are broadly indicative of the extent of inefficiency pei mitted by 
the trade-and-payments regime, either in enabling high-cost 
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value-adding industries to produce and bid resources away from 
other, more economic endeavors, or in providing domestic 
producers with a sheltered domestic imarkea. High proportionate 
variation in ERP levels across industries is generally reflective of 
a trade-and-payments regime (and the presence of othei incen­
tives) that permits sizable inefficiency in the domestic produc­
tion structure. 
When some incentives come in the form of tax exemptions 
and differential incentives for foreign and domestic sales, it is 
necessary to take into account these incentives as well. While 
some estimates of ERPs take these phenomena into account, 
many investigators prefer to treat the "effective subsidy" as 
comprising the total protection implicit in tax exemptions, sub­
sidized credit, and other inducements, along with the incentives 
created by the trade-and-payments regime. 
For Korea, there is an excellent set of estimates of effective 
protective and subsidy rates for 1968 done by Westphal and 
Kim."i The Westphal and Kim computations are based, not on 
legal tariff rates which, as already seen, do not represent actual 
tariff rates due to exemptions, but on direct comparisons 
between domestic and foreign prices. Such comparisons enable 
taking into account the entire range of incentives and charges 
which confront producers, and are therefore vastly to be 
preferred to estimates of ERPs based simply on tariff tables or 
tariff collections. 
Table 48 gives a sample of the Westphal-Kim estimates for 
representative industries among their 150-sector breakdown. The 
first coluni a indicates the nature of the industry, and the second 
indicates its classification. The broad industry groups into which 
the iidividual industrie:, bulong, and the criteria for classifica­
tion, are given in notes to the table. The third and fourth 
columns give the average nominal triff rate and the actual 
amount of tariff collections. Estimates of effective rates ot 
protection are given in the fifth and sixth columns, while the 
last two columns give estimates of the effective subsidy rates­
taking into account both the protection as estimated in the fifth 
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TABLE 48 Nominal and Effective Protection Rates and Effective Subsidies, 
Individual industries, 1968 
(% of international value added) 
Effective Protection Effective Subsidy 
Classi- Nominal Domestic Domestic 
Industry fication Tariff Protection Exports Market Exports Market 
1. Rice NIC 23.4 13.3 -0.3 14.5 2.6 19.2 
11. Livestock NIC 20.9 19.8 -1.0 11.4 7.5 10.9 
12. Forest products NIC 9.8 5.6 -0.5 4.4 0.5 4.6 
13. Fishing NIC 29.9 0.0 1.9 -4.2 11.0 1.0 &, 
17. Canned sea food X 28.7 3.1 -3.0 11.8 9.1 4.7 
23. Refined sugar NIC 38.8 0.0 -0.3 -38.0 3.9 -43.6 
32. Tungsten ore X 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -5.8 4.4 -26.8 
44. Cement NIC 13.3 2.8 -3.7 -12.8 5.3 -11.7 
47. Cotton yarn NIC 23.1 0.0 13.7 -15.0 12.1 -18.5 
48. Silk yarn X 5.3 0.0 -2.1 -2.8 -4.5 -15.7 
53. Lumber NIC 25.7 0.0 19.0 -18.5 14.3 -26.3 
54. Plywood X 10.2 0.0 30.9 -28.4 41.8 -35.9 
56. Synthetic resins and 
fibers IC 40.6 24.1 -0.4 37.1 19.1 49.9 
57. Petroleum products NIC 18.3 -24.9 1.0 -66.2 2.0 -69.4 
TABLE 48 (continued) 
Effective Protection Effective Subsidy 
Ciassi- Nominal Domestic Domestic 
Industry fication Tariff Protection Exports Market Exports Market 
60. Glass products IC 87.8 8.7 2.2 -4.9 3.5 -12.4 
61. Pig iron IC 9.4 14.3 -12.4 28.9 280.4 260.0 
62. Steel ingots NIC 11.4 11.4 -7.1 -12.2 -5.3 -14.. 
65. Cctton fabrics X 73.6 23.4 -8.7 169.5 93.8 176.2 
66. Silk fabrics XIC 91.6 45.2 260.6 198.8 13.0 233.8 
72. Wood produmts NIC 58.8 2.1 -3.5 -8.3 2.3 -10.4 
74. Paper and paperboard IC 44.9 14.8 -5.7 14.8 -7.8 2.7 
76. Tires and tubes NIC 93.9 0.0 1.2 -44.3 -14.0 -57.2 
78. Basic inorganic 
chemicals IC 47.5 21.6 -0.4 22.1 9.2 19.1 
84. Pesticides NIC 28.8 47.0 1.3 62.0 -8.4 58.2 
86. Fertilizers IC 0.0 4.8 -6.3 -2.9 35.1 29.0 
88. Steel sheets and bars IC 24.4 27.8 -7.5 138.7 15.0 -3i86.6 
94. Tools and other metal 
products XIC 36.2 27.1 -4.3 57.8 4.4 55.0 
98. Knit products X 61.3 11.7 -2.4 31.0 2.3 14.0 
104. Leather shoes X 89.9 6.7 -1.7 -3.0 5.2 -9.9 
TABLE 48 (continued) 
Effective Protection Effective Subsidy 
Classi- Nomina! Domestic Domestic 
Industry fication Tariff Protection Exports Market Exports Market 
110. Pottery 	 IC 76.4 49.6 -2.5 97.3 52.3 96.3 
117. Toys and sporting goods XIC 74.9 4.2 -2.4 -14.3 9.5 -21.1 
121. Electronic compoitents XIC 1.6 1.6 -2.1 39.2 6.3 49.6 ''. 
126. Bicycles 	 NIC 96.6 20.5 -3.5 4.7 0.4 -4.9 2­
130. 	 Metal working 
machinery IC 20.9 4.5 -3.3 -10.6 -5.3 -14.7 
134. Textile machinery IC 13.9 0.5 -2.8 -16.8 -0 i -16.0 
137. Office machines XIC 70.4 24.2 -4.1 34.2 7.3 31.9 
140. Generatcrs NIC 8.6 5.2 -3.1 -9.2 19.5 4.8 
64.5 0.7 48.1144. Electrunic equipment IC 51.7 44.6 -5.8 
149. Motor vehicles IC 121.5 88.0 -13.5 247.7 -6.1 241.8 ' 
Source 	 Wcstphal and Kim, "Industrial Policy and Development," Appendix Tables 2A and 2B. 
Notes: a. Industries 1-13 are designated agriculture, forestry and fishing; 14-25 are processed foods; 26-29 beverages and tobacco; 
30-43 mining and energy: 44-46, construction materials; 47-64 intermediate products 1; 65-97 intermediate products II; 98-121 non­
durable consumer goods; 122-127 consumer durables: 128-145 mach'nery; and 146-150, tians~ort equipment. 
b. X = export industry (exports greater than 10% of total production)
IC = import-competing industry (imports greater than 10% of total domestic supply) 
XIC = both X and IC 
NIC = non-impcrt competing industry (all industries with less than 10% exported and less than 10% of total supply imported) 
c. Westphal and Kim give both Balassa and Corden estimates of effective protection and subsidy rates. The Corden measures are reproduced 
here. 
Allocative Efficiency 
and sixth columns, and divergences of tax liabilities and interest' 
rates paid from the average for all industry. 
Several features are noteworthy. First, the "true" nominal 
protection afforded to various industries does not, in general, 
appear to have been exceptionally high. judged by the standards 
of most other countries, nominal protective rates in Korea on 
the whole seem fairly moderate, despite some fairly high legal 
tariff rates, when exemptions, and so on, are not taken into 
accotunt. Second, in most instances, effective protective rates 
appear to be even more moderate compared to levels found else­
wh-re. Here, of course, account must be taken of the difference 
between selling prices in the domestic market-some of which 
were considerably above prices of comparable products for 
export-and for export. In general, effective protective rates for 
export are mildly negative, while those for the domestic market 
range from minus 44 percent (for tires and tubes) to a positive 
247 percent (for motor vehicle,) The silk fabrics industry, 
which is both exporting and import-competing, is the only 
industry with very high rates of effective protection both for 
export and for the domestic market. 
When attention turns to effective subsidy rates, however, the 
picture changes rather dramatically. In particular, most industries 
were confronted with positive rates of effective subsidy when 
selling in the export market, and most had greater total incen­
tives to export than to s 11 domestically. Exceptions seem to lie 
mostly in the import-competing industries, such as pottery and 
basic inorganic chemicals, where the effective subsidy rate for 
the domestic market exceeds that for export. To be sure, there 
are anomalies, such as cotton fabrics, which apparently received 
fairly high effective subsidies both for the domestic market and 
for export. 
In general, the thrust of Korea's export-promotion policy 
shows through clearly. Unlike most -"ther countries, where 
effective rates of protection and subsidy are systematically and 
significantly higher for import substitutes than for export, in 
Korea export effective subsidy rates in general exceeded those 
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for the domestic market. In this regard, the "mportance of the 
credit and tax incentives shows through clearly: the effective 
rates of protection by themselves usually did not provide more 
incentive for exports than for the domestic market. 
Some summary sta istics serve to highlight the wealth of 
information contained in the detailed ERP ar.d effective subsidy 
rates calculated by Westphal and Kim. Table 49 gives estimates 
of nominal and effective protective rates and efiective subsidy 
rates by industry group. These estimates were made in the sarne 
way as the data given in Table 48, and then weighted to form 
industry aggregates. As can be seen, the structure of Korean 
protection was unusual in a number of respects. Unlike most 
other countries, the average nominal protection to primary com­
modities exceeded that accorded to manufacturing. Thus, for a 
large number of manufacturing sectors, effective rates of protec­
tion were negative. When account is taken of differential tax 
treatment and credit subsidies, however, export effLctive sub­
sidies once again are positive (for all manufacturing industries 
except Transport Equipment), while a number of industries 
faced negative effective rates when selling on the domestic 
market. Intermediate Products 1-which includes such products 
as cotton yarn, lumber, plywood, petroleum products, glass 
products, pig iron, steel ingots, copper, and other nonferrous 
metals-is the category with the largest differential incentive 
between export and domestic sales, with an effective subsidy 
rate of phs 26 percent for export and minus 22 percent for the 
domestic market. Transport Equipment consisted almost entirely 
of import-competing activities in 1968, wh.ch probably accounts 
for the unusual combination of high incentives for the domestic 
market and an absence of incentives for export. 
In addition to the differential ;n incentives for domestic and 
foreign sales, the other notable characteristic of Table 49 is the 
relatively moderate levels of protection and effective subsidies. 
Except for Transport Equipment, no sector received an effective 
subsidy in excess of 26 percent, and only three manufacturing 
sectors benefited from effective subsidies for export in excess of 
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TABLE 49 Nominal and Effective Protective Rates and Effective Subsidies, 
Industry Group, 1968
 
(%)
 
A verage Average Effective Protection Effective Subsidy 
Actual Numinal Domestic Domestic 
Industry Group Tariff Protection Export Sales Export Sales 
Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing 36.0 16.6 -15.3 17.9 -9.4 21.7 
Mining and Energy 9.6 6.9 -0.9 3.5 2.7 4.5 
Total Primary Production 34.1 15.9 -7.0 17.1 -2.4 20.7 
Processed Foods 56.7 2.7 -2.2 -14.2 1.8 -19.6 
Beverages and Tobacco 135.4 2.1 -1.7 -15M5 12.6 -20-8 
Construction Materials 30.5 3.7 -3.9 -8.8 4.4 -12.9 
Intermediate Products - I 31.0 2.4 18.6 18.80 26.0 -21.9 
Intermediate Products - II 53.4 19.1 -0.2 17.4 11.6 13.1 
Nondurable Consumer Goods 67.9 8.6 -1.4 -8.0 4.1 -15.7 
Consumer Durables 78.4 30.7 -3.0 39.8 1.5 23.6 
Machinery 49.1 27.9 -4.6 29.5 1.9 21.0 
Transport Equipment 61.8 54.3 -13.1 83.2 -5.6 80.8 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 58.8 10.7 2.2 -1.1 8.9 -6.5 
ALL INDUSTRIES 49.4 12.6 0.3 9.0 6.5 8.6 
Source: Wcstphal and Kim, "Industrial Policy and Development," Tables 2.A and 2.B. 
Efficiency ofExport Strategy 
10 percent. The range of effective subsidies was somewhat 
greater for the domestic market, presumably reflecting the dual 
motivation of the government in providing protection: on the 
one hand, there were industries where the motive was primarily 
to encourage export sales, so that the domestic market ended 
up with negative effective subsidy rates; on the other hand, 
there were sectors where import-substitution industries pre­
dominated, and i, those cases, positive subsidy levels reflect the 
government's desire to encourage those sectors. 
These conclusions are reinforced by the summary statistics in 
Table 50, again drawn from Wesphal and Kim's study and 
presenting the same statistics as Table 49, except that the 
aggregation is by sales destination of commodity. Export 
industries, that is, those which sold more than 10 percent of 
their output in the export market, were on average provided 
with an effective subsidy rate of about 10 percent for foreign 
sales in manufacturing, while sales to the domestic market were 
effectively taxed about 20 percent. Manufacturing import­
competing industries, by contrast, receivd effective subsidies of 
about 16 percent for the export market, and 50 percent for the 
domestic market. Non-import-competing activities were accorded 
relatively low levels of protection, while the industries in which 
both export- and mi port-competing sectors were important 
received positive effective subsidies for both destinations. In 
general, incentives to exports appear to have been fairly uniform 
whereas import-substitution incentives were far more selectively 
provided. 
EXPORT POLICY 
If one uses the Westphal-Kim estimates of effective subsidy as a 
guide, the average effective subsidy to manufactured exports 
was about 9 percent, while that to manufactures for the 
domestic market was miinus 6 percent. This would imply a 15 
percent differential in favor of exports, compared with what 
incentives would have been in the absence of government 
intervention. 
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TABLE 50 	 Nominal and Effective Protective Rates and Effective Subsidies, 
Commodity Categories, 1968 (%) 
Average Average Effective Protection 
Actual Nominal Domestic 
Commodity Category Tariff Protection Export Sales 
A. Export Industries 
Primary Activities 1.4 	 -7.6 -11.6 -12.0 
Manufacturing 53.7 5.2 	 3.4 -14.0 
Total 	 51.2 4.6 0.7 -13.9 
00i 
B. Import-Competing Activities 
Primary Activities 22.8 46.3 -0.2 66.6 
Manufacturing 55.4 31.6 -3.9 55.1 
Total 47.5 35.2 -3.6 57.3 
C. 	 Non-Import-Competing Activities 
Primary Activities 36.2 13.3 0.6 12.7 
Manufacturing 64.1 5.0 -0.7 -12.6 
Total 49.5 9.3 -0.1 3.8 
Effectivc Subsidy 
Domestic 
Export Sales 
-8.5 -19.0 
9.8 -20.4 
6.5 -20.3 
4.6 74.2 
15.8 50.2 
15.0 59.8 
8.2 16.1 
5.0 -18.7 
6.5 3.9 
TABLE 50 (continued) 
Average Average Effective Protection 2ffective Subsidy 
Actual Nominal Domestic Domestic 
Commodity Category Tariff Protection Export Sales Export Sales 
D. 	 Export- and Import-Competing Industries 
Primary Activities 1.2 7.6 -1.3 10.6 2.6 13.7 
Manufacturing 46.3 23.1 
-1.4 46.1 5.6 34.8 
Total 44.3 22.5 -1.3 43.6 5.3 33.4 
Source: Westphal and Kim, "Industrial Policy and Development," Tables 3A and 3B. See Table 48 for definition of commodity categories. '­
0 
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This estimate bears out the impression gained from inspection 
of export-promotion policies-that the totality of government 
policy was oriented toward export promotion, and that incen­
tives were biased somewh2 toward exports and against the 
domestic market. However, examination of effective incentive 
rates and other evidence does not bear out the allegation some­
times heard that the Korean regime was as chaotic and 
indiscriminate in its export orientation as other regimes have 
been toward import substitution. Since policies toward exports 
were one of the key areas in Korea's growth strategy, it is 
important to provide ieasons why the "indiscriminate" export 
promotion hypothesis does not withstand close scrutiny. 
First, much of what dis rimination did exist was not between 
exports and import substitutes: it was between sales to the home 
market and sales abroad. This is most clearly seen by examining 
the contrast between effective subsidy rates for domestic sales 
and for exports; discrimination came at the point of sale, not at 
the point of production. Second, and closely related to the first, 
Korean government strategy usually discriminated in favor of 
exports and not in favor of specific commodities. By and large, 
the resulting differentials in effective subsidy rates were not the 
icsult of consciot.s government policy favoring one sort of 
export over anothcr. Thus, any firm that exported was eligible 
for export incentives; many of thL incentives were significant 
only if the firm could profitably export. To the extent that that 
was so, a market test still retained importance in selecting 
appropriate export industries, since prices provided one impor­
tant determinant of profitability, and the incentives were 
effective only to the extent that profits were realized. 
To be sure, sech a link was not perfect, and probably some of 
the export incentives resulted in less than an optimal mix of 
exports. Nonetheless, the ERP estimates. as Well as other data, 
all suggest that divergences in the output mix were of liiited 
magnitude. 
If incentives did not discriminate unduly among exports, they 
surely encouraged techniques of greater-than-optimal capital 
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intensity, especially in the early 1970s. Several pieces of evidence 
are available. First, there are two sets of estimates of the factor 
intensity of exports. In addition, Rhee and Westphal have made 
a careful microeconomic estimate of the impact of the incentive 
structure on the choice of technique. 
The two sets of estimates of the factor intensity of Korean 
trade are those of Westphal and Kim and of Wontack Hong. 
The Westphal-Kim estimates are based entirely on 1965 and 
1966 input-output coefficients and factor inputs (labor and 
capital at 1968 prices) per unit of output. These data, while 
highly reliable, do not take into account changes in factor 
intensity within industries that might have occurred over the 
period covered by their estimates, 1960 to 1968. They do, how­
ever, reflect the changing commodity composition of trade. 
Westphal and Kim estimated the direct and direct-plus-indirect 
labor and capital requirements for exports and import-com­
peting goods for primary commodities and manufactures 
separately. 
Wontack Hong's data are not entirely comparable for a number 
of reasons. First, he used annual data in constructing his 
estimates, so that his coefficients refer to the year of the esti­
mate and therefore include both changes in the output mix and 
changes in factor intensity within industries. Second, Hong's 
estimates are in 1970 prices, contrasted with 1965 prices for the 
Westphal-Kim data. Third, by virtue of a different base year, the 
commodity categories used by the two are not entirely 
comparable. Finally, Hong's estimates for direct-plus-indirect 
inputs follow the Corden concept-that is, they include indirect 
home goods only. 
The results of the two sets of estimates are presented in 
Table 51. The Westphal-Kim estimates clearly show the impor­
tance of treating primary and manufacturing industries sep­
arately. The direct labor requirements for manufacturing exports 
increased slightly from 1960 to 1968 according to the West­
phal-Kim estimates while capital requirements for exports fell. 
Thus, the labor-capital ratio for manufactured exports rose 
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TABLE 51 Estimates of Factor Intensity of Production, by Comniodity Categories 
Westphal-Kim Estimates,1960 to 1968 
1960 1963 1966 1968 
DirectFactorRequirements L K LIK LIK LIK LIK L K 
Primary 
Domestic Output 10.86 0.65 16.60 17.20 17.08 17.16 10.74 0.63 
Exports 7.54 0.92 8.19 6.89 6.15 5.69 6.27 1.10 
Imports 11.06 0.67 16.58 15.91 16.13 15.48 11.28 0.73 4. 
Manufacturing 2 
Domestic Output 1.63 0.55 2.97 2.89 2.67 2.64 1.53 0.58 
Exports 1.87 0.69 2.72 3.02 3.24 3.55 1.89 0.53 
Imports 1.29 0.62 2.09 1.93 1.98 2.33 1.54 0.66 
Total 
Domestic Output 5.44 1.24 4.39 4.59 4.46 4.12 4.48 1.09 
Exports 4.83 1.49 2.52 2.52 2.41 2.10 2.56 1.22 
Imports 3.37 0.74 4.87 4.87 4.05 4.29 2.96 0.70 
Total FactorRequirements 
Primary 
Final demand less imports 12.86 1.12 11.46 11.79 12.10 12.61 13.36 1.06 
Exports 9.84 1.49 6.55 5.75 5.13 4.81 8.29 1.73 
TABLE 51 (continued) 
Westphal-Kam Estimates,1960 to 1968 
Total FactorRequirements L 
1960 
K LIK 
1963 
L/K 
1966 
LIK LIK 
1968 
L K 
Primary (continued) 
Imports 12.99 1.08 11.99 11.50 11.90 11.30 13.06 1.16 
Manufacturing 
Final demand less imports 
Exports 
Imports 
8.92 
7.89 
5.06 
1.64 
2.11 
1.84 
5.43 
3.74 
2.77 
5.41 
3.71 
2.40 
5.03 
4.09 
2.40 
5.14 
4.29 
2.74 
8.53 
7.91 
5.56 
1.66 
1.83 
2.03 
Total 
Final demand less imports 9.50 2.16 4.39 4.59 4.46 4.12 9.32 2.26 
Exports 8.12 2.38 3.42 3.05 3.25 3.15 7.53 2.38 
Imports 6.74 1.79 3.78 3.66 3.26 3.48 6.62 1.89 
Wontack Hong'sEstimates 
1960 1963 1966 1968 1970 1973 
Capital Requirements (million 1970 dollars per $100 million exports or import replacements) 
Direct Exports 
Indirect Exports 
43 
50 
48 
68 
41 
49 
41 
50 
41 
58 
44 
44 
Total Exports 93 116 90 91 98 88 
TABLE 51 (continued) 
Wontack Hong'sEstimates(continued) 
1960 1963 1966 1968 1970 1973 
Capital Requirements (continued) 
Direct Imports 48 41 58 49 45 44 
Indirect Imports 59 58 83 69 70 77 
Total Imports 107 99 141 118 115 121 
Labor Requirements (1,000 workers per S100 million exports or import replacements) 
Direct Exports 105 05 59 49 39 23 
Indirect Exports 50 71 38 32 27 17 
Total Exports 155 136 97 81 66 40 
Direct Imports 45 54 40 41 43 34 
Indirect Imports 47 45 39 37 28 21 
Total Imports 92 99 79 78 71 55 
K/L Ratio (1,000 dollar capital per worker) 
Direct Exports .41 .74 .69 .84 1.05 1.91 
indirect Exports 1.00 .96 1.29 1.56 2.15 2.59 
Total Exports .59 .85 .93 1.12 1.48 2.20 
All Manufacturing n.a. 1.53 1.53 1.44 1.67 1.58 
Direct Imports 1.07 .76 1.45 1.20 1.05 1.29 
1973 
TABLE 51 (continued) 
Wontack Hong's Estimates (continued) 
1960 1963 1966 1968 1970 

K/L Ratio (continued) 
Indirect Imports 1.26 1.29 2.13 1.86 2.50 3.69
 
Total Imports 1.16 1.00 1.78 1.51 
 1.62 2.20 
Sources: Westphal and Kim, "Industrial Policy and Development"; Wontack Hong, 'Trade, Distortions and Employment" Table 7.10 " (revised edition 1977). 
"
 
Notes: a. Hong's estimates are for all sectors, primary included. They therefore correspond with the Westphal-Kim estimates given under 
"total."b. Hong's estimate for 1973 was derived using 1970 input coefficients. 
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from 2.72 to 3.55 according to thcir estimates. Direct factor 
requirements for manufactured exports were, therefore, below 
those2 for domestic output but above those for import substi­
tutes in 1960; by 194,8, manufactured exports had a higher 
labor-capital ratio than either domestic output or import 
substitutes. 
These findings are obscured in the estimates of factor require­
ments for all commodity categories because primary commodi­
ties were ipparently highly labor intensive for import substitutes 
compared to the coefficknts for exports. As a consequence, 
total exports were less labor intensive than either domestic out­
put or imports throughout tile period. When direct and indirect 
factor requirements were computed, the results were not 
significantly affected: the labor-capital ratio in manufacturing 
rose throughout the period (except for 1963), while that for 
imports declined from 1960 to 1966, and rose again thereafter. 
When primary commodities and manufacturers are grouped 
together, the labor intensity of primaly-coiimodity import 
substitutes dominats the figures, thus leaving iiiiports more 
labor-intensive throughout. 9 
Hong's esrimates span a longer time period than the Westphal-
Kim data, but are not available for manufacturing and primary 
commodities separately. His data ('Table 51) show direct labor 
reqdir."ments for exports falling from 1960 onward, direct 
capital rcquircments staying constant, and hence a rising capital­
labor ratio in exports throughout, with the exception of 1963, 
a year that appears to have certain anomalies in both sets of 
estimates. Hong's estimates show direct requirements for exports 
to be more labor-intensive than those for imports, and totai 
exports (direct-plus-indirect) are more labor-intensive than total 
imports until 1970. 
The picture that seems to emerge is that the beginning of the 
Korean export boom from 1960 to 1970 was a period during 
which the exports that grew rapidly were of greater labor 
intensity than was Korean manufacturing as a whole. Simul­
taneously, the capital-labor ratio for import substitutes was 
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either constant, or rising very slowly. One possible interpreta­
tion is that, during this period, the factor content of exports and 
import substitutes was growing closer together, perhaps because 
capital-intensive industies that had been started in the 1950s 
diminished in importance, and perhaps in response to the failure 
of the real wage to rise as unemployed labor was being absorbed 
while the real interest rate increased substantially.2 0 
Since Korean comparative advantage at that time surely lay in 
labor-intensive industries, the Korean experience is consistent 
with the noion that the export-piomotion policies of the 1960s 
resulted in resource reallocation toward the industries with 
comparative advantage. This was probably true both for export 
and for import-competing industries 
After about 1968, rapid capital accumulation resulted in 
a gradual change in comparative advantage toward less labor­
intensive commodities. That export and import-conipeting 
industries both became more capital-using is consistent with 
that. More over, capital-labor ratios in import-competing and 
export industries moved closer together over the decade. It 
seems clear that ideal resource allocation would, if capital and 
labor were the only factors of production, dictate approximate 
equality of those ratios. All of these considerations, as well as 
the relatively small variation in effective protection and subsidies 
compared with other LDCs, suggest that resource allocation 
improved significantly during the 1960s. 
After 1970, increasing capital intensity, as shown in Wontack 
Hong's estimates, is broadly consistent with the rising wage­
rental ratio that characterized the economy in those years. To 
the extent that exports were becoming more capita!- intensive 
than import substitutes, it is possible that interest-rate sub­
sidies, which were of increasing importance both proportion­
ately and absolutely in the early 1970s, began inducing even 
more capital-intensive exports and techniques than were optimal. 
A partial explanation of the increasing capital-intensity of 
exports, as revealed in Hong's data, however, may lie in the 
fact that some of the import-substitution industries started up 
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in Korea during that time: steel, fertilizer, and petrochemical 
derivatives. As Westphal and Kim argue, 
All of these products require capital-intensive production methods in 
plants subject to severe economies of scale . . . Given a decision to 
meet the domestic demand for these commodities through domestic 
production, temporary e.ports can be efficient as they permit the 
construction of large plants without experiencing the initial excess 
capacity ...Even without such a decision, exports of cement, steel, 
and fertilizer during the first half of the 1970's may well have been 
in Korea's dynamic comparative advantage. 
2 1 
Westphal and Kim, however, appear to question the wisdom of 
the decision to produce petrochemicals to supply the textile and 
plastic industries. 
Thus, part of the increased capital intensity of exports 
reflected in Hong's data reflects altered comparative advantage. 
Part reflects efficient utilization of large-scale plants in import­
substitution industries (which may or may not themselves have 
been efficient), and part undoubtedly reflects the use of overly 
capital-intensive technioues induced by credit subsidies a: a formn 
of export incentive. Moreover, even this source of non-optim !­
ity should be kept in perspe:ctive: there can be little doubt that 
the Korean economy of the 1970s had a vastly more efficient 
resource allocation than that of the early 1960s. The point is 
that the export drive itself was relatively efficient, although 
there were sonic deviations from optimality. 
A study by Rhece and Westphai22 tends to confirm the con­
clusion that microeconomic inefficiencies, in the form of non­
optimal capital intensity, were present in the early 1970s. They 
examined the capital equipment purchased for cotton-textile 
weaving in the period 1970 to 1973. It shiould be noted that 
cotton-textile weaving was one of the least effective industries 
in Korea, judged by the height of effective protection granted 
to it in 1968, which serves to put the finding of inefficiency 
in perspective. 
In the cotton-texti!e-weaving industry, producers had two 
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choices: domestically produced semi-automatic looms, and 
imported automatic looms. The purchase price of a domestically 
produced semi-automatic loom was about 30 percent of the 
price of an imported one. Domestic looms were, naturally, less 
capital- and more labor-using. Nonetheless, large numbers of 
imported looms were purchased, and Rhee and Westphal set out 
to find out why. Interviewing 79 textile firms (with 233 models 
of looms), they estimated the technological relationships per­
taining to each loom. 
They ther. estimated the benefits and costs that would accrue 
to each firm as a function of the type of loom purchased, taking 
into account as many microcconomic characteristics of the 
product and the loom alternatives as possible. Their conclusions 
are worth quoting at some length: 
It is a fair generalization to say that large producers have monop­
olized the production of luxury fabrics where high profits are to be 
made through export subsidies and discriminatory pricing on the 
protected domestic market. One might wonder why these producers 
export at all, but exporting is the price paid to do business in 
Korea ... In turn, large scale producers tend to be inefficient, 
because of their reliance on imported automatic technology. The 
only clear exception to this is in the production of wide cloth. But 
the inefficiency of large scale producers appears not to result from 
any failure to maximize profics on their part, it is rather due to 
government policies which have favored capial imports. 23 
Rhee and Westphal also noted that smaller-scale producers, not 
able to benefit froin government subsidies, were efficient pro­
ducers using domestic capital equipment. Being ineligible for 
export subsidies, however, they exported relatively little. 
From the myriad details underlying the Rhee-Westphal esti­
mates it is apparent why more microeconomic studies are not 
available. Nonetheless, thcir conclusions are significant in con­
firming both that the qualitative predictions of economic theory 
are in fact borne out and that producers, in responding to incen­
tives, were using overly capital-intensive techniques of produc­
tion. it should be noted that the incentives that resulted in the 
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use of overly capital-intensive techniques were removed after 
1972, which is consistent with the view that reduced bias 
toward exports after 1972-1973 probably was economically 
justified. 
The overall picture, tlierefore, seems to be one of increasing 
efficiency of resource allocation-both in the commodity 
composition of output and in factor proporoions-throughout 
the period after 1960. From 1960 to at least 1968, the improve­
ment in resource allocation must have been very significant. 
Thereafter, opportunities for further gains were not as great. In 
the 1970s, comparative advantage was shifting, but there is sonic 
evidence that the shift toward capital-using techniques was 
somewhat too rapid. There can nonetheless be little doubt that 
the efficiency of trade in 1975 far exceeded that of the 1950s.4 
Indeed, one of the factors responsible for rapid growth under 
export promotion must certainly have been the improved 
resource allocation that resulted from it and the other policies 
that accompanied the export-oriented strategy. 
CAPITAL FLOWS 
It has already been seen that there were virtually no capital 
flows other than foreign aid prior to the 1960s. From 1960 to 
1965, private capital flows were relatively small, and did not 
play a significant part in resource allocation. This was not a 
cosequeiice of policy failure: it is undoubtedly true that Korea 
could not have begun to attract significant non-concessionary 
private capital until such time as her export-promotion po!icies 
had began exhibiting success. For that reason, it is policy only 
with respect to private capital flows after 1965 that needs to be 
evaluated here. 
As with other aspects of resource allocation, it is likely that 
the capital inflows were economically justified. There can be 
little doubt that the social rate of return on capital cxceeded the 
foreign borrowing rate, so that the inflow of funds was generally 
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well used. Nonetheless, there were incentives to borrow exces­
sively, and some misallocation undoubtedly resulted, especially 
in the 1968-1971 period. After that, these incentives diminished. 
The divergence betwec, the real rate of interest as perceived 
by businessmen and the real social cost of borrowing was 
described in Chapter 4. it will be recalled that, during the late 
1960s, exchange-rate depreciation was limited and well below 
the domestic rate of inflation. All borrowing from abroad for 
maturities in excess of one year was denominated in foreign 
currencies. Thus, a Korean businessman borrowing from abroad 
could reasonably expect his revenues-even if he was an 
exporter, since export subsidy policies could be expected to 
maintain the real exchange rate for him in the absence of 
devaluation-to keep pace with the domestic rate of inflation 
and the exchange rate to lag well behind. From 1965 to 1970, 
the average rate of increase of the GDP deflator was 11.3 
percent, and the average rate of depreciation of the currency 
was 3.2 percent. With interest rates on foreign loans ranging 
between 6 and 8 percent, it is evident that the majority of 
borrowers paid negative real interest rates on their loans. Since 
inflation had been at even higher rates in earlier ycars, it is 
likely that rates of inflation in excess of the interest rate were 
anticipated. 
Hatl all who wished to do so been free to borrow at the 
foreign interest rate, there is litle question but that the 
aggregate level of foreign borrowing would ha%-' been much too 
high to be optimal from the viewpoint of the Korean economy, 
with consequent resource misallocation. This would have 
occurred both because borrowers used more capital-intensive 
techniques and invested in more capital-intensive industries than 
they wouid have found profitable at the real foreign rate of 
interest. In addition to an above-optimal total amount of bor­
rowing, there would have been sec-oral inefficiencies, since 
some sectors of the economy were relatively favored and some 
were disadvant.-ged, contrasted with what would have happened 
had all been free to borrow at the true social cost. 
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In practice, however, the government did not permit foreign 
loans without approving them, so that implicitly subsidized 
loans were available subject only to rationing on the part of the 
government. This constrained the level of foreign borrowing well 
below what would have occurred had there becn no quantita­
tive intervention. 25 Moreover, the government ginerally per­
mitted foreign loans to finance only a fraction of the total cost 
of proposed projects, loans from commercial banks and bor­
rowing from the curb market both generally had Lo be used to 
finance a proposed project. The interest rate in {act paid by a 
prospective borrower was thus a weighted average of the interest 
rate paid to each lender. As such. it was above the nominal 
interest rate to be paid on foreign loans. 
Nondheless, there undoubtedly was some excessive borrow­
ing, and some resltking resource misallocation, in the late 
1960s. 26 Frank, Kim, and Westphal report that domestic bor­
rowers sharply reduced their demand for foreign loan~s after the 
large and unexpected devaluation of 1971. In their words, 
Interviews with businessmen suggest that ... thee was no expecta­
tion that the exchange rate would change as much as it did during 
the late 1960's. If this is true, the large influx of foreign capital may 
have been due in part to an underestimate of the real private costs 
because of an expectation of a stable exchange rate ... The value of 
the w~n, however, gradually fell between the beginning of 1968 and 
mid-1971, at which time there was a sharp devaluation. Neverthe­
less, during 1968 and 1969, foreign commerical borrowing con­
tinued to grow sharply. !n 1970, however, the demand for foreign 
loans was reduced sharply. Perhaps by 1970, it had become clear to 
businessmen that movement in the value of the wtn was not 
temporary and that the true cost of foreign borrowing was likely to 
be greater than they had originally expected, although government 
ceilings on foreign borrowing may have been chiefly responsible for 
the slow growth of foreign borrowing in 1970. 
in i971 and 1972, also, the demand for foreign commercial borrow­
ing seems to have slackened. According to businessmen interviewed, 
their desire for foreign loans was curbed by the devaluatifn of June 
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1971 and by the reintroduction of the rapidly sliding peg in early
7 
1972.21 
Although borrowing in the late 1960s almost certainly exceeded 
the optimal level, it is difficult to believe that the low private 
real rate of interest caused quantitatively significant distortions 
within the economy. First, as pointed out by Frank, Kim, and 
Westphal, the exchange rate began depreciating in 1968. Second, 
the government rationed credit and did so in accordance with 
export periormance. Third, insofar as credit rationing dis­
criminated against any industries within Koret, it was against 
domestic-machinery and capital-equipment industries. But those 
industries, during the time when the ral foreign interest rate 
was distorted, were not usually industries in which Korea 
appeared to have a comparative advantage. Fourth, as the 
Westphal-Kim and Hong data on factor intensity indicate, 
exports were concentrated in labor-intensive industries-the 
ones permitted to borrow abroad. Finally, part of the value of 
the implicit credit subsidization was included in the Westphal-
Kim estimates of effective subsidies reported above. The fact 
that the range of effective subsidies seems fairly moderate is 
further reflection of the fact that foreign borrowing, although 
potentially dangerous, was sufficiently contained by credit 
rationing so that, while above the optimum, it probably did not 
constitute a major distortion in resource allocation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Economists' prescriptions for optimal resource allocation are 
never exactly met in reality, and judgment must always be used 
in assessing the extent to which misallocations result in signifi­
cant losses. In the Korean case, there is ample evidence on 
which to base the conclusion that large and significant inef­
ficiencies in the trade-and-payments regime stemmed from the 
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currency overvaluation and multiple exchange-rate practices of 
the 1950s. The exchange-rate regime was sufficiently unrealistic 
and chaotic so that important losses resulted and these were the 
most significant source of misallocation in the 1950s. 
In terms of the industries that developed during the 1950s, 
however, the evidence suggests that rcsCurcc misallocation, while 
substantial, was not as large a, that which seems to have accom­
panied import-substitution drives in some other countries. To be 
sure, growth seems to have faltervd in the late 1950s as the 
''easy" import-substitution wasstage over, and that hesitation 
may be credited as a cost of the inport-substitution policies. 
Nonetheless, insufficient time had elapsed for Korea to develop 
the entire range of intermediate-goods and capital-goods indus­
tries that would have made the transition to the 1960s much 
more difficult. It was thus the inefficiency of the trade-and­
payments regime more than the inefficiency of tle import­
substitution policies that in part accounted for the significant 
misallocations of the 1950s. 
With regard to aid, some of the contributions at the micro­
economic level were fundamental-education and land reform 
among them. Moreover, given the importance of aid in financ­
ing the import bill, it is difficult to disassociate aid allocations 
from the overal! allocation of resources within the Korean 
economy of the 1950s. Aid was sufficiently sizable that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to assess its role in microeconomic 
terms. The aid role, at the ,.acrocconomic level, is discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
As for the 1960s and early 1970s, all the evidence points to 
the conclusion that the trade-and-payments regime, and the 
export-promotio:1 policies of that er,, were considerably more 
efficient in microcconoinic terms than the policies of the 1950s. 
To be sure, effective subsidies did depart from uniformity, which 
is the economist's prescription for optimal resource allocation. 
Nonetheless, the range of variation in incentives for production 
of different commodities appears to have been reasonably nar­
row, as much discrimination was really between domestic and 
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foreign sales, regardless of the nature of the commodity. If 
there is an identifiable source of resource misallocation in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, it probably lies in the credit ration­
ing and interest rate subsidization policies that were increasingly, 
as time progressed, relied upo, to encourage exports. The 
available evidence is not sufficient to enable a definitive conclu­
sion with regard to the probable quantitative importance of 
those subsidies, but it would appear that, at least until 1975, 
those policies did not result in significant costly misallocation. 
This same conclusion applies to foreign borrowing, which 
probably was excessive in the late 1960s, owing to the low real 
interest rate paid by domestic borrowers; the quantitative 
importance of the excess was probably not large. The overall 
verdict must be that the Korean export-promotion strategy of 
the late 1960s vwas generally based on relatively efficient pat­
terns of resource allocation, and broadly reflected Korea's com­
parative advantage. 
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MacroeconomicEffects of Trade and Aid 
Any distinction between macro- and microeconomic aspects of 
growth is tenuous, and never more so than in the case of Korea. 
Growth itself is a macroeconomic variable, but who can doubt 
that improved microeconomic efficiency, as discussed in Chapter 
5, was a major contributor to the increased growth rate of the 
1960s? Thus, the topics already discussed in earlier chapters have 
had significant macroeconomic effects and are not dealt with 
again here. Focus instead is on the more traditional macro­
economic variables-components of GNP, and growth rates. 
There are three major avenues through which trade, the pay­
ments regime, and aid affected macroeconomic performance. 
First, there is the contribution of aid, and later capital inflows, 
to the total resources available for capital accumulation. A 
second major impact of the trade-and-payments regime, espe­
cially after the policy reforms of the early 1960s, was the effect 
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rapid growth of exports had on the domestic economy. Third 
and finally, there is the impact of the trade straitegy, and 
esp rial!y the growth of exports, on employment. These three 
as~tcts are treated in turn here. A final section attempts an 
overall assessment of the contribution of trade, aid, and capital 
flows to Korea's growth. 
AID AND CAPITAL FLOWS
 
AS A SOURCE OF SAVING
 
Table 52 gives data on domestic and foreign saving for the 
period 1954 to 1975. The data virtually speak for themselves: 
net borrowing was negligible in the 1950s, and transfers con­
sisted almost exclusively of aid. Aid contributed more than half 
the total resources available for capital accumulation in every 
year from 1955 to 1962, and in some years its contribution was 
substantially more than that. Indeed, in 1956, net transfers from 
abroad exceeded total saving, as government dissaving more 
thn offset private domestic saving. The relative importance of 
aid began declining rapidly after 1962,' although net transfers 
still exceeded 40 percent of total saving in 1965. Thereafter, 
they declined rapidly in importance, dropping below 25 percent 
of total saving in 1966 and 10 percent in 1971. However, except 
by the standards of the earlier contribution of aid to savings in 
Korea, net transfers constituted a significant augmentation of 
total resources available for savings at least through 1970. 
Indeed, with gross investment equal to 24.8 percent of GNP in 
1970, net transfers, which constituted 35 percent of total 
savings, still equaled almost 2 percent of Korean GNP; in the 
1950s, of course, the figure had exceeded 10 percent. 2 Even in 
1975, foreign saving financed investments equal to 10 percent 
of GNP, although most of that came from foreign loans. 
These orders of magnitude are, by themselves, sufficient to 
indicate the importance of aid. First, in regard to the 1950s, a 
number of observations are in order. In the absence of aid, it is 
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TABLE 52 Domestic and Foreign Saving, 1954-1975 
Domestic Saving 
Private Government 
ForeignSaving 
Net Net 
Transfers Borrowing 
Total 
Savingb 
Percentages 
Foreign Gros. 
Saving of Investment 
Total to GNP 
1954 
1955 
1956 
6.06 
8.37 
2.35 
-1.80 
-2.69 
-4.42 
billionsof won 
2.82 
6.49 
17.62 
0.70 
1.64 
-1.14 
7.78 
13.81 
14.41 
Saving 
45.2 
58.9 
114.4 
11.1 
11.1 
8.5 
1957 
1958 
16.94 
16.70 
-6.01 
-6.43 
19.24 
18.65 
0.09 
-2.19 
30.26 
26.73 
63.9 
61.6 
13.9 
12.0 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
14.60 
8.55 
16.88 
10.34 
31.81 
48.39 
46.48 
93.37 
99.96 
117.71 
-5.94 
-5.01 
-5.30 
-4.86 
-1.32 
3.55 
14.02 
29.08 
51.85 
100.61 
15.89 
22.06 
29.51 
30.73 
33.73 
44.03 
53.95 
59.58 
60.94 
62.54 
-0.83 
-1.07 
-4.22 
7.22 
18.63 
5.10 
-2.42 
28.05 
51.92 
121.79 
23.72 
26.80 
38.79 
45.47 
90.26 
102.24 
121.98 
224.48 
280.97 
427.87 
63.5 
78.3 
65.2 
83.4 
58.0 
48.1 
42.2 
39.0 
40.2 
43.1 
10.0 
10.0 
12.0 
11.8 
16.7 
13.6 
14.2 
20.0 
20.3 
24.0 
TABLE 52 (continued) 
Domestic Saving 
Private Government 
ForeignSaving 
Net Net 
Total 
Savingb 
Percentages 
Foreign Gross 
Transfers Borrowing Saving of Investment 
Total to GNP 
billions of won Saving 
1969 235.63 129.55 70.86 158.16 620.70 26.9 26.9 
1970 243.20 180.00 55.96 193.35 704.66 35.4 24.8 
1971 268.17 190.10 59.32 294.68 805.35 44.0 23.0 
1972 427.74 149.51 66.71 148.32 805.48 26.7 19.8 
1973 864.68 225.09 75.74 123.18 1292.29 15.4 25.2 
1974 1099.90 202.98 90.37 827.35 2125.88 43.2 27.6 
1975 a 1299.57 336.61 106.48 922.01 2459.78 41.8 24.4 
Source: BOK, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1974, pp. 300-301, 1976, pp. 300-301. 
Notes: aAll 1975 data are preliminary.
bFigures do not sum tc total due to statistical discrepancy. 
:ro:conoric Effects 
clear that, if domestic saving had not altered, net investment 
would probably have been negative in several years. While it is 
true that depreciation rates were undoubtedly very low in the 
immediate post-war years, replacement investment nonetheless 
would have required some resources. Domestic savings as a 
percentage of GNP were 6.1, 4.6, minus 5.0, plus 4.6, and 3.6 
percent in the years from 1954 to 1959, respectively. While 
these rates might have been adequate to maintain capital stock, 
such maintenan ce was from a war-torn base, and certainly 
would not have been sufficient to keep per capita incomes 
constant. 
It follows, therefore, that, given domestic savings rates, aid 
flows in the 1950s were necessary in order to permit such 
economic growth and recovery as took place. By and large, that 
conclusion hold,- even if one takes into account the fact that 
domestic savings would probably have increased somewhat had 
aid flows been significantly reduced. As inspection of ''able 52 
shows, government saving was negative throughout the 1950s, 
and continued so until 1964. Such a large deficit would 
probably have been politically intolerable (and unsustainable. 
depending as it did upon the availability of foreign aid for its 
financing) in the absence of aid flows, or even in the presence 
of significantly smaller ones. 
Part of the reason for this was pointed out by Cole and 
Lyman: 
Thus, in Rhee's time, the Yorean government followed a set of 
policies that clearly kept the internal and external financial gaps 
wide open to facilitate finzincial and real-resource transfers from 
abroad and to help justify the need for more aid. These policies con­
sisted of an overvalued exchange rate, relatively low tariffs on 
imports, no efforts to encourage exports, a deficit budget financed 
by borrowing from the Central Bank when taxes and aid-generated 
revenues were insufficient, Central Bank financing of commercial 
bank credit to the private sector, and low interest rates that 
assured excess demand for credit. 
3 
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It is impossible to estimate what would have happened if 
economic aid had been granted in a manner that gave the 
government inccntives for eliminating its own deficit and 
encouraging private saving. Several considerations point to the 
conclusion that, at least through 1957 or 1958, even the best of 
policies with the benefit of hindsight would have made aid the 
major source of resource for capital formation. First, if one 
considers the low per capita incomes of the immediate post­
war period, it is apparent that appropriate real interest rate 
policy could not have induced a higher private saving rate as a 
fraction of income than was observed in the mid-1960s when 
income levels were higher and interest rate policy altered; in 
1965, private savings were 5.4 percent of GNP, and in 1966, 
they were 8.3 percent. The latter number is surely an upper­
bound estimate (given lower per capita incomes) of what 
private saviigs rate could have bean achieved; if the government 
had simply balanced its budget, it would have performed well. 
The conclusion that aid was essential to generate any growth in 
per capita incomes follows immediately. And, if a 7-8 percent 
savings rate is the best that Korea could conceivably have done, 
aid in excess of 5 percent of GNP was probably necessary to 
insure a minimal rate of growth of per capita income. However, 
once aid levels were of that magnitude, it is difficult to imagine 
that there would not be, dirc.ctly or indirectly, some con­
sequent disincentives for domenstic saving, requiring an even 
higher aid inflow. 
Thus, while there was undoibtedly some avoidable reduction 
in the domestic savings rate as i consequence of the large aid 
inflows and the policies surrounc.ing them, it seems reasonable 
to conclude that large aid inflows were essential, in any event, 
in the immediate post-war period and that, in their absence, per 
capita income would have stagnated, if not declined. Had 
domestic policies regarding savings incentives and the govern­
ment budget been altered, the realized rate of economic growth 
probably could have been higher than was in fact the case. To 
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conclude that, however, is not to minimize the crucial role of 
aid in the post-war icconstruction period. 
As to the 1960s and early 1970s, the diminishing relative 
importance of aid has already been noted. Before borrowing is 
considered, however, one contribution of aid in the 1950s to 
growth in thci 196 0s must be noted: Korea emerged from the 
1950s virtually debt free and without any debt-servicing obliga­
tions. Had aid in the 1950s been in the form of loans, rather 
than grants, the prospects for growth ill the 1960s would have 
been significantly diminished, or, alternatively, the same volume 
of commercial borrowing in the I 96 0s would have provided far 
smaller net resources for growth. A simple underestimate of the 
order of magnitude suffices to illustrate the importance fo 
these considerationls. Cumulative U.S. aid from 1954 to 1963 
(from Tables 18 and 30) was S2,369 million. if a grace period 
until 1964 had been extended on all grant aid in the 1950s, and 
a conccssiona.-y interest rate of only 3 percent had been 
charged, the interest obligation in 1964 would have been S71 
million, or 60 percent of exp'orts in that year. An interest rate 
of 3 percent is probably too low and, had there been interest 
obligations accruing in earlier years, the debt would have been 
bigger. But one need not -,tenipt to refine the estimate, for it 
is difficult to imagine Korea having been s'ifficieitly credit­
worthy to enter international capital markets as she did in the 
late 1960s if a debt of even S2.4 billion had already been 
incurred. Counterfactual historical experiments are always 
troublesome. but the importance of Korea's debt-free status in 
the 1960s should not be underestimated as a contributor to 
growth during the decade after 1965. 
This impression is confirmed by the figures on net borrowing 
and their contribution to foreign saving during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. As Table 52 shows, net borrowing exceeded 
net transfers starting in 1968, and, by 1970, it was almost three 
times as large.4 Frank, Kim, and Westphal attempted to esti­
mate the contribution of foreign savings to growth during the 
latter part of the 1960s. Two different techniques of estimation 
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were used. First, they noted that foreign savings had fluctuatd 
at around 10 percent of GNP over the 1960-1970 decade. 
Taking the gross capitai-uutput ratio of 2.5 which prevailed oer 
that period, they concluded that about 4 percentage points of 
Korea's growth rate could be attributed to foreign savings. As a 
check on this rough calculation, they estimated an ordinary 
least squares estimate of real non-agricultural GNP on previous 
year's non-agricultural GNP and previous year's real investment. 
The results are in Table 53. The e.Jimated increment in GNP 
over what would have been realized in the absence of foreign 
TABLE 53 Growth Rate and Foreign Savings 
(billions of won) 
Actual 1971 GNP 3,151 
Estimated 1971 GNP without foreign 
savings, 1966 to 1970 2,760 
Estimated 1971 GNP without foreign 
borrowing, 1966 to 1970 2,925 
Estimated 1971 GNP without foreign 
commercial borrowing, 1966 to 1970 3,023 
Source: Frank, Kim, and Westphal, p. 107. 
savings was about 12 percent. When they applied their regres­
sion to the 1960s as a whole, the estimate was that about 
one-third of GNP could be attributed to foreign saving. This 
econometric result implied a rising incr-,' ental capital-output 
rQo. For this reason, foreign savings in earlier years made 
a larger contribution to GNP than foreign savings in later 
years. Consequently, the relative contribution of aid, even 
in the 1960s, appears greater than simple comparison of trans­
fers and borrowing indicates, since aid was concentrated in the 
earlier part of the decade.' 
As the data in Table 52 indicate, domestic savings were rising 
as a fraction of total savings after 1964. For this reason alone, 
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foreign savings would have been less important in later than in 
earlier years, especially since the ratio of investment to GNP was 
also increasing rapidly. Nonetheless, as is evident, the domestic 
savings rate, even in 1974 and 1975, was still only about 15 
1,s -zent. Foreign savings continued, therefore, to make an 
important contribution at the margin to gross capital formation. 
Overall, then, aid, virtually the only source of forcign savings 
in the 1950s, was essential during that decade if there was to be 
any significant growth in per capita real GNP. By the I960s, that 
role was diminishing, although it was still as large as in most 
other aid-receiviig countries. By the late 1960s, commercial 
borrowing, was replacing aid as the cl;ief form of foreign savings, 
while the domestic savings rate wi s rising sharply. Whether 
commercial borrowing could have contributed anywhere near 
what it in fact did, had aid earlier I cen in the form of loans 
rather than grants, is extremely doubtf ,1.Whereas the aid of the 
1950s constituted thle bulk of availabIle resources for capital 
formation, the foreign savings of the la(( 1960s and early 1970s 
were really a supplcecnLt tu dumestic savings, but one that was 
critical to permit the high rate of growth that Korea actually 
enjoyed in those years. 
CONTRIBUTION OF EXPORTS TO GROWTH 
Whereas it is relatively straightforward to estimate the fraction 
foreign resources constituted of total saving, and thus infer with 
some quantitative precision their relative importance in the 
growth process, any attempt to estimate the contribution of 
export growth to overall growth is extremely difficult and con­
jectural. One can, Of course, do a straightforward "accounting" 
of the increment of GNP, and attention will turn to that below. 
Such an accounting, however, misses a number of intangibles 
which may be of great importance. 
To turn to some of the more obvious considerations, there is 
the already-mentioned fact that the export-promotion strategy 
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resulted in a vastly improved resource allocation. This improve­
ment certainly increased the growth rate, but that contribution 
cannot be measured by growth accounting. Second, there is the 
fact that the foreign savings, which originated through com­
mercial borrowing in the late 1960s and early 1970s, would not 
have been available had export earnings not been growing. To a 
certain extent, therefore, export growth mtst be credited with 
providing an environment within which Korea was a com­
mercially credit-worthy borrower. Third, there are also such 
intangibles as the contact that exporters had with the inter­
national market, which may have enabled them to achieve more 
rapid increases in productivity and quality control than would 
have been possible in the absence of the export orientation. 
Fourth, it is difficult, if not impossible, to assess the importance 
of the competition Korean exporters faced in the ,.ternational 
market. It is likely that domestic gains in productivity were 
more rapid than they would have tcen in the absence of the 
export-oriented strategy. indeed, the export trtist of policy was 
sufficiently pervasive that it would be difficult to find any 
aspect of the Korean economy whose performance was not 
affected by it.6 
Along a different line, it is apparent that the dictates of an 
export-promotion strategy placed certain constraints on eco­
nomic policy. The low mean and variance in effective protection 
and effective subsidy rates is one such example: the need to 
maintain a realistic exchange rate undoubtedly constrained 
policy-makers. 
It is impossible directly to measure these, and other, intan­
gible effects. What is evident is that the I950s witnessed at best 
a 5 percent rate of growth of real GNP, and even that rate 
dropped off sharply once easy opportunities for import sub­
stitution had been exhausted and after aid flows leveled off. In 
the 1960s rapid growth of exports was accompanied by very 
rapid growth of GNP. To be sure, there were numerous pre­
conditions, such as an educated productive labor force, required 
to enable the successful growth performance. Nonetheless, it is 
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noteworthy that rapid growth was occurring against the back­
drop of diminishing levels of foreign aid: export growth had to 
provide foreign-exchange earnings not only for additional 
imports, but to replace those which had previously been 
financed by foreign aid.7 
To turn, then, to the "accounting" measures, the Westphal-
Kim estimates Of th contribution of exports and import 
substitutes to growth continue only through 1968. Their 
findings for the period through 1966 were reportcd in Chapter 
3. For 1966 to 1968, they estimated the percentage contribu­
tions as given in Table 54.' While these estimates confirm other 
TABLE 54 	 Estimated Percentage Contribution of Exports 
& Import Substitutes, 1966-1.968 
Total Direct Contribution 
Cottribution To Manufacturing Growth 
Export Expansion 21.3 13.0 
Import Substitution -6.6 -0.1 
impressions as to the relative importance of import substitution 
and export expansion in contributing to growth, they also point 
to the fact that, for the entire period 1955 to 1968, Westphal-
Kim find that domestic demand expansion contributed virtually 
four-fifths of the total growth in output.' 
For later years, two sets of estimates are available. The first 
was made by Wontack Hong. Using national accounts data at 
1970 prices, lie simply took the ratio of die increment in various 
magnitudes relative to the increment in GNP. His results, 
updated to 1975, are presented in Table 55. The first column 
links the increment in exports to the increment in GNP. As can 
be seen, that ratio rose from its levels of the mid-1 960s to a 
high of 75 percent in 1972, and remained at very high levels 
except for 1974. When attention turns to net exports (see Table 
36), the orders of magnitude are smaller, naturally, although the 
same time trend is evident. The fact that net exports in 1974 
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showed an increase over 1973, while gross exports (in 1970 
prices) declined, reflects the fact that, in 1974 (and again in 
1975), the ratio of net exports to gross exports increased. 
TABLE 55 Direct Contribution of Export Expansion 
to GNP Growth, 1963-1975 
(%contribution to increase in GNP) 
Increase in 
Increase in Increasein Increase in Value Added of 
Exports Net Exports Manufacturing ManufacturedExports 
1963 11 - 23 
1964 11 1! 8 3 
1965 21 17 41 7 
1966 15 -3 20 5 
1967 16 7 42 5 
1968 17 7 36 5 
1969 16 9 26 4 
1970 30 16 46 8 
1971 24 12 42 8 
1972 75 55 53 27 
1973 65 29 47 17 
1974 -8 6 57 n.a. 
1975 54 41 49 n.a. 
Source: Wontack Hong, FactorSupply, Table 6.4. 
Note: Hong based his computations on the 1970 dollar value of the aggregation.
Estimates for 1974 and 1975 are based on 1970 won values from the BOK, Economic 
Statistics Yearbook, 1976. Data for 1975 are preliminary. 
If the data on net exports can be relied upon as an indicator of 
the trend in the contribution of export expansion to GNP, 
these numbers can be linked with the Westphal-Kim estimates 
for 1966 to 1968. From TaLle 55, it is apparent that the 
increase in net exports averaged 4 percent of GNP for 1966 to 
1968. For that time span, Westphal-Kim show a total contribu­
tion, direct plus indirect, of 21 percent. if the same ratio held 
for 1970 and 1971, it would imply a total contribution, direct 
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plus indirect, of net exports to growth of about 60 percent. For 
1972 and 1973, the numbers would be even higher. 
The second estimate is from Suk Tai Suh. His estimates 
pertain to the direct contribution of exports only. They are 
reproduced in Table 56. As can be seen, Suh's data also show an 
increasingly large contribution of exports to growth in the early 
1970s-23. 6 percent of growth for the 1970-1973 period. For 
light manufacturing, the contribution was cveii greater -in excess 
of 40 percent. Compared with data on the contiibution of 
trade to growth for other countries, these figures are very large. 
TABLE 56 Suh's Estimates of the Direct Contribution of 
Exports, Import Substitution, and Domestic 
Demand to Growth 
(%of total growth) 
1960- 1963- 1966- 1968- 1970­
1963 1966 1968 1970 1973
 
Total Growth 
Import Substitution -2.0 1.7 2.8 0.6 -5.2 
Domestic Demand 99.0 89.0 87.8 91.9 81.6 
Exports 3.0 9.3 9.4 7.5 23.6 
Light Manufacturing 
Import Substitution 6.8 -2.6 -3.3 7.1 -3.9 
Domestic Demand 88.7 84.6 84.8 73.9 63.0 
Exports 4.5 17.9 18.4 19.0 40.9 
Source: 	Suk Tai Suh, "Import Substitution and Economic Development in Korea," 
KDI Working Paper 7519, (1975), Table 5-17. 
All of these pieces of information point to the importance of 
export growth as a sourcL of GNP growt,. One further question 
remains: Can anything be said about the extent to which the 
rate of export growth was, in any sense, optimal? There is 
already the microcconomic evidence presented in Chapter 5, 
which indicates that it was fairly close to being so. An alterna­
tive approach, using simulation techniques, was employed by 
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Frank, Kim, and Westphal. They examined, not export levels 
per se, bui: rather the extent to which the exchange rate and 
other commercial policy variables were optimal. In doing this, 
they first estimated economctrically the behavioral determinants 
of exports, GNP, and other macroeconomic variables. They 
then used those estimated equations to simulate changes in 
policy variables, .rch as the ex:change rate, the height of tariffs, 
and so on, to ascertain the effects of those alterations upon real 
GNP.' 0 
Their main findings centered around the possibility that, had 
the Korean government had a slightly higher level of tariffs and 
lower export subsidies, government savings might hav - increased, 
thereby enabling more rapid growth. This finding supports the 
conclusion reached above with respect to the importance of 
foreign savings in permitting rapid growth in Korea, since it 
points to savings as a critical constraint on the rate of growth. 
With respect to other aspects of commercial policy, Frank, Kim, 
and Westphal concluded: 
The experiments also support the view that the 1965 exchange rate 
was ,n equilibrium rate in the sense that all subsidies and tariffs 
could have been eliminated and the same historical growth still 
achieved ... Our experiments show that the optimal "pure" exchange 
rate is slightly higher than the actual (about 102 percent of the 
historical) and is combined with more expansionary monetary and 
fiscal policies. if subsidies and taxes on exports and imports are 
combined with exchange rate policy, the optimal rate is about equal 
to the historical rate. The optimal rate should be combined, how­
ever, with higher import duties (or fewer exemptions) and roughly 
similar subsidies. I 
This finding tends to support the conclusions emerging from 
analysis of microeconomic data: there is little evidence of any 
significant inefficiency in the Korean push to promote exports. 
On the contrary, it would appear that exports contributed 
significantly to the growth rate of GNP, but that any higher 
growth of exports would have been at the expense of GNP 
growth. While there are always ways in which one can, with 
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hindsight, find improvements that might have been made in 
policy variables, it i,3 difficult to point with any certainty to any 
major changes in Korean economic policies with respect to 
the trade-and-payments regime that cou!d have significantly 
increased the rate of growth of real output. 
RELATIONSHIP OF EXPORTS
 
AND EMP!.OYMIPNT GROWTH
 
One of the remarkable fcatures about the altered performance 
of the Korear economy after the e'xport-promotion drive started 
compared to its earlier behavior is the rapid growth of non­
agricultural employment opportunities. Table 57 gives the basic 
data oil growth of the population and employment. It is 
estimated that, in the early 1960s, unemployment reached 8.3 
percent of the labor force with about 57 percent of tile popula­
tion engaged in farming.' 2 That rate, therefore, was equivalent 
to about 1 7 percent of the non-farm laLor force seeking jobs. As 
Table 57 shows, non-farm employment rose rapidly, more than 
doubling between 1964 and 1975. Whereas farm employment 
exceeded non-farm employment almost 50 percent in 1964, 
non-farm employment was about 30 percent greater than farm 
employment in 1975. 
Moreover, the unemploywient rate fell dramatically, reaching 
a low of 4 percent of the labor foice in 1973. Since by that time 
the population was more than 50 percent non-farm, that rate 
was equivalent to about 7.3 percent of tile non-farm labor 
force. 
In view of the fact that Korea's success with increasing 
employment opportunities contrasts sharply to the experience 
of the majoriy of developing countries where slow employnent 
growth is a major problem, it is natural to investigate the rela­
tionship between employment growth and the export-promotion 
strategy of the 1960s. Of course, to the extent that rapid over­
all growth resulted from export growth, and employment 
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TABLE 57 	 Labor Force Data, 1964-1975 
(1,000s of persons) 
Population Agricultural Manufacturing 
14 and over Employment Employment 
1964 15,052 4,655 637 
1965 15,937 4,603 772 
1966 16,367 4,695 833 
1967 16,764 4,598 1,021 
1968 17,166 4,582 1,176 
1969 17,639 4,687 1,232 
1970 18,253 4,826 1,284 
1971 18,984 4,758 1,336 
1972 19,724 5,110 1,445 
1973 20,438 5,260 1,774 
1974 21,148 5,304 2,012 
1975 21,833 5,123 2,205 
Source: BOK, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1976, Table 135. 
Total 

Non-Farm 

Employment 

3,144 
3,603 
3,728 
4,119 
4,573 
4,727 
4,919 
5,308 
5,449 
5,879 
6,282 
6,707 
Total 
Employment 
7,799 
8,206 
8,423 
8,717 
9,155 
9,414 
9,745 
10,066 
10,559 
11,139 
11,586 
11,830 
Unemployed 
Number % of 
Labor Force 
650 7.7 tI 
653 7.4 
648 7.1 
578 6.2 
492 	 5.1 
474 4.8
 
454 4.5
 
476 4.5
 
499 4.5
 
461 4.0
 
494 4.1
 
510 4.1
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opportunities grew rapidly because the economy grew rapidly, 
one can in any event attribute employment growth to the 
export-promotion strategy. Nonetheless, it is worth,,ile to 
inquire how much of the increment in non-farm, and especially 
manufacturing, employment is directly and indirecily attrib­
utable to the demands generated by the export sector. 
It has already been seen that manufacturing exports became 
increasingly labor-intensive over the period 1960 to 1968. This 
was the result of two interdependent factors: 1) there was a 
shift in the commodity composition of exports toward labor­
intensive commodities; and 2) thk real wage appears to have 
remained relatively constant during the early years of rapid 
growth of manufacturing. 13 This enabled the upward shift in the 
demand for labor to be reflected in increasing employment 
opportunities, rather than in rising real wages for those already 
employed. The more rapid rate of increase in real wages after 
1966 was primarily a consequence of market forces, reflecting 
the fact that unemployment had diminished and wages had to 
rise to attract additional workers. Once wages began rising, it is 
not surprising that the incremental capital-output ratio, in 
export industries as in others, began rising, as reflected in the 
capital-labor ratios discussed in Chapter 5. 
Against this background, it is of interest to examine estimates 
of the contribution of exports to employment growth. Two such 
sets of estimates have been made. On one hand, Watanabe 14 
relied upon sample-survey data in order to attempt to differen­
tiate between exporting and domestic-market activities within 
industries. His estimates are for 1969 only. Or the other hand, 
Cole and Westphal 1 relied upon input-output data to derive 
estimates of the direct and indirect employment generated by 
exports, and to provide comparable estimates for 1960, 1963, 
1966, and 1970.
 
Each of these methods has advantages and drawbacks. The 
sample-survey method is especially weak when it comes to 
estimating indirect effects. The input-output method is distinctly 
superior in estimating indirect employment effects of exports, 
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but is less satisfactory for distinguishing between labor employed 
within an industry to produce for the domestic market, and 
labor employed to produce export commodities. ,6 Despite their 
differences, the two methods of estimation yield very similar 
figures for cotal employment ottributable to manufacturing for 
the one year that both estimates are available. "7Because of this, 
and the fact that the Cole-Westphal estimates cover more years, 
only their results are considered here. Table 58 gives their basic 
results. 
TABLE 58 Estimated Employment Attributable to Exports, 
1960, 1963, 1966, 1970
 
(1,000s of workers and %) 
1960 1963 1966 1970
 
Primary Sectors 
Direct Employment in Exports 128 71 75 108 
Total Employment Due to All Exports 214 181 237 279 
% of Primary Employment 3.4 2.7 4.4 5.0 
Manufacturing 
Direct Employment in Exports 12 23 113 225 
Total Employment in Exports 26 46 172 348 
% of Manufacturing Employment 5.0 6.4 16.5 22.5 
All Sectors 
Direct Employment in Exports 183 134 274 475 
Total Employment in Exports 302 290 585 941 
% of Total Employment 3.7 3.3 6.7 8.9 
Source: Cole and Westphal, "The Contribution of Exports", p. S4. 
Note: Cole and Westpha; provide two sets of estimates for 1966 and 1970, but only 
one for 1960 and 1963. To maintain comparability, only the set available for all years 
is reproduced here. 
The most significant impact of exports on employment is 
clearly within the manufacturing sector, where Cole and West­
phal estimate that the number of jobs directly attributable to 
manufactured exports rose from 12,000 in 1960 to 225,000 in 
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1970, while total employment due to exports rose from 
26,000 to 348,000. This represented an increase from 5 percent 
of total manufacturing employment in 1960 to 22.5 percent in 
1970. Presumably, this figure rose even higher with the export 
boom of the early 1970s. 
For the economy as a whole, approximately 9 percent of all 
jobs were attributable to exports ia 1970, compared to less than 
4 percent in 1960. That 9 percent of all jobs are export-related 
may not seem startling at first glance, but it is much more 
impressive when it is recalled that the increase in export-related 
employment was greater than the decrease in unemployment in 
the period in question. 
There arc, of course, difficulties in attributing a particular 
fraction of employment growth to export growth. Had exports 
not expanded as rapidly, it is likely that job opportunities 
would have been created elsewhere in the economy. Moreover, 
employment growth itself was a function of the behavior of the 
real wage and not simply of exports. Indeed, had the real wage 
risen rapidly with the beginning of the export boom, the boom 
itself might have been thwarted, since the Korean comparative 
advantage in labor-intensive commodities might not have been 
reflected in wage costs. 
Nonetheless, it seems clear that rapid export growth con­
tributed significantly to expanding employment opportunities 
throughout the years of th.- export-promotion strategy. In 
addition to that direct eff"ect, there was the contribution 
provided by foreign savings, in the form of enabling more invest­
ment and more jobs, and the contribution of more rapid growth, 
part of which can be attributed to export growth. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Techniques are not available for estimating the "true" con-ribu­
tion of the export-oriented growth strategy to Korea's rapid 
growth during the 1960s and early 1970s. A "true" estimate 
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would entail the specification of an alternative growth path over 
those years, and an estimate of what would have happened 
under an alternative strategy. 
In a sense, though, pointing to wht would be required for an 
accurate assessment of the role of the trade-and-payments regime 
to the Korean economy highlights an important aspect of that 
role: the interrelationships between the export orientation of 
the economy and virtually every other economic variable are so 
close and so complex that the question is largely unanswerable. 
Korea adopted an export-promotion strategy in 1960. There­
after, her growth rate increased markedly. Other reforms were 
undertaken which were probably essential to the continued 
success of the export drive. Certain necessary conditions in the 
domestic economy were also met, including thc availability of 
an industrious and literate labor force and the willingness of the 
government to allow market forces to determine the wage. 
Initial success led to more rapid export growth, and more rapid 
growth of GNP. That, in turn, led to further rapid export 
growth. The commitment of the government to the export 
strategy was so complete that virtually all policies were scruti­
nized and considered in light of their implications for the export 
drive. 
Description of what happened, however, does not necessarily 
imply causation. Yet attempts to estimate causation by quanti­
fying the macroeconomic contribution of the trade-and-pay­
ments regime, aid, and capital flows leave the inescapable 
impression that some important attributes of each are not 
captured. Even so, foreign savings and the export drive have 
each been crucially important by these measures. 
The role of foreign savings in permitting larger gross capital 
formation than would otherwise have occurred has been of great 
importance throughout the thirty years of Korean moderniza­
tion. While foreign savings, in the form of aid in the 1950s, were 
the predominant source of resources for investment, their role 
continued significant in permitting a very high growth rate right 
until the end of the thirty-year period of modernization. 
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Obviously, in the 1970s Korea could have sustained a positive 
rate of growth in the absencc of a capital inflow, but foreign 
savings permitted a much higher growth rate than would other­
wise have been possible. That role was different from the role 
in the 1950s, when aid was virtually the only means of obtaining 
impor . And providing resources for capital formation. 
Export growth, of course, did not begin rapidly until after 
1960. Thereafter, it was the most salient characteristic of the 
Korean economy. While its influenc2 was pervasive in many 
intangible ways, quantitative estimates suggest that between 4 
and 8 percentage points of the growth rate were attributable to 
export growth, at least until the early I 970s. F, those years, the 
contribution may have been even greater. Certainly the modern­
ization of Korea would have proceeded much more slowly if 
exports had grown more slowly. Finally, rapid export growth 
"as a significant factor in permitting the rapid growth of 
employment opportunities. 
Whether these quantifiable contributions of trade, aid, and 
capital Pows to Korea's modernization are necessarily their 
most significant contributions is a matter for debate. But, by 
any standard, trade, commercial policy, aid, and capital flows 
have been integrally linked to Korea's fortunes throughout the 
modernization period. 
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Definition of Exchange-Rate Terms
 
It usually happens, especially in contexts of exchange control, that the 
official parity of a country bears little relationship to the actual receipts 
of an exporter or costs of an importer per unit of foreign currency. More­
over, in the context of a rate of inflation significantly different from that 
in the rest of the world, the economically meaningful measures of exchange 
rates in units of local carrency need deflation to render them comparable 
over time. For these ,easons, it is useful to distinguish among the exchange­
rate concepts given below. I 
1. Nominal exchange rate: The official parity for a transaction. For 
countries maintaining a single exchange rate registered with the Inter­
national Monetary Fund, the nominal exchange rate is the reg'stered rate. 
2. Efjective exchange rate (EER): The number of units of local currency 
actually paid or received for a one-dollar international transaction. Sur­
charges, tariffs, the implicit interest foregone on guarantee deposits, and 
any other charges against purchases of goods and services abroad are 
included, as are rebates, the value of import replenishment rights, and 
other incentives to earn foreign exchange for sales of goods and services 
abroad.
 
3. Price-level-deflated (PLD) nominal exchange rates: The nominal 
exchange rate deflated in relation to some base period by the price I:vel 
index of the country. 
4. Price-level-deflated EER (PLD-EER): The EER deflated by the price 
level index of the country. 
5. Purchasing-power-parityadjusted exchange rates: The relevant (nom­
inal or effective) exchange rate multiplied Sy the ratio of the foreign price 
level to the domestic price level. 
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Appendix B 
Important Datesfor Trade and Aid 
September 1945: 
1947: 
June 1947: 
August 1948: 
January 1949: 
June 1950: 

July 1953: 

December 1953: 

August 1955: 

1958-1959: 

April 1960: 

January 1961: 

February 1961: 

May 1961: 

June 1961: 
January 1963: 
October 1963: 
May 1964: 
March 1965: 

1965: 

September 1965: 

in Korea'sModernizatio. 
U.S. Military Government installed in Korea. 
First stage of land reform.
 
Chosen Exchange Bank established to facilitate private
 
foreign trade.
 
Transfer of authority from U.S. Military Government
 
to the Republic of Korea. 
U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration begins 
functions. 
Beginning of war between North and South Korea. 
Korean War Armistice signed. 
W~n officially devalued from 6 to 18 per dollar. 
W~n officially devalued to 50 per dollar. 
Stabilization program cuts growth of real output. 
President Rhee resigns. 
Devaluation of w~n from 65 to 100 per U.S. dollar. 
Devaluation of w~n from 100 to 130 per U.S. dollar. 
Military coup from which General Park emerges as head 
of ruling junta. 
Unification of multiple exchange-rate system. 
Return to multiple exchange rates. 
Elections after which General Park is elected President 
by National Assembly. 
Devaluation from 130 to 257 w~n to the dollar; fluc­
tuating exchange rates.
 
Reunification of multiple exchange rates.
 
Normalization of relations with Japan.
 
Interest rate reform.
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July 1967: Reform of the import control system from positive-list 
to negative-list system. 
1967: Tariff reform. 
June 1971: Devaluation from 326 to 370 w~n to the dollar; 
exchange rate pegged. 
June 1972: Exchange rate pegged at 400 per dollar after controlhed 
upward floating. 
Fall 1973: Oil price increases. 
December 1974: W~n devalued to 484 per dollar. 
July 1975: Shift from duty exemption to drawback system for 
exports. 
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ONE The 1945-1953 Period 
1. The basic source of these data is Ch5sen S5tokufu, Chtsen S~tokufu 
t~kei nenp5, and H. Ouchi, ed., Nihon keizai tokeishii, (Tokyo, 1958). 
They are presented in Wontack Hong, "Trade, Distortions and Employ­
ment," Statistical Appendix, Tables B.1-B.16, (Seoul, mimeo, 1977). 
In 1936, 52% of gross "commodity production" originated in agriculture, 
5% in forestry, 7% in fisheries, 5% in mining, and 31% in manufacturing. 
According to Hoag's estimates, in value-added terms, about 64% of produc­
tion originated ii agriculture and about 15% in manufacturing in 1936. 
Non-commodity sector output is omitted from the computation. If non­
commodity sector constituted 30% of GNP, agriculture would have 
accounted for about 45% of national income and manufacturing for 
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about 11%. Hong, "Trade, Distortions a..2 Employrent," Chap. 2 and 
Tables B.1-B.2. 
2. Ibid. Manufactures exports from Korea included some re-exports of 
Japanese-made products which amounted to around 5% of total manufac­
tures exports. 
3. Ibid., Table B.8. 
4. Ibid., Table B.5. 
5. The term "Japan proper" refers to Japan itself, Taiwan, and her 
other colonial islands in the Pacific. 
6. Wontack Hong, "Trade, Distortions and Employment." In the years 
1901 to 1905, exports to Japan proper were about 80% of total Korean 
exports, while about two-thirds of all impoit, originated from Japan. The 
fraction of trade with Japan proper was thus high prior to colonial rule, 
although it rose still further during that period. 
7. Korean yen became Korean w~n in 1945. A currency reform on 
February 14, 1953, exchanged 100 w~n for one hwan. A later reform, in 
1961, exchanged one new w5 n for ten hwan. Throughout this study, units 
will always be new won. 
8. Based on Hong's approximation of per capita GNP over the period 
1910 to 1940. See Hong, "Trade, Distortions and Employment," Tables 
B.1.-B.3. 
9. Ibid., Table B.11. 
10. BOK Research Department, Price Statistics Summary (1964), p. 23. 
The index, with 1960 = 1, stood at 0.120 in December 1939 and 0.188 in 
June 1945. This would imply that inflation during World War 11 was 
relatively modest. Indeed, all accounts suggest thar damage during World 
War II was not large relative to that inflicted upon many other countries. 
On a 1960 = 100 base, the price index stood at 0.076 in August 1945 
(which would compare with 0.0018 two months earlier) and 0.331 in 
December 1946. 
11. There does not appear to be a satisfactory commodity breakdown of 
exports for that period. The data for 1949 indicate that 69% of the w~n 
value of exports consisted of food products and 13% inedible crude 
materials. The poportions in 1950 are not significantly different. See 
BOK, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1958, p. 213. 
12. The last U.S. occupation forces were withdrawn in 1949, although 
technical military advisers continued to be supplied to the ROK under 
ECA auspices. 
13. For a description of the incoherence and lack of .oordinati,.n of 
American post-war policy toward Korea, see Gregory Henderson, Korea: 
The Politics of the Vortex, (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), Chap. 5. Until the 
end of 1947, U.S. policy was based on the implicit assumption that 
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reunification would take place. Thereafter, debate centeredthe over 
whether Korea was in any sense vital to U.S. interests. Sea Henderson, 
pp. 148ff 
14. Harold Koh, "The Early History of U.S. Economic Assistance to the 
Republic of Korea, 1955-63," typed, 1975 (p. 2) gives this figure, citing
W. D. Reeve, The Republic of Korea: A Political and Economic Study 
(London, 1963), p. 105. 
15. Apparently, .here had earlier been discussion of a $500 million aid 
program to star; in 1947 that would concentrate on development objec­
tives. This was regarded as part of an overall strategy that would strengthen
South Korea and enable the United States to withdraw its military units, 
and leave South Korea outside the "defense shelf" of tile United States in 
the Pacific. The British withdrawal from Greece and Turkey at hat juncture inspired President Truman's "Point Four" proposal. Huwever,
"President Truman quietly informed the Department of State that lie 
could not go before Congress with two large requests; the Korean long­
term aid progr.n would have to be dropped. After that time, until the 
Korean War, 'our support for Korea tottered along in an unimpressive, 
inadequate, and sporadic fashion.' A decision had been reached: . . . dis­
engagement took place, but the 'gracefulness' was nisAng: without 
requisite aid or defense the Korean policy created by Americans was a leg­
less monster from birth." Henderson, p. 150. 
16. E. A. G. Johnson, .1 nerica~i Imperialism in the Inage of Peer Gynt:
Memoirs of a Professor-Pureaucrat(Minneapolis, 1971), p. 178. Johnson 
was Director of the Korean ECA program after earlier serving in various 
roles in the interim government, including Minister of Commerce. 
17. U.S. Department of State and the Economic Cooperation Administra­
tion. "ECA Recovcry Program for 1950" (mnimeo, Washington, June
 
1949), p. 4.
 
18. General Wedemeyer, among others, strongly expressed this view. See 
Koh, p. 3. 
19. When responsibility for administration of U.S. aid was transferred to
 
ECA, ti,e Republic of Korea and the American 
 government signed the 
ROK-U.S. Agreement on Aid. This agreement was similar to tie ones used 
undet the Marshall Plan and in effect stipulated that the two governments
would achieve a consensus on desirable monetary, fiscal, and balance-of­
payments behavior. This issue already became a bone of contention in 
1949. It is discussed below. 
20. Sung Hwan Ban, Growth Rates of .orean Agriculture 1918-1971, 
(KDI, 1974), pp. 245-250. 
21. Henderson, p. 156. Earlier rentals were generally between 50 and 90% 
of output, although owners supplied purchased inputs and maintenance. 
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These expenses are estimated to have amounted to about 20% of gross out­
put, so that net rentals were probably in the range of 40-70% of output. 
22. For a number of reasons, the occupation forces became identified 
with the earlier colonial Japanese rulers. A very early statement that 
USAMGIK would distribute the land implied that it would not seek 
compensation. USAMGIK consistently underestimated the technical prob­
lems involved in divestiture and even, at one time, contemplat. J retaining 
title to the land to turn over to the Korean government when occupation 
ended. This led to considerable misinterpretation of American intentions, 
which in turn provided the pressure for immediate distribution. For 
further details, see Koh, Chapter 1I. 
23. Henderson, p. 156. 1 ch ngbo = 2.45 acres. 
24. Clyde Mitchell, "Land Reform in Asia, a Cas: Study," (National 
Planning Association Pamphlet 78, 1952), pp. 19-20. 
25. See Rural Development in this series for an in-depth analysis of land 
reform. 
26. Koh, p. 27. 
27. David C. Cole and Princeton N. Lyman, Korean Development, The 
Interplay of Politics and Economics, (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), p. 21. 
28. Henderson, pp. 156-157. 
29. Cole and Lyman, pp. 21-22. 
30. Koh, p. 66. 
31. For greater detail, see in this series Noel F. McGinn, et al. Education 
and Development in Korea. 
32. See in this series Kwang Suk Kim and Michael Roemer, Growth and 
Structural 7"ransfoimntion for a comparison of the real per capita con­
sumption levels of the 1930s with those of 1910 and the period before 
Japanese rule ';egan. 
33. It should not be confused with the United Nations Commission on 
the Unification and Reconstruction of Korea. This Commission, as its 
name implies, was charged with the mission of formulating plans for 
development in the event of reunification of the country. 
34. For a detailed history of UNKRA and its attempts to function during 
the war, see Gene M. Lyons, ?lilitary Policy and Economic Aid: The 
Korean Case, 1950-1953 (Columbus, Ohio, 1961). 
35. John P. Lewis, "Reconstruction and Development in South Korea," 
(National Planning Association, December 1955), Pamplet 94, p. 36. 
36. The issue could be turned around, and all expenditures of an ally to 
assist in defense of territory could be classed as aid. This demonstrates the 
futility of attempting a definition. 
37. It can be argued that the burden of the war effort was not otherwise 
fully shared, but that issue takes us far afield here and relates to 
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the more general and unanswerable question as to how aid should be 
defined. 
38. See Lewis, pp. 39 ff., for more details. 
39. Donald G. Tewksbury, Source Materials on Korean Politics and 
Ideologies, (New York, 1950), pp. 145-46. One of ECA's activities in 
1949-1950 was to sponsor the visits of Arthur Bloomfield and John P. 
Jensen, then both of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to assist in 
the formulation of banking legislatian and the foundation of the Bank of 
Korea. See Koh, Chapter III, and Arthur I. Bloomfield and John P. Jensen, 
"Banking Reform in South Korea" (New York, March 1951). 
40. Devaluation would also have increased the value of counterpart 
funds, which provided yet another reason for reluctance to devalue: more 
counterpart funds meant that the United States had to approve more 
Korean government expenditures. 
41. Frank, Kim, and Westphal, p. 15. 
42. See Appendix A for the definition of effective exchange rate. 
43. Strictly speaking, the appropriate index ought to be a "purchasing­
power-parity" price level deflated effective exchange rate. During the 
period under review, there was an increase in the world price level and also 
that of Korea's major trading partners. However, it was small relatr.e to 
fluctuations in the real exchange rate in Korea. The fact that nominal, and 
not effective, exchange rates are used in Table 8 is probably the more 
serious omission. 
44. See note 42. 
45. Until then, the w~n redemption rate was negotiated separately for 
each advance. Conditions deteriorated so far in the fall of 1952 that the 
South Korean government suspended advances on December 15, advising 
the UNC to redeem its accumulated advances and to buy w~n from the 
Bank of Korea. In return, the flow of petroleum products for civilian use 
was halted. See Frank, Kim, and Westphal, pp. 28-29, 41. 
46. Tungsten, which was the chief mineral export, was exported only 
under government monopoly. 
47. See Frank, Kim, and Westphal for additional details, p. 26 ff. 
48. Ibid., p. 34. 
49. It is hard to estimate how important customs duties were as a source 
of revenue. I was able to locate data only for 1953. In that year, customs 
duties receipts were 351 million w5n, while total internal tax receipts were 
1,745 million w~n. However, BOK borrowings and bonds issued were 
2,723 million w~n. Data are from Wontack Hong, 'Trade, Distortions and 
Employment," Table B.24. 
50. It will be recalled that, even earlier, "trust shipping" had provided 
such a link under the Bank of Korea. 
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TWO Trade and Aid, 1953 to 1960 
1. Analysis of the efficiency of resource allocation under import sub­
stitution is provided in Chapter 5. 
2. See Table 8 above. 
3. See Appendix A for definitions of the various exchange rate measures 
and concepts. 
4. See Appendix A for definitions. 
5. Capital flows, other than aid, were virtually nonexistent. 
6. See pp. 56, 161ff. 
7. In any country with quantitative restrictions, the government allo­
cates foreign exchange among competing import claims. It is not obvious 
why there were additional difficulties resulting from the fact that foreign 
exchange was received initially by the government. However, Frank, Kim, 
and Westphal, (p. 29), comment thus: "The large inflow of U.S. grant aid, 
United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) assistance, and 
government receipts of foreign exchange from United Nations Command 
(UNC) sources created difficulties n allocating foreign exchange to various 
industrial sectors that lasted for some time after the war." Kwang Suk 
Kim, in correspondence, has suggested that U.S. fiscal year requirements 
and regulations surrounding the use of aid funds were the chief source of 
difficulty. 
8. Sources are: Wontack Hong, "Trade, Distortions and Employmer.t" 
Table B.24 for customs duties; IMF, International Financial Statistics, 
May 1976, for won value of imports. 
9. Frank, Kim, and Westphal, pp. 29-34. 
10. Ibid., p. 34. 
11. There were also a few exceptions wherein commodities were imported 
at less than the official rate. Such was the case with fertilizer which, until 
February 1956, was 25 w~n per dollar, although parity had earlier altered 
to 50 w~n per dollar. See IMF, Annua! Report on Exchange Restrictions, 
1956, p. 216. 
12. See pp. 165-166 for an estimate of the order of magnitude of pre­
miums. 
13. IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1956, pp. 219-220. 
14. IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1961, p. 228. 
15. Frank, Kim, and Westphal, p. 234. 
16. U.N., Yearbook of InternationalTrade Statistics, 1955, 1956, and 
1957, Korea Tables, Table 3, pp. 457, 357, and 357 respectively. 
17. The food and beverages, and textile sectors' exports increased 
sharply after 1957 and 1958 respectively. However, textile exports in 
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1959 were still below the level of any year between 1953 and 1957. 
18. The data in Table 13 were derived from a 43-sector classification. 
Aggregation to the level given in Table 13 was done primarily to avoid 
having entire rows of zeros. Reproduction of the entire 43-sector classi­
fic tion would only reinforce the impression of erratic behavior on the part 
of individual exports. 
19. Frank, Kim, and Westphal, p. 92. 
20. Ibid., pp. 96-97. 
21. In part, this may reflect the fact that some supplies of consumer 
goods were imported by the military and not included in commercial 
imports. Supplies diverted from the PXs may also have increased domestic 
availability. Both these factors would imply , downward bias in Suk Tai 
Suh's estimate of the ratio of imports to domLstic consumption. 
22. Kwang Suk Kim, "Outward-Looking Industrialization Stnaregy: The 
Case of Korea," in Hong and Krueger, Trade and Development, p. 20. 
23. Suk Tai Suh, Import Substitution, Tables 5-3-1, 5-3-2, and 5­
3-3. 
24. Primary industry has a higher value-added content than manufactur­
ing, so that these figures probably overstate the increase in the relative 
importance of manufacturing. 
25. The Korean statistics provide a breakdown of imports into "com­
mercial," "ojfficial aid," "foreign loans," and "other." On the basis of 
those data, aid imports were 55, 61, 68, 83, and 85% of total imports for 
the years 1953 to 1957. 
26. There are also problems, as demonstrated in Suk Tai Suh's appendix, 
with the appropriate measure of aid. There are fiscal year and calendar 
figures, each on an obligation basis, a disbursement basis, and a delivery 
basis. Differences in timing can affect the yearly totals, sometimes by 
substantial magnitudes. 
27. See pp. 74-75 for a discussion of the use of counterpart funds. 
28. Data for 1953 are not available. 
29. The source for this statement is data provided by Suk Tai Suh, 
Import Substitution. The sector for which commodity project support 
was greatest was Public Utilities, which received more than two-thirds of 
the total in all years except 1954. The Fertilizer sector was the largest 
receipient of project supporting assistance for plant. 
30. Data are from ibid., Table 5-2. 
31. Ibid. 
32. It will be recalled that percentages do not add to 100 due to the 
"unclassfiable" category. Tie source is the same as Table 20. 
33. Moreover, the fact that data on EERs are unreliable makes the entire 
effort suspect. For even in cases where the commodity is homogeneous, 
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a comparison of the ratio of the domestic price to the imported price at 
the official exchange rate tells little. 
34. See also Chapter 5, where the results of an effort to estimate via 
simulation are reported. 
35. When "freed resources" are then allocated to another purpose, there 
is a resource allocation effect. In that instance, the effect of the imports is 
not generally deflationary. When the counterpart funds are accumulated 
rather than spent, the effect is deflationary. Difficulties arise when counter­
part f'ands are accumulated and then spent at a later date: in the first 
period, Lhe effect of .he imports is deflationary; when counterpart funds 
are then spent, the offsetting resources are already absorbed, and the effect 
is not dissimilar to that from printing money. 
36. Data are from Cole and Lyman, p. 174. Borrowing constituted the 
remaining 13% of government receipts. Government expenditures exceeded 
government revenues by 50%, with much of the excess financed by U.S. 
military assistance. 
37. For a descripcion of the plan, see Lewis, Chapter IV. 
38. Ibid., pp. 35-36. 
39. Koh, p. 13. 
40. Cole and Lyman, pp. 164-165. 
41. Ibid., pp. 167-168. 
42. Ibid., p. 129. See Chapter 6 for further discussion. 
43. Ibid., p. 165. 
THREE The Transition to ait Export-OrientedEconomy 
1. See Tables 9 and 10. As discussed in Chapter 2, as of 1960 the 
premium-exclusive EER for exports was above that for imports, although 
there is every reason to believe that the system was still biased toward 
import substitution. 
2. Kwang Suk Kim, pp. 25-26, in Hong and Krueger, Trade and 
Development. 
3. Insofar as quantitative controls still lefc sizable premiums on licenses 
for some import commodities, a variable exchange tax was levied in June 
1961 to absorb the premiums. See discussion under quantitative restric­
tions below. 
4. The data in Table 22 reflect annual averages of exchanges rates and 
are not end-of-year figures. 
5. In fact, some vestiges of multiple rates continued, as exchange 
certificates were sold in the curb market. However, the relative importance 
of the secondary rates was markedly reduced. 
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6. The link system was reinstituted in 1963, resulting in a return to 
multiple exchange rates. 
7. To try to absorb the implicit value of restrictions, a monthly 
survey of prices was taken and commodities were reclassified, depending 
on the results. On the basis of the 1964 results, the number of items was 
increased to 2,700. See Frank, Kim, and Westphal, p. 49. 
8. However, the fact is that even in this case the tariff exemption 
covered more than the intermediate goods necessary for production of 
exportables. The exporters were therefore able to profit by this means 
when they sold on the domestic market. 
9. Some "incentives" to export were of a different form. Firms failing 
to meet their expected performance in exporting experienced a number of 
difficulties in other dealings with the government. The value of the 
the intangible "government approval" incentive was, and continues to be, 
considerable. 
10. Although no breakdown is available of the relative importance of 
private and public enterprises as a source of exports, there is every indica­
tion that t'ie public enterprises' share of exports, even when adjusted for 
the sectoral composition of output, was far less than their share of output. 
See Leroy Jones, Public Enterprisesand Economic Development: The Case 
of Korea (Seoul, 1975), pp. 114 ff. 
11. See Chapter 5 for a further discussion of the effects of the wastage 
allowance provisions. 
12. Frank, Kim, and Westphal, p. 46. 
13. While it is impossible to provide any quantitative estimate of the 
significance of targets, they surely played a considerable role. At the time 
the modernization study was under way, targets for exports during the 
period 1976--1981 were being debated. It was generally thought that MCI 
officials wanted relatively low targets since higher targets would entail 
"more work" for them. 
14. See Frank, Kim, and Westphal, Table 5-8. 
15. Data are from Wontack Hong, "Statistical Appendix," p. C.39, where 
the percentage distribution o- commodity exports by destination is given. 
These percentages were then multiplied by the export totals gi 'en in Table 
13 and Table 25 to estimate total exports to Japan. 
16. Contrasted with most other countries, Korea was able to adjust 
remarkably well to the oil price increase and worldwide recession of the 
mid-1970s, as will be seen in Chapter 4. By that time, Korea was already 
well established in international markets, but her success in adjusting to 
those events does show that Korean policies are adapted to international 
conditions and that success might have occurred even in less favorable 
world market conditions in the 1960s. 
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17. Crop failure and the consequent increase in food imports also con­
tributed to the increase in imports. 
18. Petroleum imports are not to be confused with imports of petroleum 
products. 
19. Suh, Import Substitution, Table 5-2. There are also a number of 
categories for which the import-domestic demand ratio rose. Most notable 
is transport equipment, for which the percentage of imports rose from a 
very low level in the late 1950s to 25% by 1965 and even higher propor­
tions in the late 1960s. The fraction of machinery and electrical equip­
ment imported also began rising after 1965, as did fabricated metal 
products and basic chemicals. 
20. Frank, Kim, and Westphal, p. 92. 
21. See Chapter 6. 
22. Franl:, Kim and Westphal, p. 105. 
23. Ibid., p. 104. 
24. Cole and Lyman, p. 90. 
25. Data are derived from Suk Tai Suh, Import Substitution, Tables 
11-6 and 11-7. 
26. See Kwang Suk Kim and Michael Roemer, Growth and Structural 
Transformation, Studies in the Modernization of the Republic of Korea: 
1945-1975 (Cambridge, Mass., 1979) for a full discussion of the financial 
and monetary reforms of 1964-1965. 
27. Even so, some distortions were introduced into the payments regime 
by virtue of a differential between the domestic a.d foreign interest rate. 
See Chapter 4. 
FOUR Emeroence as a Major Exporter, 1966 to 1975 
1. Kwang Suk Kim, "Outward Looking Industrialization Strategy," 
p. 21. 
2. Frank, Kim, and Westphal, Chapter 5. 
3. Data are from IMF InternationalFinancialStatistics, (May 1976). 
The export target in the Fourth Five-Year Plan was to achieve a 1% share 
of world trade 'by 1981. 
4. IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions,1970, p. 297. 
5. Ibid., 1971, p. 256, and 1972, p. 294. 
6. IMF, Ibid., 1973, p. 295. 
7. IMF, Ibid., 1975, p. 297. 
8. Another factor that may have been significant was the increasingly 
protectionist stance of the United States. In January 1972, the Korean and 
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American governments signed a five-year agreement, retroactive to 1971, 
under which Korea would limit the annual growth rf synthetic and woolen 
textile exports to 7.5% and 1%by volume respectively. 
9. See pp. 000-000 for an examination of the tariff structure. In 
addition to the tariff schedules, the government continued to have and 
to employ its power to administer variable tariffs to absorb the premiums 
on import licenses. 
10. The wastage allowance component of the exemption was extended 
to the rebate system. 
11. Cole and. Lyman, pp. 190-191. 
12. Larry E. Westphal and Kwang Suk Kim, "Industrial Policy and 
Development in Korea," (mimeo, 1974), p. 9. 
13. Thc tariff rates upon which import EERs were calculated are taken 
from actual tariff collections: if the legal rates had been used, the differential 
incentive in favor of exports would appear to be somewhat smaller. 
14. IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1968, p. 254. Frank, 
Kim, and Westphal (p. 58) give the following data in an attempt to com­
pare the situation before and after the shift: 
Number of Automatic Approval Sub-items: 
Before July 24, 1967 After July 25, 1967 
3,760 17,128 
15. IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1969, pp. 274-275. 
16. Ibid., pp. 274-275. 
17. Frank, Kim, and Westphal, pp. 56-57. The attempted tariff reform 
and the debt-servicing problem are discussed on pp. 140-141, 146-148. 
18. Their percentage was even higher in earlier years, reaching 38% in 
1973. 
19. Westphal and Kim, p. 4-4. 
20. See Frank, Kim, and Westphal, p. 82. 
21. Frank, Kim, and Westphal (pp. 82-83) provide some additional 
evidence thae ttds to confirm this view. 
22. A frequently heard assertion is that South Korean sales to Vietnam 
were an important explanation for South Korea's success in promoting 
exports. Sales staited in 1967 ($15 million) and reached a peak of S64 
million in 1971 -hardly a major part of the export boom. 
23. IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1972, p. 260. 
24. Data were taken from BOK, Economic Statistics Yearbook 1976, 
pp. 260-261.
 
25. In 1976, yet another 2ttempt to reform the tariff system was started. 
See Suk Tai Suh, "Revision of Tariff Rates and t" e Introduction of 
Flexible Tariff System" (KDI. mimeo, July 5, 1976) for more details. 
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26. Frank, Kim, and Westphal, p. 50. 
27. IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions,1974, p. 268. 
28. Hong, "Statistical Appendix," Table B-39. 
29. This authority was used in 1974 and 1975. Tariffs were raised on 
items competing with domestic production, and lowered on raw material 
imports. The latter was designed to offset part of the impact of shifting 
from customs exemption to a drawback system. See Suk Tai Suh, Import 
Substitution, for an itemization. 
30. See Chapter 5 for estimates of effective rates of protection and the 
resource allocation effects of tariffs. 
31. Development Loan Fund sources from AID were the main exception. 
32. The normalization of relations with Japan in 1965 also contributed 
to increased capital flows. Under the agreements, the Japanese were to 
provide $300 million -n credits to Korea. Of course, Japanese were also 
eligible to provide equity capital under the same conditions as other 
foreigners, but no amount was stipulated under the agreement. 
33. This naturally had implications fer resource allocation, which are 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
34. Data are from Frank, Kim, and Westphal, Table 7-5, p. 116. 
35. Parvez Hasan, Korea, Problems and Issues in a Rapidly Growing 
Economy (Baltimore, 1976), p. 251. 
36. Although there was discussion of debt-management problems in 
1970-1971 and 1974-1975, it would appear that concern was aroused by 
behavior of the current account and not by debt-service obligations them­
selves. 
37. As seen earlier, the opposite was true of r'rect investment, where 
Japanese investors accounted for 66% of al direct investment and 
American investors accounted for 27%. 
38. Frank, Kim, and Westphal, p. 106. This was in addition to the $300 
million in commercial credits mentioned earlier. 
39. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was a 
relatively unimportant lender until 1968. Even thereafter, its loans were 
moderate as a fraction of Korea's overall public indebtedness. As of Dec. 
31, 1974, public debt outstanding to the World Bank was $492 million, 
of which $224 million had been disbursed. This represented 8% of the 
total public debt and 5.5% of disbursed loans. See Hasan, p. 221. 
40. Hasan's data on public debt at the end of 1974 indicate that about 
half was owed to other governments and international institutions and 
half to private creditors. See pp. 220-221. 
240
 
Notes to ChapterFive, pp. 162-176 
FIVE The Allocative Efficiency of Trade and Aid 
1. It may be objected that the estimate of "domestic imports" is too 
low due to the use of the 0.5 coefficient. Exports were, in any event, 
sufficiently small, however, so that use of zero would not affect the order 
of magnitude of the estimate significantly. 
2. The choice of year is important, as the Korean economy was 
increasingly open as time progressed. Choice of an earlier year would 
suggest smaller premiums than the estimates based on 1970. Conversely, 
choice of a later year would raise the estimated premiums. 
3. Westphal and Kim, "Industrial Policy and Development" (pp. 3-59), 
estimate the import demand elasticity to be in the range between 1.1 and 
2.7 in absolute value. 
4. The relevant elasticities are those taking into account both demand 
and supply changes resulting from income growth. 
5. Large as these numbers are, they may not be unreasonable. Estimates 
for India and Turkey suggest similar orders of magnitude, and there is 
some basis for believing that the Korean exchange rate of the 1950s may 
have been even more overvalued than the Indian or Turkish rate. See 
Anne 0. Kru'zger. "Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," 
American Economic Review, 1974. 
6. See, for example, Cole and Lyman, pp. 156 ff. 
7. Obviously, with the rapid growth of GNP after 1961, the increased 
size of the domestic market would have provided an offset to the impact 
of increased competition from abroad. 
8. BOK, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1965, pp. 172-175. 
9. Even if output growth did resume, it may have originated from firms 
other than those established in the 1950s. 
10. There were also unfortunate consequences for macroeconomic policy, 
which are considered in Chapter 6. 
11. Efforts were repeatedly made to encourage use of domestically 
produced intermediate goods. For example, a "local LIC" system was 
established in 1965 under which producers of intermediate goods used for 
export were extended many of the same privileges as exporters. See Frank, 
Kim, and Westphal, p. 51. That imported inputs remained cheaper than 
domestic ones is evidenced by the fact that the wastage allowance was 
regarded as an export incentive. 
12. Borrowers typically were able to finance about 70% of their 
projects through these loans, and resorted to the curb market for the 
remainder. In general, curb-market rates exceeded 35%. Hong estimates 
that the average rate of return on capital was also well over 30%. 
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13. This happened because shoxt-term export credit loans were eligible 
for unlimited rediscount by the Bank of Korea. 
14. Wontack Hong, "Trade, Distortions and Employment," p. 129. 
15. See the discussion of Rhee and Westphal's results under export 
policy below. 
16. For a careful statement of the theory of effective protection, see 
W. M. Corden, The Theory of Protection (Oxford, 1971). 
17. To be sure, if the industry subject to higher effective protection also 
has a greater cost disadvantage, a higher ERP may not be associated with 
more resources being pulled into an industry. 
18. See Westphal and Kim, "Industrial Policy and Development," Appen­
dix Table 2. 
19. Wontack Hong, in correspondence, has suggested that the different 
labor coefficients in primary industries in the two sets of estimates are the 
result of different treatment of agriculture. The Westphal-Kim data are 
numbers of employed persons in agriculture, while the Hong data are in 
man-years c" labor. 
20. See the discussion of employment in Chapter 6. 
21. Westphal and Kim, "Industrial Policy and Development," pp. 4-5. 
22. Yung W. Rhee and Larry E. Westphal, "A Micro, Econometric 
Investigation of the Impact of Industrial Policy on Technology Choice," 
paper presented at the Econometric Society Meetings, Atlantic City, 
September 16-18, 1976. The article was published in the Journal of 
Development Studies, September 1977, bi:t the quotation cited here was 
omitted from the published version. Westphal has stared in correspondence, 
however, that the authors still agree with it. 
23. Ibid., p. 47, iii the mimeo version. 
24. See also the discussion of the macroeconomics of the labor market in 
Chapter 6. 
25. See Chapter 6 for estimates of the contribution of foreign loans to 
foreign saving, total saving, and economic growth. 
26. This is over and above the misallocation resulting from non-optimal 
industries or techniques. The distinction is that optimal foreign borrowing 
takes place when the real rate of return equals the interest rate. When the 
real return i3 below the real interest rate, as must have happened, there is a 
net loss from the country to foreigners as the real cost of borrowing 
exceeds the real return. if that happens domestically, the result is simply a 
transfer from one part of society to another. 
27. Frank, Kim, and Westphal, p. 116-117. 
242 
Notes to ChapterSix, pp. 205-214 
SIX MacroeconomicEffects of Trade and Aid 
1. Data on savings are available only in current prices. The w~n 
value of net transfers is therefore not indicative of the absolute level of the 
real resource flow. 
2. It should be recailed that, by 1970, most aid took the form of 
concessional leans, so that -net transfers" can no longer be identified 
solely with aid flows, and aid was not only in net transfers. A consistent 
framework for linking aid to net savings is not available except via net 
transfers. The problem is, in large part, the difficulty of converting dollar 
flows of aid into w~n equivalents. 
3. Cole and Lyman, p. 170. 
4. See fable 44 for estimates of the relative importance of aid in bor­
rowing in the latter part of the 196 0s. 
5. See Frai., Kim, and Westphal, pr: 107-(08. 
6. Another av'lue by ,vhich exports may have contributed is to the 
extent there were ec, iomies to Eca'e in individual manufacturing sectors. 
Since exporting permited greater scpie in some sectors, more economies of 
scale were exploitable. The only available estimate is that of Chong Nam. 
He estimated production fimct.ons and found that, for the 1966-1968 
period, about 18% of the growth in manufacturing output could be 
accounted for by economics to scale in individual manufacturing sectors. 
See his "Economie:: of Scale and Production Functions in South Korean 
Maaufacturing," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1975. 
7. In the belief that intangibles of export promotion may well be of 
great significance in determining growth pci formance, for other purposes I 
attempted to treat the tme series observations of the ten countries 
"ncluded in the National Buceau of Economic Research project on Foreign 
Trac'e Regimes and Economic Development together, in effect, "pooling 
time seriesI and cross vection." The :eparate rate of growth of each 
courtry's real GNP was estimated as a function of time, and then a com­
mon estim.tor was obtained for the effect of varying the rate of growth of 
export earnings. The results of thiose esti:nates, which are subject to 
numerous qualifications, implied dhat a 1% increase in the rate of export 
grow:h leads, on average, o more rapid GNP g,'owth by one-tenth of 1%. 
If that estimate is then used on Korea alone, it implies that her 40% 
average rate of growth of exports from 1960 to 1973 accounted for about 
4 percentage points of real GNP growth amnually. if that estimate is com­
bined with the rough calculaions of the contribution of foreign savings 
given above, the "guesstimate" would be that about 8 percentage points of 
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Notes to ChapterSix, p. 214-Appendix A, p. 225 
growth in the 1960s and early 1970s are accounted for by the trade and 
payments regime and capital flows. See Anne 0. Krueger, Foreign Trade 
Regimes and Economic Development: Liberalization Attempts and Con­
sequences, (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978). 
8. Westphal and Kim, "Industrial Policy and Development," p. 109. 
9. Of course, part of domestic demand expansion may have resulted 
from the multiplier effects of export growth. If, however, dcmand 
management would anyway have been satisfactory, one cannot attribute 
multiplier effects to export growth. I 
10. For full details, see Frank, Kim, and Westphl. Chapter 9. 
11. Ibid.. p. 184. 
12. Ibid., p. 220. 
13. Frank, Kim, and Westphal give i.verage real monthly earnings (at 
1970 prices) as 7,778 w5n in 1957, risir:g then to a peak of 8.902 w~n in 
1959. Thereafter, they fluctuated between 7,549 w 'n (in 1964) and 8,540 
w6n (in 1962), with no discernible trend until 1967. In that year, average 
earnings rose to 9,159 w6n. Thereafter, the growth of real wages was 
rapid, averaging 15% per year between 1967 and 1970. Foreign Trade 
Regimes, p. 222. 
14. Susumu Watanabe, "Exports and Employment: The Case of the 
Republic of Korea," International Labor Review, (I)ecember 1972), 
pp.495-526.
 
15. David C. Cole and Larry E. Westphal, "The Contribution of Exports 
to Employment in Korea," in Hong and Krueger, Trade and Development, 
pp. 89-102. 
16. For a comparison of the two vmthods, see ibid., pp. 96 ff. 
17. The breakdown of employment by industry, however, is quite 
different. 
APPENDIX A Definition of Exchan,.e Rate Terms 
1. These concepts were first used systematically in the National Bureau 
of Economic Research Project on Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic 
Development. See Krueger, Foreign Trade Regimes, for a fuller discussion. 
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